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ABSTRACT 
 
 This dissertation presents an examination of the pharmaceutical industry with a 
primary focus on the importance of intangible assets from the original institutional 
economics perspective. This is done in three main chapters. The first main chapter 
examines the importance of intangible assets within the context of the heterodox theory 
of the business enterprise. It is argued that in the early stage of the going concern – 
where production is separate from consumption – intangible assets necessitate the 
creation of monetary bargaining transactions. In industrial capitalism – with the 
internal separation of the enterprise into industrial and pecuniary divisions – intangible 
assets take the form of rationing transactions, limiting the number of sellers of a 
particular product. As the enterprise then evolves into its modern joint-stock form in 
money manager capitalism, intangible assets become the basis for capitalization, upon 
which incorporeal property may be issued, increasing the return to shareholders.  
 The second main chapter discusses the structure and performance of the 
pharmaceutical industry. Based on the concept of centralized private sector planning 
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and Alfred Chandler’s theory of learned organizational capabilities, I develop a core-
nexus understanding of pharmaceutical industry activity. The core is seen as made up 
of 15 firms who dictate the direction and evolution of the industry as a whole. I then 
examine the performance of this core using measurements of financial ratios. 
Measuring performance in this way is consistent with the stated motives of the business 
enterprise under money manager capitalism, which embodies the dominance of 
pecuniary habits of thought over industrial ones. 
 The third main chapter combines the first two, examining one specific member 
of the core – the Pfizer Corporation – and examines the importance of intangible assets 
on its activity. Over time, it is shown that Pfizer has become more reliant on intangible 
assets as an overall portion of total assets, its net tangible assets – the book value of the 
company – has become negative, and Pfizer relies more heavily on drugs obtained 
through acquisition, rather than internal development.  
 Money manager capitalism, as a regime of accumulation, rewards enterprises 
that take on an intangible characteristic. In the pharmaceutical industry, this is done 
with the aid of mergers and acquisitions due to accounting rules for intangible items 
such as goodwill and the division of labor between the core and nexus. Dominant 
pharmaceutical firms, then, should be seen as rent-collecting institutions, as opposed to 
productive entities.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 This dissertation extends the heterodox tradition, particularly the Veblenian 
institutionalist path, by examining the nature and role of intangible assets in the 
organization of the pharmaceutical industry. Based on insights from heterodox 
economics, the standard structure-conduct-performance model is modified to reflect 
enterprises as going concerns, whose management is primarily concerned with 
pecuniary returns to shareholders, which are considered separately from economic 
efficiency, as is claimed by neoclassical agency theories of industrial organization. Using 
the Pfizer Corporation as a case study and examining its merger and acquisition history, 
intangible assets are shown to be at the root of its conduct and performance, and the 
acquisition of such assets performs an important function in the structure of the 
pharmaceutical industry as a whole. Money manager capitalism, as a regime of 
accumulation, rewards enterprises that take on an intangible characteristic. In the 
pharmaceutical industry, this is done with the aid of mergers and acquisitions due to 
accounting rules for intangible items such as goodwill and the division of labor between 
the core and nexus. Dominant pharmaceutical firms, then, should be seen as rent-
collecting institutions, as opposed to productive entities.  
 Industrial organization deals with how production and distribution are 
organized, and in that sense covers all aspects of the provisioning process. An 
important feature of industrial organization and the provisioning system in a capitalist 
economy is private property rights. Property rights proscribe the ways in which 
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community members gain access to the provisioning system; those who own are able to 
withhold from those who do not. Property rights include not only rights over physical, 
tangible objects, but within also rights over intangible and immaterial things. Important 
sources of intangible property rights include patents, copyrights, franchises, and 
trademarks. These largely determine who may use certain ideas and produce certain 
products. In this sense, intangible property – and intangible assets as a whole – 
represent income streams for the owner not because of productivity, but because they 
grant control over different forms of social relations1.  
 Heterodox economics has focused on the significance of intangible assets within 
the system of social provisioning. Marx’s explanation of fictitious capital in Volume III of 
Capital can be – and in this dissertation, is – viewed as a result of intangible assets2 
(Marx 1894; Hilferding 1910). Veblen specifically focuses on the importance of 
intangible assets in influencing the behavior of enterprises, particularly once industrial 
activities have been separated from business activities (Veblen 1904, 1908a, 1908b). In 
the Post Keynesian tradition, the valuation of assets – both tangible and intangible – 
                                                        
1 While intangible property rights can be seen as emerging out of innovative activity, I 
would hesitate to claim that they cause such activity.  This topic will be revisited later in 
this chapter. 
 
2 Marx considers the capitalized value of the enterprise to be the sum of its productive 
capital, or capital in use, and what he calls “fictitious capital”, or the value of stocks and 
debts that the enterprise has issued. While these two values may be related, as Marx 
claims that the value of capital in use is related to the value of fictitious capital, the 
value of fictitious capital depends upon the expected earning capacity of the enterprise, 
which depends upon its assets. Intangible assets swell the value of the asset based used 
in capitalization, thus increasing the ability for the enterprise to issue fictitious capital 
(Marx 1894). 
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under a monetary and credit economy are seen as a source of instability. When assets 
are re-valued at lower or higher rates, the ability of the company to meet its 
outstanding obligations is changed, creating variously panic, economic downturn, 
speculation, and increased expectations of future returns (Keynes 1936; Minsky 1975, 
1986; Wray 2007, 2009). I endeavor to add to this tradition by specifically examining 
the way in which intangible assets are used to gain a differential advantage within the 
pharmaceutical industry and specifically to the role of mergers and acquisitions in this 
process. 
The Pharmaceutical Industry 
 Life expectancy in the United States has increased over the course of the last 
half-century. In 1950, life expectancy at birth was 65.6 years for men and 71.1 years for 
women. In 2011, those numbers had increased to 76.3 years for men and 81.1 years for 
women, with death rates from cardiovascular disease, cancer, and HIV/AIDS in decline 
(Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 2013a). Several factors are 
associated with this change, but one important factor has been access to 
pharmaceutical products. Lichtenberg (2007) found that the launch of new medicines 
accounted for nearly 40% of the increases in life expectancy during the 1980s and 
1990s. Hence, in the modern era, the ability to provide for the growth and maintenance 
of the community is mitigated by its access to pharmaceuticals. Understanding the 
environment within which pharmaceutical products are invented, developed, 
manufactured, and distributed is important in understanding the continuation of the 
life process. 
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 In this section, I review research regarding two areas that influence the way in 
which industry activity is undertaken. First is a brief summary of the benefits and costs 
of patents, as well as a review of the literature surrounding this topic. While this is not 
the primary focus of this dissertation, it is useful because such issues are inseparable 
from the issues surrounding the pharmaceutical industry. Second is a review of the role 
that mergers and acquisitions have played in shaping the industry. Of interest here is 
the network-type of relationships between large pharmaceutical firms and the smaller 
firms that compose the supporting nexus. 
Pharmaceutical Research and Patent Debates 
 Many of the questions regarding the pharmaceutical industry revolves around 
the nature of intellectual property rights. Patent defenders claim that for enterprises to 
take on the high costs of pharmaceutical research, there must be a way to recoup costs. 
Without property rights to protect the innovation, no firm will create new, beneficial 
pharmaceuticals. Patent opponents, on the other hand, claim that patent rights do not 
incentivize innovation, but promote rent-seeking behavior. Further, patents work to 
prevent innovation by prohibiting knowledge spillovers and increasing the cost of 
innovation through licensing fees once a patent has been issued. 
Costs of Pharmaceutical Research 
 Pharmaceutical research is costly to the enterprise3. However, there are 
disagreements as to how costly the research actually is. In 2006, the Congressional 
                                                        
3 For a more detailed description of what pharmaceutical research and the 
pharmaceutical approval process entails, see Appendix A. 
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Budget Office, based on research by DiMasi, Hansen, and Grabowski (2003) found the 
cost of developing a new drug to be approximately $800 million, with annual total 
spending on pharmaceutical research reaching $40 billion. Since then, these estimates 
have continued to increase. In 2007, DiMasi and Grabowski found that it cost $1.2 
billion over a 10 to 15 year period to develop and approve a new drug (see also Zhong 
2012). On the high end, industry reports claim the average cost of developing a new 
drug is $1.38 billion, with firms spending nearly $135 billion on R&D per year 
(International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & Associations 2012). More 
recently, the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development has estimated that new 
drugs cost $2.56 billion to take from discovery to marketing approval (2014). 
 Gagnon (2015) questions the accuracy of these estimates, while GlaxoSmithKline 
CEO, Andrew Witty, stated that the reasons costs were so high were due to failed 
candidates being included in the measurements (Hirschler 2013). Further, Light and 
Lexchin (2012), in breaking down the report of $1.2 billion, found a number of 
questionable methodologies. “Half that total comes from estimating how much profit 
would have been made if the money had been invested in an index fund of 
pharmaceutical companies that increased 11%, compounded over 15 years.” (p. 23) 
Further, they find that a quarter of the funds, or approximately $330 million, were paid 
for by tax credits and deductions, and that the only drugs that were considered were 
the most costly quintile, which were “3.44 times more costly than the average.” (p. 23) 
Another study by Morgan, Grootendorst, Lexchin, Cunningham, and Greyson (2011) 
found that cost estimates vary wildly, depending on a number of factors such as how 
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the data was collected – e.g., publicly available or privately through confidential surveys 
– and the types of treatments included. Their conclusion was that “no published 
estimate of the cost of developing a new drug can be considered a gold standard.” 
(Morgan et. Al 2011, p. 11) 
 The importance of patents can be seen as two-fold: the first question is whether 
or not such intellectual property rights over-compensate the company. High costs of 
drug development would require an ability to recover those costs, which would be 
impossible due to the ease of copying in the pharmaceutical industry (May 2007). 
Patent protection would offer the monopoly power necessary to prevent copying. The 
second question emphasizes the nature of the patent system – how do patents induce 
innovation; and is it successful in so doing? 
The Nature and Function of Patents in Innovation 
 Mazzoleni and Nelson (1998) describe four features of the patent system with 
regard to its role in incentivizing innovative activity: invention motivation, invention 
dissemination, commercialization, and broadening prospects. In this section, each of the 
four is examined. 
 The most common argument in favor of patents is invention motivation. Due to 
the costs and difficulty of inventing a new and useful product, the inventor requires a 
guaranteed monetary reward if they are successful. In this way the invention 
motivation theory states that patents are what drive individuals to create new things 
that may be of service to the community (Mazzoleni & Nelson 1998). The most common 
critique of this theory is that an inventor will receive a benefit through the first-mover 
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advantage by being the first to invent (Boldrin & Levine 2008, 2012). Rather than rely 
on patents to protect the invention, it is possible for the inventor to rely on trade 
secrecy 4 . This leads to the second defense of the patent system, invention 
dissemination. Patents, under this theory, provide an incentive for the inventor to make 
public the knowledge necessary for the creation of the product – information that 
would otherwise be kept secret. “In certain industries firms customarily engage in 
general cross licensing of process technology, a sharing of technology that likely would 
be much more difficult if patents were not available on process technology.” (Mazzoleni 
& Nelson 1998, p. 1039) Indeed, in the pharmaceutical industry, licensing of patents 
and products play an important part of drug development. Baumol (2002) and Chisum 
et al. (2004) show another benefit to patents based on the information dissemination 
theory. According to this research patents do not cover a very wide breadth of 
information, and thus there is room to invent around the patent. This leads to what 
Lichtenberg and Philipson (2002) call “between-patent competition” (p. 643). 
Disseminating information contained in a patent leads other firms to create products 
that are imperfect substitutes. In the pharmaceutical industry, this may have important 
benefits as different patients with the same disease may require different treatments. 
The information dissemination function of a patent helps these different treatments to 
be produced. 
 The third theory discussed by Mazzoleni & Nelson (1998) reflects the idea that 
while invention is the creation of knowledge, it is not until that knowledge is 
                                                        
4 Trade secrecy is difficult for pharmaceutical and chemical companies, due to advances 
in technology in those fields, as pointed out by May (200 
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transformed into a commercial product that it can generate welfare. This theory, 
supported by Teece (1981, 1989), Baumol (1990, 2002), Chisum et al. (2004), and 
Swann (2009) posits that invention is only a part of the product development process. 
There are costs involved with developing a raw invention to the point where it may be 
released as a product; patents do not induce only invention, but more importantly, 
innovation – the commercialization of new knowledge. Protection through marketing 
exclusivity in this theory is deemed necessary to incentivize enterprises to undergo the 
costly development process required to bring a product to market5. This theory was the 
basis for the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980; an Act that allowed research conducted with public 
funds – i.e., research done at little cost to the private enterprise – to be patented. 
Chisum et al. (2004) claim that prior to the Bayh-Dole Act, much biological research 
conducted at universities using government grants were not being commercialized. It 
was only after the act that such discoveries were developed into biopharmaceutical 
products, helping to create the biotechnology industry. 
 The fourth theory discussed by Mazzoleni & Nelson addresses the idea that 
patents allow for the exploration of different possibilities once invention occurs; this is 
known as prospect theory (Kitch 1977). The base for this theory is knowledge 
spillovers. “The prospect theory views an initial discovery or invention as opening up a 
whole range of follow-on developments or inventions.” (Mazzoleni & Nelson 1998, p. 
                                                        
5 In the pharmaceutical industry, this would include the cost of clinical trials and FDA 
approval. We can see a relationship, then, between the invention dissemination and the 
commercialization theories of patents. The high costs of product development may lead 
to smaller companies partnering with larger companies through licensing agreements, 
while larger companies are only willing to finance late-stage, more expensive clinical 
trials because of the marketing exclusivity. 
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1042) Patents allow the enterprise to explore different paths of research using the 
invention by reducing the transaction costs required to investigate these different 
prospects. Kitch (1977) points out that patents have several functions, including 
signaling to others what information is already available, thus reducing the cost of 
maintaining control over the knowledge generated. Further, a patent signals to other 
firms the seriousness of the holder in creating the product, making it easier to find 
development partners willing to provide finance (Lacetera 2001; Levitas & McFayden 
2009). 
 Based on this research, patents can be seen as having an important effect in the 
pharmaceutical industry by 1) incentivizing companies to take newly discovered 
compounds and continue to develop them to the point where they become socially 
beneficial drugs and 2) by creating economies of scale through a division of labor 
between the core of the industry focused on late-stage development and marketing and 
a supporting nexus that focuses on discovery and early development (Arora, 
Gambardella, & Rullani 1997). Further, if the purpose of a patent is to ensure that the 
enterprise will remain viable, despite high R&D costs, they are also successful, as 
Gagnon (2009, 2015) has demonstrated, in regards to rising prices for pharmaceutical 
products. 
 The issue at the center of the patent debate is whether or not patents – based on 
the theories above – over-compensate the holder and whether they are actually 
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innovation inducing. If innovation is seen as a cumulative process6, then it is possible 
that patents reduce the amount of innovation in an economy by preventing such 
processes from taking place. Denicolò (2007) found that within the context of 
sequential innovation – each innovation being based on prior innovations – strong 
patent protection leads to reductions in firms’ incentives to share information. This 
research supports earlier results found by Helpman (1993), which showed that with 
tighter intellectual property rights, the long-run rate of innovation actually declines: 
while innovative behavior increases initially, it subsequently falls once patents have 
been established. This supports the idea that patents prevent the cumulative processes 
necessary for innovation to occur. 
 The idea of patents decreasing innovation by preventing cumulative knowledge 
creation is tied to what Heller and Eisenberg (1998) call the “tragedy of the 
anticommons.” (p. 698) Patents, rather than incentivizing innovation, function to create 
tollbooths to innovative behavior. An innovator must pull knowledge from many 
different fields in order to create; for innovation to be successful, knowledge from one 
field must be able to spillover into other fields. However, if an innovator must pay a 
licensing fee to enter each field and gain access to that knowledge, it increases the cost 
of innovating. This explains Helpman’s result that stronger intellectual property rights 
lead to short-term increases in innovation, but long-term decreases. Prior to the 
erection of patent “tollbooths”, innovation increases as firms and inventors try to be the 
first to obtain the patent. Once property rights have been allocated, however, future 
                                                        
6 As is the case with many heterodox theories of innovation, such as those promoted by 
Veblen (1908a, 1908b), Ayres (1944), Foster (1981b), and Alperovtiz and Daly (2008). 
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innovators may be unable to obtain the licenses necessary for the patented knowledge; 
they are unable to pay the toll. From a Schumpeterian standpoint, intellectual property 
rights prevent the creative destruction process from occurring because they prevent or 
forestall the entrants necessary for the destruction of entrenched monopolies 
(Schumpeter 1942). 
 The Swedish Growth School, based on the tragedy of the anticommons and 
Schumpeter’s theory of creative destruction, developed a theory of entrepreneurship 
based on knowledge spillovers (Acs et al. 2004; Acs & Sanders 2008; Acs et al. 2009). In 
this theory, the entrepreneur is an individual acting as the central node in a network 
that is able to pull from different fields when developing new products. The knowledge 
spillover function of innovation – the concept that the creation of knowledge in one 
fields leads to further knowledge creation in other fields – is vital for entrepreneurship 
as this is how the entrepreneur obtains the necessary tools to create. This network is 
consolidated into what are called “technological innovation systems”, which represent a 
set of interrelated networks linked through the diffusion of knowledge. The end result 
of such a system is an increase in opportunities for product creation, the reduction of 
uncertainty through knowledge dissemination, and the continual course of cumulative 
innovation. When taken together, the Swedish Growth School sees knowledge spillovers 
as the primary cause of endogenous growth and social wellbeing (Carlsson & 
Stankiewicz 1991; Carlsson & Eliasson 2003; Hekkert et al. 2007; Bergek et al. 2008).  
 In order for an innovation system to form, entry barriers must be low or non-
existent, or else they prevent the knowledge spillover process. Acs and Audretsch 
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(1987) found that, once barriers to entry are taken into account, network effects are 
generated that give large, entrenched firms the ability to exploit gains from innovation; 
rather than seeing their market shares erode, larger firms find themselves in a stronger 
position when innovative activity occurs. Findings by Arora, Gambardella, and Rullani 
(1997) and Orsenigo, Pammolli, and Riccaboni (2001) support the concept that 
innovation in industries with high barriers to entry end up favoring dominant firms. 
Arora, Gambardella, and Rullani found that patents, when held by dominant firms, 
helped maintain existing market shares in the face of new entrants; when held by 
smaller firms, they induced licensing agreements between the smaller and larger firms 
for the purpose of avoiding costly litigation. Additionally, Orsengo, Pammolli, and 
Riccaboni found that in the pharmaceutical industry, new entrants caused the network 
of firms to become broader, but centrality measures for dominant firms to become 
stronger. In other words, new entrants caused the industry to expand, but 
strengthened, rather than diminished, the position of dominant firms. 
 The implication is that, rather than promote innovation, patents function to 
maintain the pre-existing industrial relations by generating rent payments. The patent 
holder receives an income stream, not necessarily because they are productive, but due 
to the differential advantage bestowed by this type of ownership. Access to the market, 
then, is dictated by the patent holder who may choose whether or not to license the 
knowledge to other producers. This is the main argument made by Boldrin and Levine 
(2012), who support the finding that in mature industries, patents function to reduce 
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innovation. In fact, they find that patents actually inhibit innovation by increasing the 
amount of rent extraction: 
Being not a ‘property’ right but rather a ‘monopoly’ right, 
patent processors will automatically leverage whatever 
initial rents their monopoly provides them with in order to 
increase their monopoly power until all potential rents are 
extracted and, probably dissipated by the associated 
lobbying and transaction costs. (p. 11) 
 
Patents, then, are important to dominant firms because they generate rent payments. In 
this way, once an industry has become organized with a dominant core in place, patents 
no longer serve their purpose as innovation inducers, but rather function to generate 
rent payments through monopoly rights7. 
 When examining the pharmaceutical industry it is important to recognize the 
ways in which patents – and intangible assets in general – help shape the industry and 
the relations between enterprises in the industry. One effect is a division of labor 
between enterprises that conduct early stage research and discovery and those that 
license patents from these nexus companies for the purpose of development and 
distribution. In the examination of the Pfizer Corporation’s merger and acquisition 
history in Chapter 4, this division of labor is seen clearly in the types of companies 
Pfizer has acquired or engaged with in strategic alliances. Understanding mergers, 
acquisitions, and strategic alliances, therefore, is an important feature in understanding 
                                                        
7 While not discussed here, another important result of patents is the creation of 
“patent trolls”, or companies that acquire patents for the purpose of engaging in 
litigation. These companies have no interest in production and simply earn an income 
through settlements or licensing agreements with producing enterprises; this is the 
most extreme version of rent extraction due to the patent privilege. For more on this 
topic, see Choi (2003), Chein (2008, 2012), and Dean (2013).  
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the effect that patents and other intangible assets have on industrial conduct and 
performance. Though this topic will be investigated in more detail in Chapter 4, a brief 
introduction to the literature with a focus on the pharmaceutical industry is given here. 
Mergers and Acquisitions: The Changing Pharmaceutical Industry 
 Chandler (2005) and Gagnon (2009) argue that the supply side of the 
pharmaceutical industry depends upon relationships between the industry core and the 
supporting nexus. Legislation in the early 1980s affecting patent rights and marketing 
exclusivity – particularly the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980, the Orphan Drug Act in 1983, and 
the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984 – further strengthened the idea that interactions 
between the core and nexus were necessary for the discovery, development, and 
marketing of pharmaceuticals. 
 Cockburn (2004) showed that pharmaceutical research in the 1980s was 
dictated by downstream concerns – the larger, core pharmaceutical companies. He finds 
that, as market values drove out academic values 8 , there began to be more 
communication between upstream and downstream enterprises. Biotechnology 
companies – which themselves had spun out of university research departments – 
developed technologies that could be used for early screening and discovery, which 
were then licensed to larger pharmaceutical companies. First movers in the 
biotechnologies used these funds to develop their own compounds, which then led to 
                                                        
8 Cockburn notes: “Historically, academic research has been driven by social norms and 
resource allocation procedures that ignored market signals and commercial concerns.” 
(2004, p. 20) Key changes to the legal structure during the early 1980s were made to 
induce the commercialization of research being done by academics, leading to the 
creation of the biotechnology sector (Chandler 2005; Gagnon 2009). 
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another form of interaction – biotechnology companies joining with larger 
pharmaceutical companies to get the product through FDA approval and take 
advantage of the manufacturing capabilities, sales network, and marketing ability of 
large companies (Chandler 2005). The modern process of pharmaceutical product 
development – and the industry itself – is built on the relationships between the 
industry core and the supporting nexus. 
 Danzon, Nicholson, and Pereira (2003) examined these relationships and found 
that products developed using an alliance between small and large companies were 
more likely to succeed than products developed by one company. “The [small] firms 
often develop drug leads9 and then out-license these leads to large pharmaceutical 
firms, who then take the drug candidates through lead optimization, development and 
clinical trials, and ultimately regulatory approval.” (p. 5) These technologies and 
compounds are protected by patents, but the small firms do not have the capabilities to 
bring them to market10; they require assistance from large firms for development. 
Further, they, like DiMasi (2001) and Arora, Gambardella, Pommolli, and Riccaboni 
(2000), found that “large firms have higher success rates on compounds that they in-
license than on compounds that they originate in-house.” (Danzon, Nicholson, & Pereira 
2003, p. 5) In other words, not only are such alliances helpful for biotech companies as 
                                                        
9 A drug lead is a new compound that may eventually be developed into a 
commercialized pharmaceutical product. 
 
10 While they may have the ability to discover a product, and in some cases, the ability 
to get the drug through approval, such firms do not have the capabilities to 
manufacture, market, and distribute the product globally. For this reason, they partner 
with the larger firms. This will be revisited in Chapter 3. 
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a source of funding, they are also helpful to large companies that obtain the marketing 
rights to products with a higher probability of being approved. 
 Following this research, Danzon, Epstein, and Nicholson (2004) attempt to 
explain why this division of labor works for small and large pharmaceutical companies. 
They find that small firms benefit from the experience of larger firms when it comes to 
late stage clinical trials and dealing with FDA requests during the approval process. 
Large firms, on the other hand, benefit from dealing with small firms because it gives 
them a way to fill gaps in their product pipeline. Evidence for this excess capacity 
hypothesis was also provided by Ravenscraft and Long (2000), who focused on the 
merger between Glaxo and Wellcome, showing that the key factor in this merger was 
the ability for Glaxo to replenish its pipeline. However, Danzon, Epstein, and Nicholson 
(2004) also found that while a merger might provide benefits in the short period, it 
does not provide a long-term solution to supply line problems. 
 Previous research in the pharmaceutical industry has shown that mergers and 
acquisitions are sought with an eye towards short-term effects, rather than long-term. 
From the standpoint of product development this is clear if mergers are a way for the 
company to refill its product line. The long-term effect of acquiring an enterprise for the 
purpose of obtaining rights to a particular product are negligible, as the product will 
eventually go off-patent and compete with generic entrants.  Further, from the 
perspective of maximizing shareholder value, mergers and acquisitions are a way of 
increasing stock values in the short run, satisfying the needs of absentee owners 
without focusing on long run productivity. Black (2000) and Alexandridis, Mavrovitis, 
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and Travlos (2012), focusing on the fifth and sixth merger waves, found that the 
primary goal for enterprises that enter into merger agreements was increasing market 
capitalization. This topic will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
Methodology 
 The above review depicts this industry in which the ability for an enterprise to 
be a going concern depends upon the ability for it to obtain patent and marketing rights 
to pharmaceutical products. From a heterodox perspective, this reflects the separation 
of industry and business – the ability to engage in profitable transactions with the aid of 
a differential advantage such as monopoly rights garnered from intangible property. 
This separation, and the importance of patent rights in this separation, generates a 
particularly industry structure and conduct in which a core group of enterprises may 
dictate the course of action for the industry as a whole. Further, the conduct of 
enterprises in this industry, because of the core-nexus structure, revolves around 
upstream and downstream deliveries of research and monopoly rights through 
mergers, acquisitions, and licensing agreements. This section describes the approach 
taken in this dissertation to understand the nature of intangible assets within the 
pharmaceutical industry 
Institutional Foundations of Industrial Organization 
 The institutionalist perspective is concerned primarily with the nature of social 
relationships – both the presence and absence – that transform inputs to outputs 
(Tauheed 2013b). These relationships both determine the structure of and are 
determined by the institutional setting within which they take place. In this sense, there 
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is a feedback between institutional relations and institutional constraints that causes 
social evolution to be a never-ending process; so long as there are agents within a social 
system interacting, the system will alter in response to their actions and in turn, change 
the way in which they act (Foster 1981a; Bush 1987; Tool 2001). From this standpoint, 
an institution can be seen in one of three ways. From the Veblenian perspective, an 
institution represents “settled habits of thought common to the generality of men… [by 
which] men order their lives.” (1909, p. 626) The second part of this definition states 
that an institution is engrained within a given social structure that determines the 
nature of relationships between the members of a community. The first part reflects the 
emergent characteristic of institutions; they are created through historical process by 
the ongoing relationships of those within the social setting. 
 From the Commons perspective, institutions represent “collective action in 
control, liberation, and expansion of individual action.” (1934, p. 648) The notion of 
collective action refers to the rules and regulations that emerge out of interactions and 
transactions between members of a community. In turn, these rules function to define 
an action space within which members of the community can engage. Further, the idea 
that such collective action not only controls, but also liberates and expands individual 
action implies that the main purpose of an institution is to create a space within which 
community members can have some sense of certainty with regards to how their 
actions, interactions, and transactions will be conducted. For example, in a capitalist 
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economy, the institutions of private property and free contracting seek to ensure that 
individuals are able to engage in trade without fear of coercion or being cheated11. 
 John Fagg Foster defines an institution as “prescribed patterns of correlated 
human behavior.” (1981e, p. 940) The concept of “prescribed patterns” refers to a value 
structure that governs the behavior of individuals within a community. The “correlated 
human behavior”, then, refers to the way in which people interact, given the value 
structure of the institution. Hayden (1982) and Bush (1983) expand upon both parts of 
this definition, showing that there exists a feedback between the interactions of 
individuals, the development of new technologies, and the value structure of an 
institution, culminating in a process of institutional adjustment that leads to continual 
changes in prescribed value structure (Foster 1981c; Bush 1987; Tool 2000, 2001). 
 Tauheed (2013a, 2013b), from a critical institutionalist perspective reconciles 
these three views of institutions by showing them to be the same definition, but 
operating at different levels of analysis. As Neale (1987, p. 1182, emphasis in original) 
states: 
An institution is defined by three characteristics. First, there 
are a number of people doing. Second, there are rules giving 
the activities repetition, stability, predictable order. Third, 
there are folkviews – most certainly what Walton Hamilton 
meant by a “bundle of intellectual usages” – explaining or 
justifying the activities and rules. 
 
From this perspective, the “people doing” represents Foster’s prescribed patterns of 
correlated behavior. They represent people acting in accordance with a particular value 
structure. This value structure, then, is derived through Commons’ collective action, 
                                                        
11 In an ideal exchange situation. 
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which represents the rules and norms regulating the individuals’ actions, interactions, 
and transactions. Lastly, “by ‘habits of thought’ Veblen did not mean behaviors, but 
propensities and predispositions to engage in certain behaviors.” (Tauheed 2013a, p. 
154; see also Hodgson 2004) These propensities, then, are the social norms out of 
which collective action is developed – what Neale refers to as “folkviews”. Over time, as 
the way in which community members act, interact, and transact changes due to, e.g., a 
technological development, the social norms will change as well. 
 The institutional structure influences the agency of the individual, while the 
individuals’ agency simultaneously influences the structure of the institution. Veblen 
identifies two sets of instincts at the core of individual action, out of which an 
institutional structure develops. On the one hand, individuals possess an instinct of 
workmanship, which represents the desire to create and solve problems through the 
process of scientific inquiry, allowing for the continuation of the communal life process. 
These instincts give rise to an industrial or instrumental habit of thought, by which the 
focus is on the promotion of the productive use of resources and incorporating 
technological change that promotes the continuity of social life (Veblen 1914). On the 
other hand, individuals are also motivated by an instinct of predation, which represents 
the desire to differentiate oneself from others based on status, wealth, and power. This 
instinct gives rise to a ceremonial habit of thought and results in actions based on 
moneymaking and wasteful spending that may threaten the community as a viable 
concern (Veblen 1899b). Based on these two instincts, Veblen develops a dichotomy 
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between industrial and business activities, reflecting the instinct of workmanship and 
the instinct of predation, respectively (Waller 1982). 
 Dean (2013), based on this dichotomy, develops a theory of the business 
enterprise from a heterodox perspective. He states “heterodox theory would recognize 
the business enterprise as a point of agency, capable of instrumental, or useful, behavior 
as well as ceremonial or wasteful, behavior.” (p. 19) From this standpoint, the focus of 
industrial organization is on the effect that the feedback loops between industry 
structure and enterprise conduct have on performance from the standpoint of the 
industrial-business dichotomy. This requires an alteration to the standard structure-
conduct-performance framework or model. 
The Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm 
 One of the main traditional methods of industrial organization has been the 
structure-conduct-performance model (SCP). In this model, structure refers to the 
environment within which business act, typically defined as the nature of competition, 
the number of buyers and sellers, the degree of product differentiation, barriers to 
entry, and cost structures. Conduct refers to the actions of individual enterprises from a 
managerial decision standpoint, focused usually on pricing strategy, product 
development decisions, and research and development choices, sometimes through a 
form of game theoretical model. Finally, performance refers primarily to the productive 
and allocative efficiency of the enterprise and the industry as a whole. The key feature 
to an SCP model is the feedback among the three features while basic market conditions 
– the nature of supply and demand – are treated as external to the industry, focusing on 
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a competitive static methodology rather than a dynamic one (Modigliani 1958; Sylos-
Labinin 1969; Chandler 1962, 1977; Greer 1992; Mansfield 2000; Church & Ware 2000; 
Waldman & Jensen 2013). The research strategy for the standard SCP model is to 
identify whether, given the existing market conditions, the industrial outcomes meet 
the standards of efficiency. If the industry is inefficient, policy can alter the industry 
structure by, e.g., breaking up monopolies or trusts, or it can alter industry conduct by 
influencing the payoff matrix enterprises face in their game. However, the goal of 
industrial organization research and industrial policy is to determine and produce 
efficient outcomes. 
 From a heterodox perspective, this is problematic for a number of reasons. First, 
viewing market conditions as exogenous ignores the ways in which enterprises work to 
formulate and manipulate those conditions. For example, advertising is designed to 
alter the structure of demand, meaning consumers are not completely sovereign in their 
decisions (Galbraith 1958). Advertising not only influences performance, but also 
influences a basic condition. Further, structure occurs within a given network of social 
relations. Rather than attempt to classify a market as competitive, noncompetitive, or 
workably competitive, market structure may be seen as emerging out of relationships 
between enterprises, similar to the way in which institutions emerge out of relations 
between individuals. Examining social relations in this way allows development of a 
more wholistic understanding of the environment within which enterprises act, 
interact, and transact. 
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 Moreover, conduct may be better understood through agency decisions of 
enterprises emerging out of the nature of the industry structure, rather than within a 
game theoretic concept. The relationship between structure and agency within industry 
may be seen as a feedback loop, where structure influences decision-making, which in 
turn influences structure, and so on. In game theoretic models, the payoff matrix 
ignores the emergent properties of enterprises and industrial conduct, meaning it 
imposes a particular structure on industrial relations (Connor 1998). When dealing 
with conduct variables such as pricing behavior, this implies that “In the end, one 
cannot be sure whether the observed gap [between prices and marginal costs] is a 
consequence of the imposed a priori structure, or stems from measurement of 
misspecification problems.” (Azzam & Anderson 1966, p. 44) From the standpoint of 
the going concern, games would be indefinitely lived and no form of equilibrium could 
be reached due to continual changes in the payoff matrix12. Examining industry conduct 
through a dynamic form of analysis using an historical approach grounds conduct in 
empirical reality and further emphasizes the relationships between enterprises that 
compose the industry structure (Granovetter 2005). 
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, industry performance cannot be limited 
to identifying efficiency or inefficiency. Performance includes the motives of the going 
concern and how well the going concern can meet these goals. From an institutionalist 
perspective, following Dean (2013), the performance of an industry is defined within 
                                                        
12 A better approach, discussed by Sen (1982), Weibull (1995), and Martins (2015), 
would be a form of evolutionary game theory in which enterprise conduct is seen as 
picking the social structure in which they will engage, rather than conduct options from 
a given structure.  
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the framework of the dichotomy – it can be measured based on instrumental and 
ceremonial means. Efficiency in production and allocation refers primarily to 
instrumental measures, emphasizing the ability for the enterprise to produce output 
and the way in which that output is distributed within the general community. 
However, from a business standpoint, the end goal for an enterprise as a going concern 
within a monetary production economy is the ability to generate earning capacity. 
Enterprise activity may be better understood by examining the means to achieve these 
ends, which, among other things, include ceremonial activities such as rent extraction 
through patents and intellectual property rights, stock price manipulation, and the 
maintenance of core-nexus relationships based on these property rights. If enterprise 
and industry performance are judged from the perspective of the going concern, then it 
becomes easier to understand, for example, mergers that do not provide for long term 
gain, or why enterprises needing quick cash flow sell productive capacity but maintain 
their monopoly rights over products (Chirstensen 2011; Denning 2011). 
 In this dissertation, the traditional use of the SCP model is modified to account 
for the issues raised above. Industry structure is examined form the standpoint of the 
relationship between the industry core and supporting nexus, while conduct 
emphasizes how these relationships are maintained through mergers and acquisitions. 
Performance is measured through the lens of shareholder return; as will be discussed 
further in the next chapter, the primary function of a business enterprise in the modern 
economy is to ensure a return to its absentee owners, regardless of whether such 
actions will harm the long term viability of the concern (Veblen 1923; Jo & Henry 2015). 
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Therefore, using measurements of interest to shareholders will reflect the ability for the 
enterprise to meet the standards of ceremonial adequacy set by its owners and other 
interested parties, which will allow the industry to remain viable with an economic 
framework that reinforces ceremonial business motives over instrumental industrial 
ones13. 
Outline and Conclusion 
 This dissertation is divided into three main chapters. In chapter two, I examine 
the evolution of the use of intangible assets in the provisioning system using Dean’s 
(2013) heterodox theory of the business enterprise in conjunction with Lazonick’s 
(2008) New Economy Business Model and Serfati’s (2009) theory of the transnational 
corporation. Of primary interest is how the use of intangible assets has changed 
through the degrees of separation. The findings from this chapter show that as the 
enterprise evolves, so too does the way in which intangible assets are used to generate 
earning capacity. Initially, they represent the ability for the enterprise to control the 
nature of the relationship between buyer and seller and the relationship between the 
community and its joint stock of knowledge. With the separation of business activities 
and industrial activities, intangible assets come to represent a form of rationing 
transaction, limiting the number of sellers of a particular product so as to generate an 
earning capacity through monopoly power. With the separation of ownership and 
                                                        
13 Differentiating between instrumental and ceremonial efficiency means that, unlike 
agency theories of industrial organization that see maximizing returns to shareholders 
as representing efficient use of resources (Lazonick & O’Sullvan 2000), I emphasize the 
ceremonial means used to achieve these ceremonially efficient outcomes and make no 
claims as to the instrumental efficiency of enterprise activity. 
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control, then, intangible assets function to increase earning capacity by increasing the 
capitalized value of the enterprise, which functions to increase the value of ownership; 
under money manager capitalism, this becomes the primary focus of management, 
whose interests have been brought in line with the absentee owners through, e.g., stock 
based compensation. They form a key part of the asset base for the enterprise out of 
which incorporeal property may be issued and distributed. Further, they aid the 
enterprise in obtaining external financing by acting as collateral and signaling 
mechanisms. Finally, through their function as property rights, they help the enterprise 
manage its subsidiaries by defining property rights along the value chain in terms of 
who has the right to develop, manufacture, and sell output. 
 In chapter three, a structural analysis of the pharmaceutical industry is 
developed. It focuses on the separation between the core of the industry, which is able 
to direct the course of industrial evolution, and the supporting nexus, which provides 
the activities necessary for the core to reproduce itself14. This chapter is grounded in 
previous work done by Alfred Chandler (2005) and Marc-Andre Gagnon (2009), 
emphasizing the importance of learned organizational capabilities – the technological, 
functional, and managerial abilities of an enterprise to develop, produce, and sell 
multiple products while maintaining itself as a going concern. The primary purpose is 
to update Gagnon’s (2009) description of the industry’s core based on more recent 
developments. I find similar results, with a few new enterprises that have managed ton 
                                                        
14 The core/nexus concept bears a relationship to be center/periphery concept 
described by Averitt (1968, 1987), but has some important differences more suitable to 
the pharmaceutical industry, in particular the importance of intangible assets. 
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entrench themselves as core enterprises and a few that have left the core via merger. 
On the whole, however, the dominance of the core remains unchanged, with the 15 
enterprises controlling 65% to 70% of industry activity. I then examine the 
performance of the core based on five different measurements, each related to the 
differing degrees of separation. Regardless of measurement, results show a similar 
pattern: during the 1990s, returns are relatively high, but fall in the early and mid-
2000s, with a valley around 2004. However, profits begin to rise again in the late 2000s 
and early 2010s, peaking in 2009. 
 Based on these results, chapter four analyzes the Pfizer Corporation to 
understand how a pattern like this may emerge. Based on the importance of mergers 
and acquisitions in acquiring intangible assets and maintaining a position in the core, I 
examine Pfizer’s merger, acquisition, and strategic alliance history from 1985 through 
2014. Results here show a shift in business strategy from 1990s to the 2000s and the 
2010s. Initially, Pfizer is focused on the discovery of new compounds, allying itself with 
nexus enterprises that emphasize screening technologies for pre-clinical testing. In the 
early and mid-2000s, Pfizer’s strategy shifts to the acquisition of companies with drugs 
in later stages of clinical testing. In the late 2000s, Pfizer’s strategy shifts yet again, with 
a focus on acquiring companies with products at the end of the approval process or 
already developed. During these later stages, Pfizer also began to sell tangible assets, 
reflecting both cost-cutting procedures and the outsourcing of manufacturing processes 
as described in the modular production network framework by Sturgeon (2002). I also 
find that in this later development that intangible assets makeup an increasingly 
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greater portion of Pfizer’s total asset base, with a substantial majority of its 2014 
revenue being generated by acquired drugs, rather than internally developed drugs. 
 The final chapter concludes this dissertation with a review of the results and 
paths for future research. Of interest are more research into the merger, acquisition, 
and strategic alliance activities of pharmaceutical enterprises to see if their strategies 
match that of Pfizer. Based on the research in this dissertation and the work done by 
Côte and Keating (2012) and Gagnon (2015), I am inclined to think it will, but further 
data is required. Another important path of research this dissertation opens is policy 
work, particularly with regards to the Orphan Drug Act and how it may be updated in 
response to changing technologies, such as pharmacogenics. 
 Pharmaceuticals are important in maintaining the community as a going concern 
by increasing the lifespan and life expectancy of its members. Consequently, the 
performance of the pharmaceutical industry is important to the ability to deliver 
products with life enhancing capabilities. However, as will be shown in this dissertation, 
the structure and conduct of the pharmaceutical industry has been organized and 
operated primarily to satisfy ceremonial motives, with performance – measured in 
terms of return to absentee owners – following suit. Intangible assets in the form of 
patent rights and goodwill have been the primary contributors in creating this 
institutional setting. Therefore, to understand the pharmaceutical industry as a whole, 
it is necessary to understand the nature of intangible assets within the provisioning 
system. To this I now turn.   
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CHAPTER 2 
INTANGIBLE ASSETS AND THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: UNDERSTANDING 
CORPORATE CONTROL OVER SOCIAL RELATIONS 
 
Introduction 
 Within a human economy, knowledge constitutes the productive core of 
economic activity. In the modern so called free enterprise system, this knowledge is 
appropriated by private individuals and companies in the form of capital, and it is from 
this appropriated knowledge that differential earnings are obtained (Veblen 1908a, 
1908b; Gagnon 2007, 2009; Nitzan & Bichler 2009). This chapter examines the 
importance of the business enterprise insofar as knowledge is appropriated, with an 
emphasis on the use of intangible assets as the means for knowledge appropriation. Of 
primary focus is the separation between the productive capacity and the earning 
capacity of the enterprise (Veblen 1904; Dean 2013). I develop this framework more 
fully so that it can be used to examine the activity of the Pfizer Corporation. As will be 
shown, intangible assets generally function as a way for the enterprise to generate 
earning capacity separate from productive capacity. In this chapter, I examine how 
intangible assets perform this function over the course of the evolution of the business 
enterprise. 
 This chapter is comprised of three sections. First, I examine the theoretical 
foundations of intangible assets within the concept of the knowledge-based economy. 
Gagnon (2009), in line with Ayres (1952) and Foster (1981b), argues that the driving 
force of economic growth is technological change. Following this argument leads to an 
examination of the relationship between technology and intangible assets. In the second 
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section, I synthesize Veblen and Commons with regards to their approach to intangible 
assets. While Veblen’s approach is grounded in the business-industry separation and 
Commons’ approach is rooted in law, both see intangible assets offering a differential 
advantage through the generation of pecuniary earnings above the industry average. 
The final section builds off this synthesis to examine the function of intangible assets in 
the modern economy. Informed by Hilferd (1910), Lazonick (2005, 2010a, 2010b), 
Serfatti (2008, 2009), and Jo and Henry (2015), I discuss how intangible assets come 
into their own as the basis for capitalization with the separation of ownership and 
control. 
Theoretical Foundations of Intangible Assets: The Joint Stock of Knowledge 
Knowledge is composed of what Veblen (1908a) refers to as the community’s 
joint stock of knowledge. This “information and proficiency in the ways and means of 
life” (p. 518) is created, possessed, and maintained by the community as a whole, and in 
this manner, forms the base for the provisioning system. As a social creation, the joint 
stock of knowledge encompasses both the relationship of members of society to the 
physical world and relations between people (Dean 2013). In the former, the joint stock 
of knowledge refers to the ability of a community to develop its material means of life1. 
The community does not organize itself around resources of technology, but through its 
knowledge of ways and means organizes the natural world around itself (DeGregori 
                                                        
1 This includes not only the development of tools, but also the creation of new 
resources. “Resources are not fixed and finite because they are not natural. They are a 
product of human ingenuity resulting from the creation of technology and science.” 
(DeGregori 1987) 
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1987, 2002). The joint stock of knowledge, then, can be seen as defining the parameters 
of possible action (Foster 1981b)2. This knowledge, further, is embodied physically in 
the tools and tangible assets used by the community to provision itself. 
The limits imposed on a community by the joint stock of knowledge are the 
technological limits of social activity. Ayres (1953) discussed technology within this 
social context, stating “[t]echnology is doing – a mode of doing, perhaps, but one that 
runs through the whole gamut of human activities.” (p. 282) For Ayres, technology is 
not a thing, but a learned behavior (Ayres 1952); it is the knowledge of some type of 
skill, which allows one to act. These skills are culturally organized, acquired, and 
conditioned – the skills one learns depends heavily upon the community in which they 
live. The knowledge manifested in skills is also embodied in tools, and it is this 
combination of tools and skills that compose technology:  
It is necessary to bear in mind at all times that technology is 
the sum of human skills, and in doing so to recognize that 
modern man is not less skilled but infinitely more skilled 
than his primitive forebears. But technology is also the sum 
of human tools. Thus we must recognize that skill is 
conceivable only in relation to tools. Skill is tool-behavior it 
is always and wholly that. (Ayres 1952, p. 52) 
 
                                                        
2 It follows that the expansion of the joint stock of knowledge also expands the 
technological limits of the community. This is done in two ways: first, through diffusion 
or assimilation, whereby a greater portion of the community becomes more adepts at 
utilizing the current stock of knowledge; and second, through invention, whereby 
additions are made to the joint stock of knowledge (Veblen 1908a). These processes are 
not separate; simply increasing the level of complexity of existing technology is not 
enough to greatly improve the quality of life of the community. Not only must the new 
knowledge be created, it must also be assimilated. 
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Technology is a set of tool-skill combinations (Munkirs 1988). The development of tools 
depends upon the size and accessibility of the joint stock of knowledge, while the skills 
that will be nurtured depend further upon the value structure of the underlying 
institutions in society3. Technology is embedded within the institutional structure – it is 
a cultural concept. The ability for a community to provision itself, then, depends upon 
access to and use of the joint stock of knowledge (Veblen 1908a; Ayres 1952; Lower 
1987; McCormick 2002). 
 Within a capitalist economy, access is defined through property rights over both 
material and immaterial things. Ownership over material things reflects ownership 
over the tools developed from the joint stock of knowledge. Ownership over immaterial 
things, on the other hand, reflects the ability to control the nature of the social 
relationships embedded within society, be they relations in production or relations in 
sale. In the next section, I examine Veblen’s theory of intangible assets and Commons’ 
theory of intangible property within the context of the business enterprise. The 
principal finding is that the earning capacity depends not only on the enterprise’s 
ability to produce output for sale, but also its ability to control these relations in 
production and sale. Further, as the enterprise evolves, the ability to control such 
relations becomes the primary way in which earning capacity is generated. 
                                                        
3 Two things should be noted here. First, it is impossible to have tools without skills, or 
skills without tools. An airplane without a pilot is simply a pile of metal, whereas a pilot 
without an airplane cannot fly anywhere. This leads to the second point, which is that 
technology, from the standpoint of tool-skill combinations, is intrinsically value-lade. 
The tool itself does not dictate its use, and the skills that will be taught emerge out of an 
institutional setting. The plane does not dictate whether it is filled with bombs or 
medicine before being sent to a war-torn area; the community in which the tool resides 
makes these decisions, and the skills nurtured reflect its value structure.  
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Veblen, Commons, and Intangible Assets: A Synthesis 
 The purpose of this section is to compare Veblen and Commons’ position on 
intangible assets and provide a synthesis to form a more cohesive theoretical 
understanding of the way in which they are used by the business enterprise in the 
modern economy. Both Veblen and Commons start with the concept of the going 
concern – that the purpose of business activity is to reproduce itself and its relations 
through time. However, due to the dynamic nature of capitalism, what it means for an 
enterprise to be a going concern changes. Initially, profit through the sale of output may 
have been the dominant focus, but later stages of capitalism – particularly industrial 
capitalism, when the ability to produce enough output is no longer in question – require 
the enterprise to obtain control over market relations. Intangible assets, then, become 
an increasingly important strategic tool for the enterprise, as they come to form the 
basis upon which output may be sold and confer a differential advantage through 
monopoly rights. Therefore, in a discussion of the business enterprise qua going 
concern, the role of intangible assets is a primary focus. 
 This section is divided into five subsections. In the first, I examine the origins of 
intangible assets, based on accounting and legal history. The purpose here is to develop 
an understanding of how such assets came to be and how they are traditionally thought 
of in business. The second section briefly examines Veblen and Commons’ perspectives 
on tangible assets and tangible property. The emphasis here is on the way in which 
these property relationships emerge and what is exactly meant by “tangible property.” 
This provides a base for the next section in which I discuss the importance of intangible 
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assets in the first degree of separation. Within this stage of business development, 
intangible assets are used to create and maintain bargaining transactions. As 
production shifts from handicraft to industrial, intangible assets come to take on the 
character of market equities, creating rationing transactions that limit the number of 
sellers of a particular product; this is the focus of the fourth section. The final 
subsection concludes by examining the common threads between Veblen and Commons 
with regards to intangible assets in the business enterprise. 
The Emergence of Intangible Assets 
 Intangible assets are important tools in ensuring the reproduction of the 
business enterprise. Their origins may be found in both legal and accounting history. 
The term “intangible asset” encompasses a wide range of things, such as “brand names, 
copyrights, corporate culture, covenants not to compete, franchises, future interests, 
licenses, operating rights, patents, record masters, secret processes, supplier 
relationships, trademarks, and trade names.” (Dean 2013, p. 82; see also Hendrickson & 
van Breda 1992; King 2006) These types of intangible assets function as rights to 
exclude others from producing and selling a given good. Indeed, this is the function of 
the patent system in general, as a patent, at its core, is a right to exclude (Chisum et al. 
2004). In the 1852 case Bloomer v. McQuewan, Chief Justice Taney ruled that “the 
franchise which the patent grants consists altogether in the right to exclude everyone 
from making, using, or vending the thing patented without the permission of the 
patentee. That is all he obtains by a patent.” (Bloomer v. McQuewan 1852, p. 542) The 
right to exclude, rather than the right to produce, is what gives the intangible asset the 
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locking out characteristic, meaning they grant the holder a differential advantage 
through the ability to set prices (Veblen 1904; Commons 1924). The enterprise who 
owns the patent, copyright, or trademark is under no obligation to use it within the 
context of output production4. 
 One of the earliest examples for this type of intangible asset comes from ancient 
Greece. In Sybaris, if a cook or confectioner had created a new and excellent dish, the 
inventor was entitled to all profits derived from that dish, and no other chef was 
permitted to serve it for one year (Anthon 1841). Apart from this however, the ancient 
Greeks and ancient Romans did not recognize property rights over intangible goods; 
rather, the working rules during these times emphasized the knowledge itself as 
opposed to the application or use of the knowledge (Chisum et al. 2004). Put another 
way, the expression of the knowledge – the material object – was important insofar as it 
reflected use-value, or the culmination of society’s joint stock of knowledge as a means 
to reproduce the communal life process. The individual doing the expressing was less 
important than the knowledge itself. 
 The first patent was granted in Florence during the Italian Renaissance in 1421 
to the architect and engineer Filippo Brunelleschi; Brunelleschi received monopoly 
rights for his ship, which transported Carrarn marble to be used in the building of the 
dome of the Florence Cathedral (Chisum et al. 2004). This event marked a shift away 
                                                        
4 This has led to a class of enterprises called “non-producing enterprises” whose main 
business is patent litigation. A non-producing enterprise, or “patent troll”, functions 
first by building a large patent portfolio and then suing companies that may infringe on 
those patents. Income is earned either through damages received or licensing 
agreements with companies that wish to use the knowledge to produce (Chein 2008). 
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from the traditional method of protecting knowledge through the use of guild 
monopolies; prior to Brunelleschi’s patent, much of the knowledge creation was 
conducted within the context of guilds, which used rigid hierarchies and collective 
protection to keep their secrets. Individuals within the guild were responsible for 
developing new techniques or new product extensions; they received protection not 
from government monopoly, but from the guild leaders (May 2007). The granting of the 
patent brought with it a shift in the philosophical landscape. May points out that the 
development of intellectual property standards requires three different social forces 
coming together: technological forces that change the way in which production and 
distribution utilized knowledge; legal forces, which refers to the way in which property 
is defined and valued; and most importantly, philosophical, or the development of the 
notion of the sovereign knowledge producer (May & Sell 2005; May 2007). 
 The technological and legal forces had been dominated by guilds. Innovation and 
invention was conducted under guild protection, and the guilds did not distribute the 
new knowledge to the general public. As a result, commerce was controlled by the 
guilds, as they were the ones with the technical know-how to produce output. Through 
the use of trade secrets, charters, and mutual agreements, the guilds were able to create 
monopolies through cartel-like arrangements to protect their knowledge and lock out 
the general population. With the development of patents, however, innovation 
philosophy shifted to view the process as an individual, rather than communal, one. The 
guild was not necessary, and became viewed as an inhibitor to knowledge creation 
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(Walford 1888; Gross 1890; Ballard 1913; Pirenne 1937; Holmes 1962; Richardson 
2001; May 2007). 
 This shift was reflected in the first patent statute enacted by the Venetian 
government on March 19th, 1474, the goal of which was to incentivize technological 
advancement through the issuance of private grants and import licenses. The statue 
included many rules that would become staples of later patent statutes. For example 
grants were not recognized where there was prior 
knowledge within the territory of the Republic of the 
supposed innovation or invention (newness); there was a 
requirement for utility (or usefulness); a limited term of 
grant (time limits for protection); rights were transferable 
(alienability); there was a rudimentary working 
requirement, in that patent grants were forfeited by the 
failure to use them within a certain term, and the state 
retained a right to compulsory license. (May 2007, p. 3; see 
also Mandich 1948) 
 
The notions of newness and usefulness formed the basis for the United States Patent 
Act of 1790, which authorized the issuance of patents for “any useful art, manufacture, 
engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein not before known or used.” 
(Chisum et al. 2004, p. 19) In 1850, this act was expanded to include a requirement for 
“nonobviousness”, meaning that the three main requirements obtaining a patent in the 
United States became novelty, or the invention had to be new; utility, or the invention 
had to be useful; and nonbviousness, meaning the invention had to be something that a 
reasonable person could not come up with on their own. These three requirements are 
primarily grounded in the philosophical foundation of the sovereign inventor. 
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Stemming from Locke’s theory of property5, it is argued that knowledge may be viewed 
as a commons and that the inventor mixes his or her labor with the commons when 
developing new ideas. Because knowledge is non-rivalrous, ideas may be appropriated 
from the common knowledge without devaluing or exhausting the overall stock. 
Further, by offering these rights, it incentivizes people to further develop the joint stock 
of knowledge, which, due to the cumulative nature of innovation, leads to exponential 
increases in productivity (Solow 1957; Hettinger 1989; Waldron 1993). 
 At its core, this class of intangible asset – the monopoly right – functions as a 
means to prevent the greater community from accessing the joint stock of knowledge. 
This knowledge, from an institutionalist perspective, is not given to the community as in 
Lockean justifications, but is created by the community through its life process. An 
individual who mixes his or her labor with the joint stock of knowledge is not utilizing a 
naturally occurring resource; they are utilizing a social creation (Ayres 1944). The 
primary function of the monopoly type of intangible asset, initially, is to grant an 
income stream based on the ability of the owner to control the community’s access to 
its knowledge stock. Another form of intangible asset is “goodwill6”, which has been a 
                                                        
5 The key point to this theory are that the commons were given to humanity by God, and 
that when a person mixes their labor with the commons, they make the result their 
property. So long as the person does not take more than they can make use of, and does 
not destroy the commons, they have a natural right to what they can mix their labor 
with (Locke 1960).  
 
6 See Table 2.1 for a breakdown of the different ways of defining goodwill discussed in 
this chapter. For a more complete history of the way in which accountants have dealt 
with the topic, see Courtis (1983). 
 
 
 
 
 
39
Table 2.1: Definitions of Goodwill, Lord Eldon to John Commons 
 
Author Year Definition 
Lord Eldon 1810 Nothing more than the probability that old 
customers will resort to the old place. (ves. 356) 
Vice-Chancellor 
Page-Wood 
1859 That good disposition which customers 
entertain towards his particular shop or house 
of business, and which may induce them to 
continue their custom with it. (Ch. 841) 
H.D. Macleod 1875 [A property right that] only exists to receive 
some uncertain profit, but no certain person is 
bound to make that payment and there is only 
the expectation that someone will, this is called 
emptio spei, or the emptio rei speratae in Roman 
Law: this Species of Property may be called 
Rights of Expectation. (p. 218-219) 
R. Bithell 1882 The advantage connected with an established 
business of good repute. A well-established 
business presents an expectation of profits to 
any one entering upon it, and is worth paying 
for. (p. 142) 
J.H. Bourne 1888 The benefit and advantage accruing to an 
existing business from the regard that its 
customers entertain towards it, and from the 
likelihood of their continued patronage and 
support. (p. 107) 
A.G. Roby 1892 The advantage or benefit which is acquired by 
an establishment or a man beyond the mere 
value of the capital, stock, funds, or property 
employed therein, or by him, in consequence of 
the general public patronage and 
encouragement which it or he receives from 
constant or habitual customers, clients, or 
patients, on account of its or his local position, 
or common celebrity, or reputation for skill, or 
affluence, or punctuality, or accidental 
circumstances, or necessities, or even from 
partialities or prejudices. (p. 289) 
  
 
 
 
 
40
Table 2.1, Continued 
 
Author Year Definition 
L.R. Dicksee 1897 The value of that reputation which a business 
has acquired during its continuance, which 
induces the confidence or expectation that the 
same, or an increasing patronage will continue to 
be extended so long as the business is conducted 
in the same place upon the same principles. (p. 
40) 
E. Guthrie 1898 The value in pecuniary terms of this intangible 
thing is the difference between the value of the 
normal results of the working of any business or 
profession which may be established by and 
worked by any person in any place, and the 
results of working any individual business of a 
similar character. (p. 425) 
W. Hunter 1901 Goodwill exists as a benefit or advantage 
accruing to the firm, in addition to the value of its 
property, derived from its reputation for 
promptness, fidelity and integrity in its 
transactions, from its mode of doing business, 
and other incidental circumstances, in 
consequence of which it acquires general 
patronage from constant and habitual customers. 
(p. 351) 
T.B. Veblen 1904 Goodwill taken in its wider meaning comprises 
such things as established customary business 
relations, reputation for upright dealing, 
franchises and privileges, trade-marks, brands, 
patent rights, copyrights, exclusive use of special 
processes guarded by law or by secrecy, 
exclusive control of particular sources of 
materials. All these items give a differential 
advantage to their owner, but they are of no 
aggregate advantage to the community. They are 
wealth to the individuals concerned – differential 
wealth; but they make no part of the wealth of 
nations. (p. 139-140). 
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Table 2.1, Continued 
 
Author Year Definition 
P.D. Leake 1914 The privilege, granted by the seller of a business 
to the purchaser, of trading as his recognized 
successor; the possession of a ready-formed 
“connexion” of customers, considered as an 
element in the saleable value of a business, 
additional to the value of the plant, stock-in-
trade, book debts, etc. Goodwill, in its 
commercial sense, is the present value of the 
right to receive expected future super-profits. 
(p. 81) 
W.A. Paton 1922 Goodwill may be defined as the capitalized value 
of the excess income which a particular 
enterprise is able to earn over the income of a 
representative competitor – a “normal” business 
– having the same capital investment, the rate 
used in capitalizing being the rate realized by 
the representative concern. (p. 313) 
J.R. Commons 1924 Goodwill in business is liberty to go elsewhere. 
In proportion as alternatives diminish, goodwill 
diminishes, until with the disappearance of all 
alternatives, goodwill disappears in the loyalty 
of vassal or slave. (p. 272) 
 
Source: Compiled from books and articles attributed to the listed authors.  
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source of confusion for economists and accountants alike7 (Courtis 1983). Initially, 
goodwill had been defined in terms of “Rights of Expectation” (Macleod 1875, p. 219) or 
“the advantage connected with an established business of good repute.” (Bithell 1882, p. 
638) This type of definition, though vague, became the standard (Bourne 1888; Dicksee 
1897; Guthrie 1898; Dicksee & Tillyard 1906; Leake 1914, 1921; Enders 1985). 
Goodwill, therefore, primarily refers to the differential advantage granted to an 
enterprise over the representative enterprise “having the same capital investment, the 
rate used in capitalizing be the rate realized by the representative concern.” (Paton 
1922, p. 313) The concept of goodwill recognizes that there is a difference between the 
productive capacity of an enterprise and the earning capacity. While the two may be 
related, the reputation of a business will increase the earning capacity without directly 
affecting productive capacity8. Goodwill, then, is pure earning capacity that offers some 
level of guarantee that the enterprise will be a going concern (Hunter 1901; Kaner 
1938; Walker 1953). 
This earning capacity may be obtained in several ways. The good reputation of a 
business may refer to a number of different relations. Wixon and Kell (1962) describe 
                                                        
7 Some of this confusion may be related to the confusion as to how to account for assets 
in general, and whether they reflect property rights that may be exchanged for cash or 
whether they reflect some abstract future benefit. For a more detailed description of 
how accountants have treated assets, see Williams (2003). 
  
8 H.E. Seed (1937) expands upon this notion that goodwill represents a differential 
advantage. For Seed, goodwill refers to “the advantage which arises from the good 
name, reputation, and connection of a business; alternatively, the benefit which accrues 
to the owner of a business from the likelihood that such business will earn, in the 
future, profits in excess of those required to an economic rate of remuneration for the 
capital and labor employed therein.” (p. 8) In other words, goodwill represents not only 
actual earning capacity, but expected earning capacity as well. 
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four different categories of goodwill showing that prestige may be derived from both 
production and distribution: 
Commercial goodwill results from such factors as 
customers’ attitudes, superior products, pleasing 
surroundings and desirable location. Industrial goodwill is 
acquired through satisfactory employee relations, including 
stable employment, high wages, and numerous fringe 
benefits. Financial goodwill reflects the favourable 
attitudes of credit institutions, investors, and trade 
creators. Public goodwill arises from the general reputation 
of the company. (p. 14) 
 
Goodwill emerges from the relationship between members of the community, or more 
specifically, the transactions between members. Commercial goodwill, for example, 
arises out of the bargaining transactions between buyers and sellers, while industrial 
goodwill arises out of the interactions between managers and workers.  
 This idea of customary relations as the foundation for goodwill is also seen in 
court decisions regarding the subject. As Lord Eldon in Crutwell v. Lye stated, “The 
goodwill which had been the subject of sale was nothing more than the probability that 
old customers will resort to the old place.” (1810) This implies that the customary 
relationship between buyer and seller includes not only the reputation of the business, 
but the location, name, and monopoly power9. Another key implication of this decision 
is the transferability of goodwill. Vice-Chancellor Page-Wood emphasized this point in 
Churton v. Douglas, stating that “When a person parts with the Goodwill of the business, 
he means to part with all that good disposition which customers entertain towards his 
                                                        
9 Lord Cransworth in Austen v. Boys agreed with this definition, stating “When a trade is 
established, the Goodwill of that trade means nothing more than the sum of money 
which any person would be willing to give for the chance of being able to keep the trade 
connected with the place where it had carried on.” (1858) 
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particular shop or house of business, and which may induce them to continue their 
custom with it.” (1859) The differential advantage granted by customary relations, 
then, are transferable from one party to another10. Accountants have dealt with this fact 
by considering the goodwill of a business to be valued at the difference between the 
acquisition value and book value of a company during acquisition (APB 1970; Andrews 
Jr. 1981; FASB 2001)11. 
 From the preceding discussion we may conclude that goodwill is an asset that is 
engrained within business activity and emerges from the customary, beneficial 
relations between buyer and seller or the relations within production. At its core, 
goodwill grants an income stream to the enterprise and the right to the income stream 
may be transferred when the company is bought and sold. Further, while monopoly 
intangible assets represent control over relations between the community and its joint 
stock of knowledge with regards to production of output, goodwill represents an 
income stream due to relations involved in both the production and distribution of 
output. 
 Before discussing the way in which these intangible assets confer a differential 
advantage to the business enterprise as the enterprise evolves, a brief discussion of the 
                                                        
10 Later court cases reinforced both the customary origins of goodwill and its 
transferability. See Trego v. Hunt (1896) and Commissioner’s of Inland Revenue v. Muller 
Ltd (1901) for more. 
 
11 It should be noted that goodwill, as an accounting term, can increase only during 
acquisition. When a company is acquired, its current goodwill is written to zero during 
the acquisition. Then, the difference between the acquisition value and the book value 
goes onto the acquiring firm’s balance sheet as goodwill. This reinforces the importance 
of mergers and acquisitions, as it is the only way a company can increase the goodwill 
line on their balance sheet (APB 1970; FASB 2001). 
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nature of the tangible side is warranted. The reproduction of the community qua going 
concern requires the production of serviceable output, which itself requires tangible 
assets. Control over these tangible assets in a capitalist economy is granted through a 
system of property rights, and understanding the emergence of such rights is integral to 
understanding the emergence and evolution of the business enterprise. It is to this I 
now turn, with a focus on synthesizing Veblen and Commons12. 
Tangible Assets and Tangible Property 
 One of the conclusions drawn from Veblen and Commons’ theory of assets and 
property in general is the lack of a “natural rights” theory of property, as found in 
classical liberal philosophy (Lock 1690). Veblen discusses the nature of tangible assets 
in two footnotes in his “On the Nature of Capital” (1908a). In one, he defines assets as 
“serviceable capital goods considered as valuable possessions yielding income to their 
owner.” (p. 539 fn 1) In an earlier footnote, he addresses the property relation that 
appears to be embedded in tangible assets: 
The term [asset] properly covers a pecuniary concept, not 
an industrial (technological) one, and it connotes 
ownership as well as value… In the present connection, it is 
used figuratively, for want of a better term, to convey the 
connotation of value and serviceability without thereby 
implying ownership. (p. 518, fn 1) 
 
                                                        
12 While the topic of property rights is an important feature of both heterodox and 
mainstream economics alike, my focus here is on expanding the understanding of the 
business enterprise qua going concern from the institutionalist standpoint. For this 
reason, I focus solely on Veblen and Commons’ discussion of the emergence of property 
rights. For discussions covering other branches of economics, please see Sweezy (1942) 
or Ellerman (1992) for a Marxian view and Todd (2009) for a mainstream/libertarian 
view. 
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A tangible asset has a dual nature. It provides a serviceable component to the 
community, while simultaneously generating an income stream that may be 
appropriated by the asset’s owner. However, these assets are developed from the 
community’s joint stock of knowledge, which requires the community as a whole for 
upkeep (Veblen 1908a; Ayres 1944). When understanding the joint stock of knowledge 
in the context of cumulative innovation, as described by Ayres (1952, 1967), Alperovitz 
and Daly (2008), and Lazonick and Mazzucato (2013), it becomes clear that the 
invention and innovation process is a communal one, and the income stream derived 
from the creation of tangible asset is, too, a social creation. Private property refers, then, 
to an emergent institutional structure that grants the right to the income stream to an 
individual; there are no natural rights to property (Veblen 1899a).  
 Commons, too, identifies a dual nature in tangible property. Based on the 
concepts of transactions13 and the theory of reasonable value14, he identifies how 
                                                        
13 Commons identifies three types of transactions: bargaining, which occur between 
agents of a social system absent any hierarchical structure; managerial, which are 
command-like that occur between a legal superior and a legal inferior; and rationing, 
which occur between the collective action – be it the state, the law, or any other type of 
accepted social rules – and members of the collective. To quote Commons: “Bargaining 
transactions transfer ownership of wealth by voluntary agreement between legal equals. 
Managerial transactions create wealth by commands of legal superiors. Rationing 
transactions apportion the burdens and benefits of wealth creation by the dictation of 
legal superiors.” (1934, p. 68) 
 
14 Reasonable value emerges out of the decisions made by a third party – hereafter 
referred to as the court – when settling disputes by members involved in transactions. 
It is an evolutionary idea that depends upon the political, moral, and economic 
circumstances of the time (Ramstad 1995). Two quotes from Commons should be 
sufficient to explain the concept: 
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decisions made by the courts have led to a change in what is considered “property” 
from use-value to exchange-value. The 1872 Slaughterhouse Cases judged, given the 
pre-existing working rules, that property was valued based on the serviceability to the 
community – the use-value. Over time, however, this definition changed to incorporate 
exchange-value. The 1890 Minnesota Rate Case considered property as “the expected 
earning power of those things… and property is taken from the owner, not merely under 
the power of eminent domain which takes the title and possession, but also under the 
police power which takes its exchange value.”15 (Commons 1924/2007, p. 16) When 
referring to tangible property, then, the courts ruled that the main concern is what may 
be got in exchange for the item, not just the productivity of the item in use. The 
transformation from property-as-use-value to property-as-exchange-value is neither 
spontaneous nor exogenous; it occurs through the decisions of the courts based on the 
doctrine of reasonableness. 
 Two similarities between Veblen’s description of tangible assets and Commons’ 
description of tangible property may be noted. First, both describe tangible 
                                                                                                                                                                            
“Reasonable value, in the United States, is what the constituted Court decides is 
reasonable, by mere fiat, not what individuals think is reasonable… It is not a matter of 
subjective or individual opinion; it is the constitutional structure of the American 
judicial system that decides.” (1936, p. 245) 
 
 “When we investigate reasonable value, we are investigating the unwritten 
constitution. When we investigate the evolution of reasonable value, we are 
investigating the Court’s changes in meanings of such fundamental economic terms as 
property, liberty, person, money, due process. Each change in meaning is a judicial 
amendment to the constitution.” (1936, p. 249) 
 
15 For a more complete description of this change, see the first section of chapter two in 
Commons’ Legal Foundations of Capitalism (1924). 
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assets/property as having a dual nature, incorporating both the serviceable use-value 
and the pecuniary exchange-value. This is clearly seen in Commons’ discussion of 
property initially being considered a use-value to being considered an exchange-value. 
The important note here is that, while the item in question may be valued based on 
what may be got for it, it does have some serviceable component to it separate from the 
exchange-value. Veblen recognizes the serviceable aspect to assets arising out of the 
joint stock of knowledge, implying that they impose an instrumental value on society. 
However, within a given social system that recognizes private property rights, the 
income stream generated from these assets simultaneously implies an exchange-value 
embedded within them. This emerges out of the pecuniary relationships between 
owners and non-owners, and depends upon the working rules of society, i.e., the 
reasonable value process. What is important for Veblen and Commons, then, is the 
relationship of this use-value to exchange-value, and how the property relationship 
emerges out of the working rules of society (Veblen 1904, 1908a; Commons 1924, 
1936). 
 This leads to the second similarity. Unlike classical liberal philosophy in the 
Lockean tradition, there are no natural rights to property in either theory. For Veblen, 
tangible assets arise out of communal knowledge, and their use-value originates within 
the community. It is only under a given set of social relations that grant property rights 
to individuals that a single person may claim ownership. For Commons, the same is 
true: property rights emerge out of the working rules of society, and as these rules 
change, so too does what is deemed “property.” In both cases private ownership is 
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emergent and depends upon the nature of social relationships within a given 
community. 
Intangible Assets in the First Degree of Separation 
 The first degree of separation refers to a locking-out process that occurs with the 
development of private property and the handicraft and early industrial mode of 
production. With the development of the surplus, it becomes possible for certain 
members of the community to live off the work done by others. Those in positions of 
power or status are able to appropriate this surplus for their own use by appropriating 
parts of the joint stock of knowledge. This separates the community into those who own 
and are able to provision themselves, and those who do not and must first gain access 
to the joint stock of knowledge through the sale of labor (Marx 1867; Veblen 1899a, 
1899b; Resnick & Wolff 1989; Lee & Jo 2011; Bowles 2013). Production, in this first 
degree of separation, is not for use, but for sale. “The separation of consumption and 
production reflects an economic system organized according to the interests of one 
party to an industrial process over another as evidenced by the interaction of producing 
and consuming positions.” (Dean 2013, p. 64) Those with ownership rights over the 
joint stock of knowledge – the producing positions – are able to require those without 
ownership rights to engage in continual bargaining transactions to gain access – the 
consuming positions. Production in this stage is organized around the going plant16, 
which has ownership rights over the tangible assets of the community. The community 
does not dictate the use of these assets; their interaction with the knowledge stock is 
                                                        
16 For more on the make-up of the going plant, see chapter two of Dean (2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
50
limited to bargaining transactions with the going plant, while the plant qua going 
concern requires continual monetary bargaining transactions to reproduce itself. If 
these transactions are not sufficient to maintain the enterprise as a viable entity, the 
plant shuts down (Dean 2013; Lee 2013). 
 From a Veblenian perspective, intangible assets are initially important because 
they endow certain enterprises the ability to earn an income stream through the control 
of social relationships. When production becomes motivated by sale, the ability for an 
enterprise to reproduce itself as a going concern depends upon the salability of its 
output. Those enterprises with ownership of intangible assets are better able to do so, 
despite the fact that they provide no greater social benefit17. Through the privatization 
of the knowledge base, the enterprise is able to require those who do not own to engage 
in bargaining transactions to provision themselves. Thus, the joint stock of knowledge 
becomes the vehicle for the Veblenian form of exploitation: owners earn an income not 
solely because they produce output, but because they have successfully appropriated 
the knowledge base. The intangible asset represents an income stream due to the 
control over access to the joint stock of knowledge, much in the same way a tollbooth 
operator controls accesses to a road (Heller & Eisenberg 1998). 
 Goodwill in the form of customary relationships is also an integral part of the 
survival of the business enterprise in the first degree of separation. The way in which 
the enterprise is able to continue as a going concern in handicraft production is through 
                                                        
17 Veblen (1904) explains that the items included in goodwill “give a differential 
advantage to their owner, but they are of no aggregate advantage to the community. 
They are wealth to the individuals concerned – differential wealth; but they make no 
part of the wealth of nations.” (p. 139-140) 
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the price system. Prices must be set at a level to ensure the reproduction of the 
enterprise and the continuation of bargaining transactions (Lee 1986, 1996, 1998; 
Downward 2000; Gu 2012). The customary relations between buyer and seller grant 
the enterprise a differential advantage by making easier the continuation of the 
necessary bargaining transactions. An enterprise with goodwill is able to ensure 
ongoing monetary transactions in a more stable or greater capacity than the normal 
enterprise might expect (Roby 1892; Guthrie 1898; Patton 1922; Veblen 1904, 1908b; 
Commons 1924). 
 Finally, we may reiterate that intangible assets may be transferable and thus 
fully function as assets: 
When property rights fall into definite shape and the price 
system coms in… differential advantages take on something 
of the character of intangible assets. They come to have a 
pecuniary value and rating, whether they are transferable 
or not; and if they are transferable, if they can be sold and 
delivered, they become assets in a fairly clear and full sense 
of the term. (Veblen 1908b, p. 113) 
 
Intangible assets are genuinely an ownership right, and these rights are transferrable. 
In the case of monopoly rights, this is seen through the licensing of patents, either 
compulsory or otherwise, and the ability for enterprises to acquire brands and 
trademarks from other companies. In the case of goodwill and customary relationships, 
this is seen when an enterprise acquires another at a price above the book value of the 
firm – what has been acquired is the perceived value of the pre-existing relationships of 
the acquired company. 
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 For Veblen, intangible assets represent control over social relationships that 
emerge out of the separation of the community from its joint stock of knowledge qua 
private property; like tangible assets, this control may be transferred through purchase 
and sale. For Commons intangible assets arise out of the transactions between different 
members of the community. Goodwill is seen as the ability to control access to the 
market through controlling the market supply 
The mere ownership of land, physical capital, or 
commodities has no significance for a business economy 
unless accompanied by access to a market, and access to a 
market has no significance without power to control the 
supply and fix the price of things offered on that market 
(Commons 1924, p. 268) 
 
Goodwill, in both theories, is the ability for an enterprise to control market price, 
generated through the establishment of customary relations. Commons further 
identifies three types of goodwill – personal, business, and location; the first two 
emerge out of the customary relations between buyers and sellers, while location 
goodwill refers to Lord Eldon’s statement regarding the probability that customers will 
continue to return to the old location. 
 The primary difference between Veblen and Commons with regards to 
intangible assets is the effect control over social relations has on social stability. For 
Veblen, intangible assets are extortionary, resulting from private appropriation of social 
relations for the purpose of pecuniary gain, leading to market power (Veblen 1904, 
1908a, 1908b; Enders 1985; Atkinson 1987). Commons, however, describes intangible 
assets from a harmonizing perspective. “Goodwill, in Commons’ schema, is an intangible 
phenomenon which harmonizes opposing interests in market exchange. It is the social 
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psychology of the market.” (Enders 1985, p. 683) Buyers and sellers involved in market 
exchange seek to reduce uncertainty – for sellers, it is the uncertainty that they will not 
be able to sell output at a going concern price whereas for buyers it is the uncertainty as 
to the quality of the product they receive. Goodwill – and to a larger extent, intangible 
assets in general – “is liberty to go elsewhere.” (Commons 1924, p. 272) In true 
bargaining transactions, with multiple buyers and sellers, goodwill reflects the fact that 
consumers choose not to shop elsewhere, despite the higher price. Unlike Veblen’s 
theory, Commons’ theory of intangible assets is not exploitative, but arises out of the 
customary relations that give security to the buyers in terms of quality and the seller in 
terms of a consumer base. 
 In the first degree of separation, intangible assets serve two important functions. 
First, as explained by Veblen, they lock the community out from using its socially 
created joint stock of knowledge. This forces those who do not own to engage in 
bargaining transactions with those who do. Within handicraft and early industrial 
modes of production, when the survival of the going plant depends upon ongoing 
monetary production, patents, goodwill, and trademarks deriving from ownership over 
portions of the joint stock of knowledge are necessary for the creation of these 
bargaining transactions. 
 Second, goodwill in the form of customary relations between buyers and sellers 
are integral in allowing the enterprise to maintain such transactions. By forming these 
relations, the going concern is able to engage in economic activity with some degree of 
certainty as to the ability to reproduce itself. It does not need to seek out a consumer 
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base; it has one ready-made. Further, by virtue of good repute or good location, the 
enterprise is able to charge a higher price; buyers are willing to pay this price for the 
certainty of a particular quality and ease of obtaining the product. 
 Intangible assets in the first degree of separation influence the distribution of 
output, with the owners of such assets having a greater claim on the social surplus than 
those who do not. This is true regardless of social class – a capitalist with goodwill is 
able to appropriate a greater portion of output than one without it (Resnick & Wolff 
1989). This is different in the second degree of separation where intangible assets come 
to influence economic activity by affecting the overall supply of output; they create 
rationing transactions that limit the number of sellers of a given product. 
Intangible Assets in the Second Degree of Separation 
 For the going plant to survive, it must engage in ongoing monetary transactions 
via the going business side of the going concern. In the first degree of separation, 
intangible assets are used to satisfy this need through control over bargaining 
transactions. As industrial production grows larger and the ability to produce enough 
output to satisfy all members of society is no longer in question, the business 
enterprise’s main concern is ensuring the price paid for output is sufficient to allow the 
enterprise to reproduce itself (Veblen 1921). Thus, the activities of the enterprise 
emphasizing the generation and maintenance of these monetary transactions become 
separated into their own unit apart from the going plant. This separation between the 
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going business and the going plant constitutes the second degree of separation18 (Dean 
2013). With this separation, the methods through which the enterprise maintains itself 
as a going concern change. Goodwill, patents, copyrights, brand names, production 
secrets, and the like now represent the ability for the enterprise to prevent competing 
producers from engaging in bargaining transactions with consumers. 
 While intangible assets in the first degree of separation give enterprises a 
differential advantage through their control over bargaining transactions, the additional 
advantage in the second degree is control over who may access a market. Put another 
way, while monopoly rights in the first degree of separation mandated the creation of 
bargaining transactions, in the second degree they reduce the number of sellers of a 
given product. Accordingly, they are what Hamilton (1943) termed “market equities.” A 
market equity is simply a right to access a market in which to sell output. Enterprise use 
intangible assets as a means to erect barriers to entry, thereby rationing the number of 
sellers. 
 Enterprises in the second degree of separation use intangible assets as a way to 
create rationing transactions with the community. Commons defines rationing 
transactions as “the negotiations of reaching an agreement among several participants 
who have the authority to apportion the benefits and burdens to members of a joint 
enterprise.” (Commons 1934, p. 68) Rationing transactions incorporate concepts from 
                                                        
18 In the second degree of separation, the going plant is composed of the physical 
embodiments of the community’s joint stock of knowledge while the going business is 
composed of the assets – both tangible and intangible – that give the enterprise 
ownership rights and claims to income streams. The going business interact with the 
going plant through managerial transactions, and therefore determines what will be 
produced and in what quantity (Commons 1924). 
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both managerial and bargaining transactions; they involve relations between legal 
superiors and legal inferiors while influencing the sphere of distribution (Atkinson 
1987). The legal superior in a rationing transaction is able to dictate terms that specify 
an action space within which the legal inferior must remain. For example, market 
governance organizations may dictate a range of prices members of the organization 
must maintain for their output19 (Fligstein 2001; Lee 2013). The primary purpose of a 
rationing transaction is to define the parameters within which bargaining and 
managerial transactions may take place. In so doing, they shape the way in which 
output is distributed, given those parameters. 
 Intangible assets create rationing transactions in the second degree of 
separation by creating barriers to entry that limit the number of sellers of a particular 
product. These barriers may be customary or legal. Customary barriers to entry in the 
form of goodwill make it difficult for new companies to capture market share20. An 
established company obtains a differential advantage not only because it has a 
guaranteed consumer base with whom they can continually engage in bargaining 
                                                        
19 This is an example of price rationing, a form of rationing transaction that leaves the 
output decision at the will of the seller, but the price decision is made by the authority. 
The reverse of this – output rationing – occurs when the quantity sold by a seller or 
group of sellers is defined, but the price may fluctuate (Commons 1934).  
 
20 Such relationships include both the relationship between buyers and sellers and 
relationships among the supply chain that create a set of network relations, making 
production easier for incumbents (Munkirs 1985).  
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transactions, but also because they do not fear these consumers leaving when new 
entrants arise21. 
 Legal barriers to entry take the form of patents, trademarks, brand names, 
copyrights, and government licenses, as well as other forms of legally binding 
agreements that limit the number of producers for a given market. Prices, output, and 
access to the market become the decisions of those who have the legal right to produce. 
For example, an enterprise with a patent that grants the exclusive right to produce a 
product becomes the gatekeeper of the market for that product. Those who wish to 
enter must first get permission in the form of a license from the patent holder, and 
those who produce without the license are vulnerable to lawsuits and other forms of 
legal action (Lichtenberg & Philipson 2002; Chein 2008-2009, 2010). This offers several 
advantages not granted to those enterprises without intangible assets. First, by 
reducing competiton, owners of the intangible asset are able to enjoy a monopoly 
position and the advantages in production and distribution that come with it (Denicolo 
2007); this is the primary effect of the rationing transaction created by intangible 
assets. The secondary effect, however, is that through licenses, owners of patents and 
copyrights are able to earn an extra income stream (Shapiro 2001; Bessen 2003; Choi 
2003). 
                                                        
21 Veblen and Commons both stress the importance of maintaining goodwill as the 
primary concern of the owner (Veblen 1904; Commons 1924). While this is done in 
several ways – customer service, maintaining good reputation, etc. – the most 
important is advertising. Advertising allows the enterprise to both obtain a consumer 
base and increase the cost of entry; once one enterprise advertises its product, all are 
required to do so or face the loss of market share (Veblen 1904; Galbraith 1958; 
Eichner 1976). 
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 Intangible assets in the second degree of separation grant a differential 
advantage through control over these rationing transactions22. Whereas intangible 
assets granted pecuniary returns to owners in the first degree of separation by allowing 
them to facilitate and control bargaining transactions, in the second degree the 
advantage is extended from the ability to limit the number of producers of a good. Not 
only are the owners able to increase expected returns, but they also have the option of 
garnering additional income through licenses of intellectual property. In addition, these 
barriers to entry have the ability to shield dominant enterprises from the possibility of 
creative destruction as described by Schumpeter (1942). With high barriers to entry, 
rather than fear that new entrants will erode their market share, core enterprises are 
able to control the conditions under which new enterprises enter the market, 
protecting their position23. 
Synthesis 
 From the discussion above, we may conclude that while Veblen and Commons 
have differences in terms of the origin and purpose of intangible assets, they are in 
agreement in terms of the effect on the business enterprise. For Veblen, intangible 
assets represent the ability for owners to “lock out” the general community from the 
                                                        
22 While Commons does not use rationing transactions in this way, the function of 
intangible assets in the second degree of separation is to limit the number of sellers of a 
product. In this manner, I am here extending the way in which rationing transactions 
are used in industrial production to capture the evolving nature of intangible assets 
from “locking out” to “limiting factor.” 
23 This is seen primarily in studies that put innovation into a network framework, as 
seen in Acs and Audretsch (1987); Carlsson (1989); Carlsson and Stankiewicz (1991); 
Orsenigo, Pammolli, and Riccabonie (2001); Acemoglu and Linn (2004); Acs and 
Sanders (2008), and Bergek et al. (2008). 
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joint stock of knowledge. The owner is granted a set of differential advantages resulting 
in income streams due to the creation and control over bargaining transactions in the 
first degree of separation and monopoly rights that allow the enterprise to erect 
barriers to entry to protect market shares in the second degree. In general, intangible 
assets are seen as emerging with the appropriation of the joint stock of knowledge and 
reflect control over social relations. In the case of legal monopoly rights, intangible 
assets reflect control over the relationship between the community and its joint stock of 
knowledge; in the case of customary relationships such as goodwill, they represent 
control over the relationship between buyer and seller. 
 For Commons, intangible assets emerge as a means to create a degree of stability 
within the transaction process. He views goodwill as the decision of the customer to 
give up their ability to go elsewhere when engaging in bargaining transactions. The 
differential advantage, then, arises as enterprises create customary relationships and 
the ability to induce the sale of liberty becomes recognized in higher prices for the 
product. Further, because the enterprise is able to charge a higher price, it reduces the 
uncertainty with regards to the ability of the enterprise to reproduce itself. Monopoly 
rights serve to create rationing in the second degree of separation by limiting the 
number of sellers of a particular product. 
 While Veblen and Commons differ in their views on the origins of intangible 
assets and whether they represent exploitative or harmonious processes, they are in 
agreement with regard to the effect on the business enterprise. In both theories, the 
primary function of an intangible asset is to grant the owner a differential advantage. In 
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the first degree of separation, this advantage emerges from the ability for the enterprise 
to control bargaining transactions by dictating access to the joint stock of knowledge 
and forming customary relations with consumers. In the second degree, these 
advantages are used to control the number of suppliers of a particular good, granting 
the enterprise control over the process of distribution. Intangible assets come to take 
the form of market equities in this stage, as they effectively grant the right to access a 
particular market. In general, both Veblen and Commons see intangible assets as 
necessary tools for ensuring the price at which output is sold is sufficient to reproduce 
the enterprise; in cases when it may not be, they then grant the enterprise the ability to 
fix the price by withholding output (Veblen 1904, 1921; Commons 1924, 1934). 
 It may be noted that within the first and second degree of separation, the ability 
for the enterprise to earn a profit revolves around its ability to sell output; intangible 
assets are useful to the enterprise insofar as they help facilitate this activity. The job of 
the owner/agent/manager, then, is to manage the differential advantage conferred so 
they do not lose it. However, as industrial production grows and the pecuniary mindset 
becomes dominant, the business enterprise becomes less concerned with the sale of 
output and more concerned with the value of the enterprise. In the next section, the 
way in which intangible assets affect the basis for capitalization of the going concern is 
examined. 
Intangible Assets as the Basis for Capitalization 
 In the first degree of separation, intangible assets increase the pecuniary earning 
capacity for the business enterprise by assigning property rights over the joint stock of 
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knowledge. This enclosure of the knowledge base locks the greater part of the 
community out of the social provisioning process. To gain access, then, members of the 
community must engage in bargaining transactions with the owners. This is the 
Veblenian form of exploitation; the joint stock of knowledge is created by the 
community as a whole, but is owned or controlled by a few who use this position to 
extract payments, akin to rent payments as described by Ricardo (1817). In the second 
degree of separation, with the internal separation of the going business and the going 
plant within the going concern, intangible assets create a rationing transaction in terms 
of the number of sellers of a particular good. While the first degree was marked by 
small, petty traders and handicraft production in which firms relied upon gains from 
bargaining transactions to be viable, the second degree is marked by large scale 
production in which the focus for the enterprise is not simply the ability to sell output, 
but the ability to do so at a price that will ensure its viability. “Under the old regime of 
handicraft and petty trade, dearth (high prices) meant privation and might mean 
famine; under the new regime low prices commonly mean privation and may on 
occasion mean famine.” (Veblen 1904, p. 177) The primary concern for the enterprise 
becomes obtaining a differential advantage that allows it to sell output at a going 
concern price (Langlois 1989; Lee 1998; Gu 2012). Intangible assets serve this role by 
granting monopoly rights to a particular seller. This may take the form of goodwill in 
the form of control over a particular location; or it may take the form of legal monopoly 
rights, such as a patent, over a portion of the production process or product itself. In 
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both cases, intangible assets limit the number of sellers, thereby abetting the survival of 
the concern. 
 As the business enterprise grows, it may begin to fund investment in industrial 
processes through the sale of stock or ownership claims on income. This creates a third 
degree of separation in which the owners of the concern – stockholders – are separated 
from the controllers – the managers (Veblen 1904, 1923; Berle & Means 1997; Lazonick 
& O’Sullivan 2000; Lazonick 2003; Dean 2013, 2015). These new types of stock 
issuances create a new category of property, referred to by Commons as “incorporeal 
property.” (1924, 1934) This type of property consists of “debts, credits, bonds, 
mortgages, in short of promises to pay.” (1924, p. 19) It represents the “expected 
fulfillment of promises which [others] have made to us.” (p. 28) Stock ownership grants 
with it a promise of payment, e.g., the distribution of profits qua earning capacity 
appropriated by the company. Insofar as this imposes a rationing transaction on the 
enterprise, the company must engage in transactions – primarily bargaining and 
managerial, but also rationing in some cases – in such a manner that meets the 
standards set by the shareholders as owners of the going concern. 
 It should be noted that this type of property has its root in tangible property, 
through the values of the two have become separate. As Commons explains 
The investor, when selling that part of his liberty which 
consists in control over the purchasing power which had 
been his, accepts, in return a promise of future purchasing 
power, an encumbrance on the debtor or the going concern, 
and it is this investment encumbrance, or incorporeal 
property, that has emerged out of the primitive notion of 
holding physical things for one’s use (1924, p. 238). 
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The stockholder acquires the right to a share of the going concern’s profits, meaning 
their primary concern is on the earning capacity of the enterprise. This depends on a 
number of variables beyond the going plant’s productive capacity, including the power 
of the enterprise, the ability of the enterprise to maintain a going concern price, the rate 
of interest, and expectations towards the future valuation of the enterprise (Veblen 
1904, 1921, 1923; Keynes 1926, 1936; Commons 1899-1900, 1934; Wray 1994; 
Atkinson & Oleson Jr. 1998).  
The value of tangible property depends primarily on the internal activity of the 
going concern via the relationship between the going plant and the going business, as 
well as its ability to control the industry within which it produces and sells output. The 
value of incorporeal property, however, depends on both the value of the productive 
capital and the overall valuation of the enterprise, or its perceived earning capacity. The 
1901 Report of the Industrial Commission found this to be the case, in that 
Two general opinions regarding the basis of capitalization 
of companies and combinations are represented by 
witnesses: First, that the amount of capitalization should be 
limited by the actual value of the properties owned, or 
should at any rate bear some strict relation thereto; second, 
that the capitalization should be dependent on the earning 
capacity of the company. (United States Industrial 
Commission 1901, p. IX) 
 
The first case describes the situation as outlined in the first and second degrees of 
separation when the value of the enterprise depends upon the ability to sell output. The 
second case describes the situation when the primary concern of the enterprise is its 
ability to generate a return to its absentee owners. Indeed, the report found that even 
those witnesses who preferred the first method of capitalization accepted the idea that 
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the value of common stock would be based on intangible assets – patents, trademarks, 
brands, and goodwill – which represent pure earning capacity. As the value of common 
stock represents the wealth of the absentee owners, it is in the interest of those owners 
to implement business strategies that swell the valuation of the company, regardless of 
the productive capacity. This strategy requires the use of intangible assets. 
 Lazonick (2005, p. 5) states that “A business model can be characterized by its 
strategy… its finance… and its organization.” Within the third degree of separation, 
there are two types of business models. In the first, consistent with Minsky’s (1996) 
“managerial capitalism” and Lazonick’s (2003, 2005) “Old Economy Business Model” 
(OEBM), management takes a leading role in directing the activities of the enterprise, 
giving rise to the Chandlerian-form of organization. “The power of the OEBM…[is] in the 
ability of already successful firms to routinize innovation and thereby to build on their 
superior capabilities in existing product markets to move into new product markets.” 
(Lazonick 2005, p. 5; see also Schumpeter 1942; Penrose 1959; Chandler 1962, 2005; 
and Galbraith 1967). In this form, management dictates long-term strategy goals, 
including which products to produce and which industries to branch into, and the 
structure of the industry emerged out of these goal (Chandler 1962). Activity is 
financed primarily through retained earnings from selling output (Lee 1998; Hall, 
Walsh, & Yates 2000). 
 With the highly specified nature of technology and the necessary interlinkages 
involved in industrial production, industry becomes more concentrated in the OEBM, 
with the decisions of managers de facto deciding the course of industrial activity. 
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Munkirs’ theory of centralized private sector planning illustrates this concept in which 
economic activity is dictated by a small group of firms whose stock ownership, bond 
ownership, inter- and intra-locked boards of directors, and intraindustry interlocks 
gives them control over the larger portion of the provisioning process (Veblen 1921; 
Galbraith 1967; Munkirs 1985; Munkirs & Sturgeon 1985; Munkirs & Knoedler 1987). 
Due to the monopoly-like nature of these enterprises, intangible assets function in a 
similar manner as they do in the second degree of separation – maintaining going 
concern prices and generating earnings. The primary difference is that rather than 
earnings being kept within the enterprise, they are distributed to shareholders in the 
form of dividend payments and swell the value of the stockowners’ incorporeal 
property. Prices, then, are no longer going concern prices; they must also ensure a 
satisfactory return to shareholders (Hilferding 1910). This creates a conflict between 
managers concerned with the long-term viability of the enterprise and the shareholders 
concerned with their immediate return (Marglin 1974; Moss 1981; Herman 1981; Jo & 
Henry 2015). 
 The second type of business organization under the third degree of separation is 
referred to by Lazonick (2003, 2005, 2008, 2010a) as the “New Economy Business 
Model” (NEBM), consistent with Minsky’s (1996) “finance capitalism” in the pre-
depression era and “money manager capitalism” in the modern era. Under this model, 
shareholders take a more active role in dictating the activity of the enterprise. While 
they are not involved in the day-to-day activities and decision-making, they impose 
their will on the enterprise, setting the parameters within which it may act. So long as 
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they receive the highest possible return, the enterprise may do as it pleases; in this way 
the shareholders and business enterprise interact through rationing transactions. This 
also has the effect of influencing the enterprise’s strategy; while in managerial 
capitalism the focus was on increasing capacity through maintaining high prices based 
on differential advantages and industrial sabotage, finance capitalism and money 
manager capitalism in the NEBM are concerned with increasing the overall valuation of 
the company (Veblen 1921; Lazonick 2008; Jo & Henry 2015; Dean 2015). 
 The shift from the Old Economy to the New Economy begins in the 1980s with 
the financialization of the business enterprise in response to Japanese competition 
(Lazonick 2005, 2008). The shareholder revolution, beginning during the fourth U.S. 
merger wave, re-organized not only the business enterprise but also the business model 
(Black 2000; Stockhammer 2004; Serfati 2009). In the Old Economy, return to 
shareholders was a by-product of ensuring the enterprise maintained itself as a going 
concern. In the New Economy, the opposite is true; return to shareholders it he primary 
focus, with the viability of the business enterprise secondary. Before this shift could 
occur, manager and shareholder interests had to be brought into alignment. This was 
achieved by offering top executives stock options as compensation – in order for the 
manager to increase their pay, the stock price had to increase (Lazonick & O’Sullivan 
2000; O’Sullivan 2003; Lazonick 2010b). As shown by Hall and Leibman (1998) and 
Lazonick (2005), stock options increased from 19% of executive compensation in 1980 
to 48% in 1994, while the mean value of stock options increased 684% - from $153,037 
to $1,213,180 – and salary and bonus compensation increased 95% - $654,935 to 
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$1,292,29024. Further, dividend payouts “increased by an annual average of 10.8% 
while after-tax corporate profits increased by an annual average of 8.7%. In the 1990s 
these figures were 8.0% for dividends and 8.1% for profits.” (Lazonick 2008, p. 483-
484) Recent data supports this trend as well. From 2003 to 2008 the annual real 
dividend per share for S&P 500 companies increased by an annual average of 8.15% 
and since the Great Recession – from 2011 to 2014 – dividend payouts have increased 
11.71% per year (Standard & Poor’s 2015). This data may be found in Table 2.2 and 
Figure 2.1. After-tax corporate profits – shown in Table 2.3 and Figure 2.2 – from 2003 
through 2014, even when taking the Great Recession into consideration, increased on 
average 9.04% (St. Louis Federal Reserve Economic Database 2015). 
 By offering stock-based compensation, managers implemented strategies 
designed to increase the value of the company’s stock. While greenfield investment25 
continued to be largely financed with internal funds (Harcourt & Kenyon 1976; Nitzan 
& Bichler 2009; Dzarasov 2011), mergers, acquisitions, and stock-buy backs – none of 
which increase the productive capacity of the economy, but influence the valuation of 
the corporation – were undertaken using either external funds or stock as currency 
(Minsky 1986; Nitzan & Bichler 2009; Lazonick 2008, 2010). The role of stock in the 
New Economy Business Model has changed from being a way to finance industrial 
                                                        
24 Another such factor that may have caused executive compensation to increase was 
making such information public. Executives began competing for higher compensation 
than their competitors, a form of pecuniary emulation that put upward pressure on 
executive salaries (Johnson & Kwak 2010).  
 
25 Greenfield investment is defined as investments in the productive capacity of an 
enterprise, such as building new plants as opposed to purchasing already existing plants 
(Nitzan & Bichler 2009; Scheibl & Wood 2005). 
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Table 2.2: Real Dividend Per Share for Standard and Poor 500 Firms, 2003-
2008 
 
Year Real Dividend Per Share 
2003 $21.23 
2004 $23.37 
2005 $25.44 
2006 $27.71 
2007 $30.11 
2008 $31.37 
2009 $27.94 
2010 $24.15 
2011 $25.84 
2012 $29.64 
2013 $33.95 
2014 $37.54 
 
Source: Standard and Poor’s 500 (2015)  
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Figure 2.1: Real Dividend Per Share for Standard & Poor’s 500 Firms, 2003-2008 
(Standard & Poor’s 2015) 
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Table 2.3: After Tax Corporate Profits, 2003-2014, Billions of Dollars 
 
Year After Tax Profit 
2003 725.7 
2004 948.5 
2005 1,240.9 
2006 1,378.1 
2007 1,302.9 
2008 1,073.3 
2009 1,203.1 
2010 1,470.2 
2011 1,427.7 
2012 1,683.2 
2013 1,692.8 
2014 1,693.9 
 
Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve Economic Database (2015) 
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Figure 2.2: After Tax Corporate Profits, 2003-2014, Billions of Dollars (St. Louis Federal 
Reserve Economic Database 2015) 
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activity to being a way to finance business activity. Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2004) and 
Lazonick (2008) describe five key functions of corporate stock in this new organization: 
1. Creation, whereby stocks act as tradable securities to allow financers to 
withdraw their ownership of new enterprises they have helped create (see also 
Hilferding 1910). 
2. Control, whereby stockholders can influence the concentration of ownership, 
which may influence the relationship between owners and controllers. 
3. Combination, whereby stocks can act as an exchange currency in the process of 
acquiring or merging with other enterprises, as seen in stock-swap mergers. 
4. Compensation, whereby the motives of controllers may be brought in line with 
the owners by offering stock options as compensation. 
5. Cash, whereby stock can be used to raise liquidity to finance various types of 
business activity. 
Thus, while the value of the incorporeal property issued by the enterprise is separate 
from the value of the productive capacity, it acts as an important asset for businesses in 
their endeavor to increase the valuation of the enterprise as a whole. 
 Intangible assets increase the value of this incorporeal property through several 
means, but most important is their classification as an asset. First, all benefits from the 
first and second degrees of separation remain in that the intangible asset allows the 
enterprise to privatize the communal knowledge stock, thus creating monopoly power 
and allowing the enterprise to collect rent payments. Second, with the financialization 
of economic activity, intangible assets form the basis for the valuation of the enterprise. 
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Financialization refers to “a pattern of accumulation in which profits accrue primarily 
through financial channels rather than through trade and commodity production.” 
(Krippner 2005, p. 174)26 In this era, the business enterprise organizes itself in the form 
of a Transnational Corporation, which is 
an institutional sector, made up of firms whose business is 
based on financial activity… However it is also a functional 
process through which money becomes capital for its 
owner thanks to its advance as property claims and loans. 
In contemporary capitalism, this functional opportunity… is 
offered to industrial groups through the holding of financial 
assets or other rent-generating assets, which with regards 
to this opportunity can be considered as components of 
finance capital. (Serfati 2008, p. 40, emphasis in original) 
 
For the transnational corporation, intangible assets capture value through control of 
social relations, and because of their importance in increasing earning capacity, 
“intangible assets are now said to have supplanted tangible assets as the key value 
drivers in the economy.” (Serfati 2008, p. 45) Intangible assets have transformed from 
increasing earnings through control over the buyer-seller relationship to increasing 
earnings by increasing the asset base of the enterprise out of which incorporeal 
property may be issued. The greater the value of the asset-base, the better the ability of 
the enterprise to expand and increase the value of its incorporeal property. 
                                                        
26 Jo and Henry (2015) identify seven primary features to financialization. These are, in 
brief: the corporatization of the enterprise in a joint-stock company; absentee 
ownership, primarily by banks and insurance companies; the use of rationing 
transactions to dictate economic activity; maximization of the value of incorporeal 
property as the primary goal of enterprise activity; mergers and acquisitions as the 
common method of increasing the value of the enterprise, driven by speculation; stock-
based compensation for executives; and the sacrifice of productive capacity in favor of 
pecuniary returns. For more, see also Whalen (2002), Medlen (2003), Wray (2007), and 
McCarthy (2013). 
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 Further, the transnational corporation is composed of subsidiaries that carry out 
the activities of the business enterprise. These subsidiaries, termed Special Purpose 
Entities (SPE) by Serfati (2008), have several obligations. With specific regards to 
intangible assets, they 
have been given ownership of intellectual property rights 
by their parent companies and collect income in the form of 
royalties or as fees on (sub)licenses. Clearly, the creation of 
such financial entities makes transactions in intellectual 
property (e.g. R&D) and related incomes widely unknown 
from statisticians in charge of presenting national accounts 
(Serfati 2008, p. 43) 
 
The SPE, in this structure, is responsible for the appropriation of social knowledge in 
the form of patent rights; however, rather than use this knowledge for the creation of 
output, they license it to the transnational corporation, who pays a licensing fee and 
royalty for access to the knowledge. These payments to the SPE, however, are 
insignificant in comparison to the potential returns from monopoly sales and the 
increase in capitalization. From the perspective of the transnational corporation, the 
threat of creative destruction is not problematic as innovation is conducted through 
licenses in a manner that reinforces the dominance of the enterprise27.  
 Intangible assets allow the enterprise to increase the valuation of the company 
in two ways. First, the differential advantage conferred by such assets during the first 
degree of separation increases the asset base, which may then be capitalized upon in 
                                                        
27 This discussion of the Transnational Corporation will be revisited in the next two 
chapters with application to the pharmaceutical industry and the Pfizer Corporation. 
Specifically, the focus will be on the core pharmaceutical companies who direct the 
activities of the industry and the relationship of the periphery – composed of the SPEs – 
that carry out commands.   
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the form of stock issuances or other forms of incorporeal property. This process of 
valuation and re-valuation becomes the main goal of the enterprise management 
seeking to increase shareholder value, as the intangible assets must be re-valued at 
increasingly higher rates for the enterprise to maintain itself as a going concern (Jo & 
Henry 2015). Indeed, as pointed out by Veblen (1904), Keynes (1936), and Minsky 
(1975, 1986), when the company re-values its assets28 at a lower level – or even at a 
less than expected increase – it may cause shareholders to panic and lead to a sell-off, 
potentially ending in a deep and prolonged recession. Mergers and acquisition are 
important in this stage as they allow the enterprise to swell the value of its goodwill 
through acquisition (Zeff 1999, 2005). 
 A second function of intangible assets in the third degree of separation affects 
the enterprises’ access to external finance. When acquiring loans, the enterprise may 
use such assets as collateral, allowing them to increase the amount of external finance 
available for financial maneuverings such as stock buy-backs and acquisitions. Between 
2009 and 2014, for example, 14.63% of JP Morgan’s loans were made using patents and 
applications as collateral. This was also true of Bank of America (14.06% of loans), 
Citigroup (10.39%), and Wells Fargo (9.81%), as well as others (Ellis 2015). Increasing 
the availability of external financing, while not directly increasing earning capacity, 
makes such manipulations easier, and is therefore a form of differential advantage. 
Intangible assets also have the effect of reducing borrowing costs, making it cheaper to 
                                                        
28 Goodwill, for example, must be tested at the end of each year to check for 
impairment. If goodwill is impaired, this represents a decrease in value since the time of 
purchase, and if this impairment is large enough, it may have significant impact on the 
value of the company’s asset base (KPMG 2014) 
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issue incorporeal property. Levitas and McFayden (2009) found that “enterprises 
mitigate the costs associated with raising cash through external capital markets by 
reducing knowledge asymmetries through highly valued patenting activities.” (p. 675) 
Intangible assets – particularly intellectual property rights – are useful tools in raising 
external funds by signaling to lenders that the enterprise is a successful innovator and 
worthy of financing at a lower cost; this is a form of business goodwill, as described 
above by Commons. 
 When management and control of the enterprise have been separated from 
ownership, intangible assets take on the additional role of providing the basis for 
capitalization and expansion of incorporeal property29. In money manager capitalism 
and the NEBM, managerial and absentee owner goals are brought in-line by providing 
stock-based compensation to executives, resolving the conflict between the two groups 
that existed during managerial capitalism and the OEBM. Strategy, then, emphasizes 
increasing stock prices and the value of such property, with intangible assets serving 
two important functions. First, the greater the value of intangible assets, the better able 
the enterprise is to expand the volume and value of incorporeal property. Second, 
through their use as collateral and signaling mechanisms, intangible assets make 
external financing more available and cheaper. This cheaper and easier financing is 
used to acquire and merge with other companies and repurchase stocks, which have the 
                                                        
29 While it is true that intangible assets increase the basis for valuation in earlier 
degrees of separation that may be used to expand debt financing, it is under finance and 
money manager capitalism with absentee ownership that they become the primary 
focus of management to increase the value of shares for absentee owners. 
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effect of increasing the valuation of the enterprise. While such actions benefit the owner 
through increased returns, they do not affect the technological capability for the 
community to provision itself and as such have little benefit to the greater society; they 
influence the distribution of output and claims to the social surplus, rather than 
produce it30. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has examined the changing ways in which intangible assets have 
been used by the going concern within the context of the degrees of separation 
described by Dean (2013). In the first degree, intangible assets give the enterprise 
property rights over the community’s knowledge stock allowing them to dictate access. 
This type of control takes the form of monetary bargaining transactions, thus 
generating pecuniary earnings. In the second degree, intangible assets allow the 
enterprise to engage in rationing transactions with one another, limiting the number of 
sellers of a particular good. This generation of monopoly and oligopoly power allows 
the enterprise to increase earning capacity through reductions in competition. Finally, 
in the third degree, intangible assets form the basis for capitalization and allow the 
                                                        
30 From an economy-wide standpoint, mergers and acquisitions influence the 
distribution of output, not the capacity to produce; they influence differential depth not 
breadth (Nitzan 1998, 2001; Nitzan & Bichler 2009). From an industry wide 
perspective, while mergers and acquisitions may allow for more efficient production 
through scale and scope effect, empirical evidence from the pharmaceutical industry – 
discussed in a later chapter – shows that such activities are primarily focused on the 
accumulation of intangible assets, while tangible assets are divested when the 
enterprise encounters difficulty. This result reflects that transition from the OEBM to 
the NEBM and, more generally, the financialization of the economy (Papadimitriou & 
Wray 1997; Lazonick & O’Sullivan 2000; Lazonick 2010a; Lazonick & Tulum 2011). 
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enterprise to increase the issuance of incorporeal property. In doing so, higher returns 
to the absentee owners are achieved. 
 The value of intangible assets from a bookkeeping perspective is derived in two 
ways. First, goodwill reflects customary relationships, or the ability for the enterprise to 
engage in ongoing bargaining transactions with consumers. Goodwill management 
under managerial capitalism becomes the primary focus for the enterprise, as it allows 
it to obtain a differential advantage. Under money manager capitalism, goodwill is 
accounted for as the difference between acquisition value and book value when one 
company acquires another. The emphasis is now on mergers and acquisitions as a part 
of business strategy to increase the volume of intangible assets. Second, patents and 
other forms of intellectual property rights reflect the ability for the enterprise to 
appropriate communally created knowledge, and earn an income stream based on this 
appropriation. Under the first and second degree of separation, this income stream 
results from the enterprises’ ability to swell the volume of sales. Under the third degree 
of separation, this income stream comes from the ability to increase the value of 
incorporeal property held by absentee owners and the easier access to external funds 
from financial markets. 
 With the emphasis on increasing earnings qua increasing capitalization in the 
NEBM, the function of intangible assets has changed. Where once the focus was on 
acquiring monopoly power for the purpose of selling output at a going concern price, 
the new focus is on increasing earning capacity for the purpose of increasing the 
valuation of the company. The following chapters present a modified version of the 
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structure-conduct-performance model of the pharmaceutical industry designed to 
capture this change in business models. 
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CHAPTER 3 
STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: AN 
ORIGINAL INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE 
 
Introduction 
 This and the following chapter present a modified version of the structure-
conduct-performance model for the pharmaceutical industry designed to capture the 
change in business models discussed in the previous chapter. In this model1, the market 
structure emerges out of basic market conditions. This structure then defines the 
conduct and performance of the industry. Firm conduct influences the structure, as in 
the case of mergers and acquisitions. Performance can affect both the conduct and 
structure; for example, firms that are more profitable or have higher earning capacity 
may be able to engage in different activities than those with lower earning capacity, 
while lower performing firms may exit the market influencing the overall structure 
(Church & Ware 2000). Government policies, further, may affect the structure, conduct, 
and performance of the industry, and must be taken into consideration when examining 
any industry (Waldman & Jensen 2013). 
 The main modifications to the SCP model reflect the structure of the 
transnational corporation at the core of the industry, the importance of mergers and 
acquisitions as strategic tools to increase earning capacity, and the return to 
shareholders as the main measurement for performance. From a structural standpoint, 
the neoclassical view of market structure from the framework of monopoly and 
                                                        
1 See Figure 3.1 
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Figure 3.1: Standard Structure-Conduct-Performance Model of Industrial Organization 
(Modified from Waldman & Jensen 2013) 
  
Market Structure 
Market Concentration, Product Differentiation, 
Barriers to Entry/Exit, Cost Structures, etc. 
Conduct 
Pricing, Advertising, R&D, Mergers & 
Acquisitions, Collusion, etc. 
Performance 
Economic Efficiency, Technological Progress, 
Earnings Efficiency, etc. 
Government 
Policy 
Antitrust Policy, Property 
Rights, Taxes & 
Subsidies, Price Controls, 
etc.  
Basic Market Conditions 
Demand: Price elasticity, Substitutes, etc. 
Supply: Technology, Location, etc. 
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imperfect competition, measured in terms of the Lerner Index2 (Lerner 1934), are no 
longer accurate. Rather, due to the power of the transnational corporation and the 
emphasis on special purpose entities to carry out strategic decisions, industry may be 
seen as structured around a core that dictates the course of action for the industry as a 
whole, and a supporting nexus that carries out commands (Galbraith 1967; Munkirs 
1985; Munkirs & Knoedler 1986; Fligstein 2001; Chandler 2005; Gagnon 2009). 
 When discussing industry conduct, pricing decisions are less important in the 
NEBM than mergers and acquisitions. If the return to shareholders depends upon a 
company’s earning capacity qua capitalization of the company, then the ability to sell 
output at a particular going concern price is less important than the ability to increase 
the company’s valuation through merger policies. In the following chapter, I discuss 
mergers and acquisitions as the main conduct focus and how such activity increases the 
valuation of the enterprise through increasing the value of intangible assets. 
 In understanding performance, there are several key measures I use, each 
reflecting the strategy of the business enterprise in the different degrees of separation. 
To measure performance in the third degree, I focus on measurements concerning 
return to shareholders. This is similar to the approach taken by agency theories of 
                                                        
2 The Lerner Index is a way to measure the degree of monopoly power for an industry 
by relating the price to the marginal cost. It is calculated as: 
 
  = 
 − 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|ℰ| 
 
where ℰ is the elasticity of demand, P is the firm’s price, and MC is the firm’s marginal 
cost. The more inelastic demand faced by the firm, the greater the difference between 
price and marginal cost and the greater the Lerner Index, reflecting a higher degree of 
monopoly power. 
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industrial organization, which posit “that in the governance of corporations, 
shareholders [are] the principals and managers [are] their agents.” (Lazonick & 
O’Sullivan 2000, p. 16) In this view, the maximization of shareholder value is a proxy for 
economic performance:  
Since in the modern corporation, with its publicly listed 
stock, these shareholders have a market relation with the 
corporation, the economic argument for making 
distributions to shareholders is an argument concerning 
the efficiency of the replacement of corporate control over 
the allocation of resources and returns with market control. 
(Lazonick & O’Sullivan 2000, p. 28) 
 
A firm that does not efficiently allocate its resources – real, financial, human, 
managerial, etc. – will not be maximizing returns to shareholders. Shareholders, as the 
residual claimants to a firm’s earnings, bear the most risk in terms of innovative 
activities and investment. Therefore, if the firm is not maximizing their return, they will 
choose to shift their control to firms that aim to maximize shareholder value through 
the efficient allocation of resources (Ross 1973; Jensen & Meckling 1976; Fama & 
Jensen 1983; Jensen 1986). 
I make no claim here that financial performance and economic performance are 
equivalent. First, agency theories ignore the ways in which workers are residual 
claimants due to their investments in enterprise-specific “human capital”3. Second, 
stocks in the NEBM are rarely used to finance enterprise activity, but more often as 
currency for mergers and acquisitions to redistribute corporate revenues from Labor to 
capital (Lazonick 2008, 2010; Serfati 2009; Reuss 2012). Just as Adelman (1951) and 
                                                        
3 The notion of human capital is admittedly problematic, but will not be discussed here. 
For more, see Shaikh (1987) and Fine (2010). 
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Sylos-Labini (1969) demonstrate the difference between economic concentration and 
financial concentration, there is a difference between economic performance and 
financial performance. From an OIE perspective, economic performance emphasizes the 
ability for the community to reproduce itself through the instrumental use of its 
technological know-how in a non-invidious manner4 (Veblen 1914, 1921; Foster 
1981e). Financial performance, captured in the return to shareholders, emphasizes the 
ability for an enterprise to reproduce itself through its capture of the joint stock of 
knowledge qua intangible assets; it is a fundamentally ceremonial measurement 
(Veblen 1899b, 1904, 1908b; Foster 1981e; Bush 1987; Tool 2000). The focus on 
increasing shareholder value is not due to desires for economic efficiency, but the 
rationing transactions imposed on the enterprise within the third degree of separation. 
My focus here is on this ceremonial measurement of performance, as it is in this 
measurement that intangible assets come to take a prominent role in maintaining the 
enterprise as a going concern. 
 Basic market conditions in the SCP model reflect the demand and supply side 
situations that influence the delivery of the product to consumers. In the 
pharmaceutical industry, the demand side issues include many complications beyond 
the health or income of the consumers. For example, generic pharmaceuticals provide a 
market for substitutes in which consumers may engage instead of brand-name 
medications (Steele 1962; Gagnon 2009, 2015). Public policy regarding the patent 
protection of pharmaceuticals and the availability of generics is an important factor in 
                                                        
4 This may be measured, e.g., through the availability of output to the greater portion of 
the population. 
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influencing the activity and financial performance of pharmaceutical companies. 
Another important demand side characteristic of pharmaceutical markets is the 
separation between the agent choosing the drug, the agent consuming the drug, and the 
agent paying for the drug. The demand side includes not only the consumer, but also the 
doctors, insurance companies, and HMOs. As Gagnon (2013) explains: 
Pharmaceutical markets can be compared to a dinner for 
three: the first person orders the meal, the second person 
eats it, and the third one pays for it. While the third person 
might want to have a say about which meal is being 
ordered, the waiter is pretty aggressive in promoting the 
newest meals – which also happen to be the most 
expensive. (p. 573) 
 
The demand conditions, then, include the connections between the patients, doctors, 
insurance companies, and pharmaceutical companies. The patient is not as 
knowledgeable as the doctor, and therefore is not the one deciding which drug to 
consume. The doctors, because they are not the one consuming or paying for the 
medication, do not have an incentive to prescribe the cheapest option (Steele 1964). 
Finally, the insurance company does not wish to pay for the higher-priced drugs. In 
many cases, managed healthcare organizations will attempt to negotiate discounts with 
drug companies or place limits on which drugs they will pay for to treat certain 
conditions (Scherer 1997; Levy 1999). 
 Supply side conditions of the pharmaceutical industry depend primarily on the 
ability for pharmaceutical companies to develop new medications. While the process of 
innovation in the pharmaceutical industry is largely beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, I will make it a point to examine the way in which these supply side 
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conditions influence firm behavior through mergers and acquisitions. A primary issue 
that will be discussed is the cost associated with FDA approval, and how government 
regulations with regards to drug approval have abetted in generating a core-nexus type 
of structure5 (Chandler 2001, 2005). 
Outline 
 The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. First, a discussion of several 
government policies that have had considerable consequences for the pharmaceutical 
industry is presented. The emphasis here is that government policy has real, lasting 
consequences on the pharmaceutical industry and influences primarily the conduct of 
the industry; these laws typically regulate the behavior of firms in terms of R&D and 
marketing. Second, a broad structural analysis of the industry is given, including the 
value of shipments, number of firms, concentration ratios, and Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Indeices, before developing further the idea of the pharmaceutical core based on the 
work of Alfred Chandler (2005) and Marc-Andre Gagnon (2009). Finally, the chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the industry core’s performance, measured in terms 
consistent with the degrees of separation. This will provide a good base for the next 
chapter’s discussion of the Pfizer Corporation’s history of mergers and acquisitions. 
Government Regulation in the Pharmaceutical Industry 
 Regulation in the pharmaceutical industry has evolved over time in response to 
several events that necessitated changes in the legal structure. In some cases, 
regulations were implemented in response to tragedies; in others, they were the results 
                                                        
5 For a brief description of the FDA approval process, please see Appendix A 
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of technological developments; and in others still they were the results of philosophical 
changes regarding intellectual property rights and how they should be treated. In this 
section, I examine several major changes to the legal structure, beginning with the 1906 
Pure Food and Drug Act and ending with the 1995 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). 
 Though there had been other regulations regarding drugs, such as the short-
lived 1813 Vaccine Act and the 1848 Drug Import Act, it was not until the turn of the 
century that drug regulation became a primary policy focus (Swann 1988, 2005). In 
1906, Congress passed the Wiley Act, also known as the Pure Food and Drug Act. Prior 
to then, the pharmaceutical market was dominated by mislabeled medications, quacks, 
and in many cases, drugs that were well below standards or potentially dangerous 
(Parascandola 1990; Swann 2005). In response, Congress separated the Division of 
Chemistry from the Department of Agriculture into its own bureau – the Bureau of 
Chemistry – run by Harvey Wiley. The purpose of this bureau was to “devote attention 
to the assay and composition of drugs.” (Swann 2005, p. 2; see also Kebler 1940). The 
Drug Laboratory, a department within the Bureau of Chemistry, was created to fulfill 
this purpose. In charge of the Drug Laboratory was the chief chemist and SmithKline 
and French, Lyman Kebler (Miles 1976). While Kebler found many labeling problems, 
with reagents being labeled as chemically pure when they were nothing of the sort, the 
Bureau did not have the power to prosecute mislabeled medications until 1906 when 
the Pure Food and Drug Act was passed. This act gave the Bureau of Chemistry 
regulatory power regarding standards of identity, allowing them to “bring actions 
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against products whose strength, quality, or purity varied from the official standards for 
that drug.” (Swann 2005, p. 5) In 1927, the Bureau of Chemistry was split. The 
regulatory functions were spun off into the newly formed Food, Drug, and Insecticide 
Administration, while the non-regulatory functions joined the Bureau of Soils to create 
the Bureau of Chemistry and Soils (Temin 1979a; Swann 1988). In 1931, the 
administration was renamed the Food and Drug Administration. 
 In 1938, in the wake of the Elixir Sulfanilimide tragedy, Congress passed the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Bill, expanding the regulatory powers of the FDA. In 1937, the 
S.E. Massengill Company sold a mixture of sulfanilamide dissolved in diethylene glycol 
to treat streptococcal infections. Previously sulfanilamide had been used in tablet and 
powder form, but a liquid preparation was requested for children. However, 
The new formation had not been tested for toxicity. At the 
time the food and drug laws did not require that safety 
studies be done on new drugs. Selling toxic drugs was, 
undoubtedly, bad for business, but it was not illegal. 
Because no pharmacology studies had been done on the 
new sulfanilamide preparation [Chief Chemist and 
Pharmacist Harold Cole] Watkins failed to note… diethylene 
glycol, a chemical normally used as antifreeze, is a deadly 
poison. (Ballentine 1981, p. 18-19) 
 
One hundred people died as a result. More so, the 1906 law did not give the power to 
prosecute Massengill for these deaths. Rather, the only punishment they could impose 
was for mislabeling the product; “’Elixer’ was a term used to describe an alcohol 
solution, and it was misapplied to diethylene glycol.” (Temin 1979a, p. 69)  
The 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic bill rectified this problem in two 
fundamental ways. First, it required that manufacturers submit an application to the 
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FDA showing that the medication was safe for use prior to release. If the FDA did not act 
on the application within 60 days, the drug was automatically approved (Meadows 
2006). Second, the act increased the amount of information required on the label. Drug 
labels now had to contain all ingredients and the quantity of each ingredient used, 
directions for use, and warnings about the danger of use.  
There was one major exception to the labeling rule: any drug prescribed by a 
licensed physician, dentist, or veterinarian did not have to have the same labels. In 
doing so, the 1938 bill created a distinction between over-the-counter drugs and 
prescription drugs (Temin 1979a). Prior to then, the only drugs that required a 
prescription were narcotics, under the 1914 Harrison Narcotics Tax Act (Temin 1979b). 
To circumvent the labeling requirements, drug companies created a class of drugs that 
could only be sold using a prescription. As a result, the primary target for 
pharmaceutical marketers were no longer the consumers of the drugs, but the doctors 
who would prescribe them – and who did not have the same budget constraints as the 
consumers. 
With doctors now the main intermediary between consumers and 
pharmaceutical companies – and the strong patent protection offered as part of the U.S. 
Constitution – drug prices began to rise. In 1961, the Subcommittee on Antitrust and 
Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Committee released a report detailing studies of the 
ethical drug industries in which they found “unreasonably high” prices, monopolistic 
restriction of the market, abuses of the patent privilege, and excessive waste of 
resources in selling activity (Steele 1964). As part of measures to control costs under 
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state Medicaid plans and in response to growing consumer movements, states began 
repealing what were known as “anti-substitution laws.” In the 1950s, anti-substitution 
laws were enacted to prevent counterfeiting, where pharmacists would distribute drugs 
of the same size, color, and packaging to the brand name drugs, but unknown quality. 
These laws prevented any type of substitution for the brand given by the physician’s 
prescription (Grabowski & Vernon 1979). 
 Between 1961 and 1978, 40 states and the District of Columbia repealed the 
anti-substitution laws and introduced substitution laws (Grabowski 1978; Grabowski & 
Vernon 1979). While these laws varied, each of them had the same general guidelines: 
pharmacists were permitted to substitute generics or other less-costly medications for 
the brand-name medication, unless the physician specified “dispense as written” on the 
prescription (Grabowski & Vernon 1979; Suh 1999; Gagnon 2009). Subsequently, 
“generics, as a share of all prescriptions in the US, from 5% in 1965 to 9% in 1974 and 
15% in 1983” (Gagnon 2009, p. 179-180; see also Redwood 1987) while prices fell 
(Giaccotto, Santerre, & Vernon 2005). 
 The next major regulatory change in the pharmaceutical industry came in 
response to the Thalidomide tragedy6, which struck several European countries, 
Canada, and Australia7 (Bren 2001). The 1962 amendments to the 1938 act – known 
                                                        
6 Thalidomide was used as a sleep aid, but was also prescribed off-label to help alleviate 
morning sickness. Children whose mothers took thalidomide were often born with 
serious and significant birth defects, most common of which was malformation of limbs 
(Bren 2001; Fintel, Samaras, & Carias 2009). 
 
7 In the United States, FDA reviewer Frances Oldham Kelsey refused approval of the 
drug, stating more tests were necessary. While over 2.5 million tablets had been 
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asthe Kefauver-Harris Amendments – gave the FDA four new powers. First, and most 
importantly, they required firms to submit documented scientific evidence regarding 
not only the drug’s safety, but also the drug’s efficacy as shown by clinical trials 
(Meadows 2006; FDA 2012). Efficacy, as defined by the FDA, initially meant better than 
placebo, but over time came to mean better than existing alternatives (FDA 1998; 
Montalban & Sakinç 2013; Gagnon 2015). This ensured not only that the drugs being 
released were useful, but also reduced the number of “me-too” drugs, which represent a 
poor use of R&D resources and do not actually generate any price reductions8 (Hollis 
2004; Gagnon 2009). Second, the amendments gave the FDA discretionary power over 
the clinical research process. “Prior to any testing in humans, firms must now submit a 
new drug investigational plan (IND) that provides the results of animal testing and 
plans for human testing.” (Grabowski, Vernon, & Thomas 1978, p. 137) Third, the FDA 
was given power over advertising claims as a means to prevent off-label use of 
medication. This inclusion was directly the result of thalidomide being used off-label by 
pregnant women to alleviate morning sickness (Fintel, Samara, & Carias 2009). Finally, 
the condition that allowed for automatic approval of a new drug application after 60 
days without FDA action was removed (Grabowski, Vernon, & Thomas 1978). 
                                                                                                                                                                            
distributed to 1,000 doctors as part of clinical testing, the United States more or less 
avoided widespread problems (Bren 2001). Only 17 children were born in the United 
States with complications from Thalidomide, compared to 10,000 in West Germany 
(Dove 2011; CBC News 2015). 
 
8A “me-too” drug is a drug that offers no significant therapeutic advantage to an already 
existing drug and is often a follow-on. Any advantage is typically minimal and takes the 
form of a slight alteration to the drug to reduce certain side-effects or change the 
release time (Hollis 2004). 
 
 
 
 
92
 The impact of these two legal changes, the Kefauver-Harris Amendments and the 
introduction of substitution laws in various states, affected the pharmaceutical industry 
primarily in terms of the effective patent life of a medication. Though patents in the 
United States grant protection for 17 to 20 years, the drug is not marketed throughout 
this entire period, as drugs are patented prior to being approved by the FDA – typically 
once the compound is discovered. The effective patent life of a drug – the patent time 
remaining after being approved by the FDA – is much less than the actual patent. 
Grabowski and Vernon (1979) found that between 1966 and 1977, the effective life of 
the patent dropped slightly from 10 to 13 years to eight to nine years. Research by 
Grabowski, Vernon, and Thomas (1978), Peltzman (1973), and Baily (1972) also found 
that the Kefauver-Harris Amendments greatly influenced R&D activity in the industry, 
as they increased the cost of approval. 
 In response to these amendments, pharmaceutical enterprises adopted the 
“blockbuster” model of drug development, where firms developed drugs that could 
treat a large number of patients by treating broad illness categories, such as Lipitor for 
high cholesterol (Gagnon 2015). The blockbuster model resulted in a high level of 
concentration and the use of patents – despite reduced effective patent life – to increase 
prices. Steele (1962, 1964) found that the combination of patent protection and 
marketing to doctors more or less eliminated price competition. He also criticized the 
idea that patents were required to incentivize drug innovation, showing that 
Between 1886 and 1962, 82 drug discoveries have been 
made in countries without product patents, compared with 
79 in the United States, only 60 of which were found in the 
laboratories of drug firms. Fifteen were found in foreign 
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countries with drug patents. Hence, 75 drugs were found 
by American commercial firms in foreign countries with 
product patents, while 101 drugs have been found in 
countries without product patents, and by noncommercial 
American investigators. (Steele 1962, p. 50) 
 
Patents, though they did not generate new drug discoveries, were very useful in 
organizing markets and protecting core producers. During this time, the 36 largest 
companies represented 95% of research activity and selling, but only 5% of the total 
number of firms in the industry (Schifrin 1967). Meanwhile, prices only fell when 
licensing agreements were violated, as shown in the cortisone agreements between 
Schering, Merck, Parke Davis, UpJohn, and Pfizer9 (Steele 1964). 
  In the 1980s, three new laws – the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act, the 1983 Orphan Drug 
Act, and the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act – were passed that greatly influenced monopoly 
protection for pharmaceuticals. The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 greatly expanded the limits 
of what could be protected by a patent. Prior to this act, research conducted with public 
funds could not be patented; the patent was seen as an incentive to devote private 
funds to knowledge creation, and with no private funds at risk, there was no reason for 
patents to be awarded. This act reflected a philosophical change in the role of the patent 
– rather than protect the creation of new knowledge, the patent was seen as 
incentivizing the commercialization of that knowledge, or the transformation of 
knowledge into a commodity (Mazzoleni & Nelson 1998; Acs & Sanders 2008). The 
                                                        
9 Merck, UpJohn, Parke Davis, and Pfizer each agreed on a cross-licensing arrangement, 
with Schering to pay 3% of sales for three years to produce prednisone and 
prednisolone and to market it in its finished dosage form. Merck and Pfizer violated this 
agreement and began making bulk sales, leading to a drop in prices. Schering took no 
action, as the sales part of the agreement was not legally enforceable (Steele 1964). 
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Bayh-Dole act allowed for research conducted with funds received from a federal 
contract, grant, or cooperative agreement with a non-profit organization to be patented, 
regardless of whether the work was fully or partially funded. The result of this law was 
the creation of the biotechnology industry out of the university laboratories and other 
public institutions conducting research with public funds. This new industry became 
the primary component of the supporting nexus for the pharmaceutical industry due to 
its new paths of learning in biology, genomics, and biochemistry (Chisum et al. 2004; 
Chandler 2005; Gagnon 2009). 
 In 1983, the intellectual property of pharmaceutical companies was further 
strengthened. To counter the perceived problem with the “blockbuster” model of 
pharmaceutical research – the lack of treatments and cures for diseases that did not 
affect large portions of the population – Congress passed the Orphan Drug Act. To 
qualify for Orphan Drug Status, a drug must be produced for the treatment of any rare 
disease, or a condition that affects fewer than 200,000 people in the United States. 
Firms producing drugs that qualify for this special status receive seven years of 
marketing exclusivity, an expedited approval process, various tax cuts, and research 
assistance so as to alleviate the high costs of drug research and development that 
resulted from the Kefauver-Harris Amendments (Simoens 2011; Côte & Keating 2012; 
Gagnon 2015). Between 1983 and 2010, 353 drugs received Orphan Status from the 
FDA in the United States, 75% of which were treatments for cancer, metabolic 
disorders, blood disorders, infectious diseases, and neurological disorders (Haffner, 
Whitley, & Moss 2002; Cheung, Cohen, & Illingworth 2004; Côte & Keating 2012). 
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 The main effect of this act, however, has been to increase the returns to 
pharmaceutical companies. One issue has been “salami slicing”, where firms resubmit 
the same drug for FDA approval, but to treat a different rare disease. Based on work by 
Côte and Keating (2012), I compiled a list of drugs that obtained more than one orphan 
designation while having sales of over $100 million in 2008, found in Table 3.110. This 
ability to extend control over a particular drug has led to the development of what 
Montalban and Sakinç (2013) and Gagnon (2015) call the “nichebuster” model: drugs 
are developed for the purpose of treating orphan diseases, and then resubmitted for 
approval to maintain their orphan status. Further, these drugs have not shown to 
provide significant benefits, most commonly with regards to cancer treatment. “Most 
new niche drugs often provide only marginal therapeutic benefits. In oncology for 
example, they sometimes prolong survival by only a few weeks, but provoke serious 
adverse effects and can cost more than $100,000 per patient per year.” (Gagnon 2015, 
p. 457; see also Fojo & Grady 2009)  
 In 1984, to increase the entry of generic drugs in pharmaceutical markets, 
Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act. This law came out of a patent infringement 
case between Roche and Bolar. Bolar wanted permission to develop a generic version of 
Roche’s drug Dalmane, but would not have been able to begin the approval process 
until expiration; because the approval process could take years to complete, they 
argued that the existing law unjustly extended the life of Roche’s patent. While the  
                                                        
10 For instances in which the current marketer is a subsidiary, the parent company is 
given. If the drug is being co-marketed, both companies are given. 
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Table 3.1: Drugs Having At Least Two Orphan Designations With Over $100 
Million Sales (2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trade Name Generic Name Current Marketer Number of 
Designations 
Humira Adalimumab AbbVie 2 
Fosamax Alendronate Merck 2 
Ceredase Alglucerase Sanofi* 2 
Avastin Bevacizumab Genentech 4 
Velcade Bortezomib Takeda 
Pharmaceuticals* 
2 
Tracleer Bosentan Actelion 
Pharmaceuticals 
2 
Botox Botulinum Toxin Allergan 4 
Novoseven Coagulation Factor Novo Nordisk 10 
Epogen Epoetin Alfa Amgen 2 
Procrit Epoetin Alfa Amgen 3 
Enbrel Etanercept Amgen 2 
Neupogen Filgrastim Amgen 6 
Copaxone Glatiramer Acetate Teva Pharmaceuticals 2 
Gleevec Imatinib Novartis 7 
Remicade Infliximab Johnson & Johnson* 6 
Betaseron Interferon Bayer Healthcare 2 
Avonex Interferon Biogen 2 
Rebif Interferon Merck* 2 
Revlimid Lenalidomide Celgene 4 
Sandostatin Octreotide Novartis 3 
Kogenate Octocog Bayer 2 
Pegasys Peginterferon Roche AG 2 
Rituxan Rituximab Biogen & Genentech** 4 
Prograf Tacrolimus Astellas 
Pharmaceuticals 
2 
Temodar Temozolomide Merck 2 
AmBisome Amphotericin B Astellas 
Pharmaceuticals 
3 
Vidaza Azacitidine Celgene 2 
Dysport Botulinum Toxin A Amgen 3 
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Table 3.1, Continued 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Parent Company 
** Co-Marketed 
Source: Modified from Côte and Keating (2012) 
  
Trade Name Generic Name Current Marketer Number of 
Designations 
Erbitux Cetuximab Bristol-Myers Squibb 2 
Sprycel Desatinib Bristol-Myers Squib 2 
Fludara Fludarabine 
Phosphate 
Sanofi* 2 
Intron A Interferon Alfa-2b Merck 10 
Humatrope Somatropin Eli Lilly 3 
Genotropin Somatropin Pfizer 3 
Nutropinaq Somatropin Novo Nordisk 5 
Nexavar Sorafenib Bayer & Onyx 
Pharmaceuticals** 
3 
Thalomid Thalidomide Celgene 4 
Tobi Tobramycin Novartis 2 
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courts ultimately ruled in favor of Roche11, Bolar lobbied Congress to change the law 
(Chisum et al. 2004). Companies that submitted generic medications to the FDA for 
approval were no longer required to go through the same clinical testing procedures as 
brand name drugs; rather, they only had to show bioequivalence. A streamlined 
application process for generics was also created, called the “abbreviated new drug 
application.” This not only reduced the costs of producing generics, it also made it 
possible for generics to be introduced much sooner than they otherwise would have 
been. 
 At the same time, the act allowed firms holding the expiring patent to file for an 
extension if they could show that the FDA delayed in the approval of the drug. In so 
doing, 
The Hatch-Waxman Act struck a balance between the 
interests of patentees of brand-name pharmaceuticals and 
the generic pharmaceutical industry, as well as the 
interests of the general public in competitively priced 
pharmaceuticals. In short, the act was designed to promote 
technological innovation while, at the same time, enhance 
the public welfare. (Chisum et al. 2004, p. 1264-1265) 
 
This law had the effect of simultaneously increasing both generic entry and patent 
protection. In 1983, the generic share of the prescription pharmaceutical market was 
15%; this increased to 29% in 1988 and 50% in 2005. In terms of market value, this 
constituted an increase from 5% of the value of all prescriptions in 1983 up to 11% in 
2004 (Suh 1999; Pharmaceutical Industry Competitiveness Task Force 2006; Gagnon 
                                                        
11 The courts found that the FDA does not have the power to rewrite patent law, which 
is what they would have been doing in giving Bolar permission to begin the approval 
process prior to patent expiration. 
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2009). Concurrently, the effective patent life of a new drug increased; Grabowski and 
Vernon (2000) found that between 1984 and 1995, the effective patent life increased 
from 10.17 years to 11.38 years. 
 The last major legal change discussed in this dissertation occurred in 1995. 
While this change was neither the result of happenings in the pharmaceutical industry, 
nor did it target the industry directly, it has had extremely important effects and was 
primarily the result of industry lobbying. The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) was developed in 1995 at the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and required all members to provide strong intellectual property 
protection, with that protection being standardized among WTO nations. In the case of 
the domestic pharmaceutical industry, the goal was for firms to be able to protect their 
patents abroad. The TRIPS agreement included patent rights for WTO member 
countries “without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology, 
and whether products are imported or locally produced.” (WTO 1995, p. 331) The 
agreement also included ways for nations to punish other members that violated the 
terms, ranging from “soft tools”, such as dialogue and persuasion, to more forceful 
coercion, such as suspension of trade or loss of membership (Drahos 2004). 
 The agreement can be traced back to executives from the Pfizer Corporation 
(Braithwaite & Drahos 2000) and emerged primarily out of the industry’s desire to 
protect the value of their intangible property12. According to Helpman (1993), 
                                                        
12 The TRIPS agreement was not the first time an international standard for intellectual 
property rights protection had been proposed. The United States, under pressure from 
the pharmaceutical industry, had pushed for stronger intellectual property protection 
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American firms lost $2.3 billion in profits due to global intellectual property right 
infringements, but that the results of these infringements was a gain of $3.6 billion in 
consumer surplus to both domestic and foreign consumers and firms. This is the 
primary reason why TRIPS has been criticized heavily: stronger intellectual property 
right protection on international levels has harmed lesser-developed countries in terms 
of R&D and product availability while increasing the benefits to the monopoly 
producers and their home nations (Helpman 1993; Adkisson 2002; Drahos 2004; 
Collins-Chase 2008; Sell 2009; Dean 2015). Further, the TRIPS agreement was passed in 
the middle of a global HIV/AIDS epidemic, and there was fear that the agreement would 
make it nearly impossible to get the necessary medication to the areas most harmed 
(Collins-Chase 2008; Emilio 2011). In response, the WTO declared in 2001 that member 
nations were encouraged to take necessary steps to provide for public health (World 
Trade Organization 2001). These necessary steps have included actions such as 
compulsory licensing and even the potential for claims of eminent domain (Adkisson 
2002). Still, the overall effect of the TRIPS agreement has been to improve the strength 
of American intellectual property rights abroad, which has strongly benefitted the core 
of the pharmaceutical industry (Scherer 2013). 
                                                                                                                                                                            
in several free trade agreements (Drahos 2004). In the mid-1980s, the United States 
shifted from the World Intellectual Property Organization to the General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariffs, finding that it could increase their odds of success in GATT by linking 
market access to intellectual property standards. At the same time, the United States 
pushed for stronger bilateral and regional trade agreements with high intellectual 
property standards, with policies to permit the imposition of sanctions on trade 
partners that violated American intellectual property rights (Sell 1998, 2009).  
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 This section has examined the various legal changes to the pharmaceutical 
industry. The creation of the FDA and the granting of regulatory powers through the 
1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act and the 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendments meant 
that pharmaceutical companies were forced to alter their research, development, and 
marketing strategies to a “blockbuster” model. This change in firm conduct is also seen 
in the 1983 Orphan Drug Act, which has led to the development of the “nichebuster” 
model, as firms focus more resources on the development of drugs for the treatment of 
rare diseases. The removal of anti-substitution laws and the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act 
all influenced the structure of the industry by making generic entry easier, providing 
competition in the market for prescription drugs. The 1980 Bayh-Dole Act also 
influenced the market structure and conduct by providing patent protection on publicly 
funded research; this led to the development of the biotechnology sector and strategic 
alliances between pharmaceutical and biotech companies for the purpose of 
researching, developing, and selling drugs. Finally, the three acts in the early 1980s 
along with the TRIPS agreement influenced the financial performance of 
pharmaceutical companies by strengthening patent protection. 
 The next section takes a more in-depth analysis of the pharmaceutical industry 
structure and, based on the concepts of the technostructure, organizational capabilities, 
and centralized private sector planning, focuses primarily on the pharmaceutical core 
and its role in the prescription drugs market (Galbraith 1967; Munkirs 1985; Munkirs & 
Knoedler 1987; Chandler 2005; Gagnon 2009). 
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Industry Structure 
 The pharmaceutical industry is composed of network relationships between 
enterprises within different industries. This network includes pharmaceutical 
manufacturing companies, biotechnology companies, university and private research 
laboratories, and chemical companies (Chandler 2005). Governments, further, give 
federal grants to many of these actors and impose regulations to restrict certain 
behaviors and set standards, which have effects on the industry structure. 
 This section examines the structure of the pharmaceutical industry from the 
perspective of the pharmaceutical core, which has the ability to direct the course of 
action for the industry as a whole. I begin with an overview of the basic measurements 
of industry structure – including the value of shipments; value of inventories; number 
of firms; concentration ratios at the 4, 8, 20, and 50 level (CRN); and the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI)13 – and what they imply about the pharmaceutical industry as a 
whole. From here, I will examine the structure of the industry based on two paradigms 
that focus on the relationship between agents in the industry – Averitt’s dual economy 
in conjunction with Galbraith’s concept of the technostructure, and Munkirs’ theory of 
centralized private sector planning (Galbraith 1967; Averitt 1968; Munkirs 1985). In 
each of these theories, there is a separation between what might be labeled as the 
“core” of the industry, which directs the course of action, and the periphery or 
                                                        
13 Data on these basic measurements comes from the St. Louis Federal Reserve 
Economic Database (FRED) and the U.S. Economic Census. Data on the number of firms, 
concentration ratios, and Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices were taken at the four-digit SIC 
code prior to 1992 and the four digit NAICS code from 1992 forward. Herfindahl-
Hirschman Indices were calculated using the 50 largest firms in the industry. 
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supporting nexus, which carries out actions as dictated by the core and provides 
support for core activities. This will give a much more detailed understanding as to 
industry structure and the power relations within the industry. 
Concentration in the Pharmaceutical Industry 
 Traditional understandings of market structure begin with a discussion of 
industrial concentration. These views focus on attempting to place industries on the 
perfect competition/monopoly power spectrum. In industries with differentiated 
products, like the pharmaceutical industry, neoclassical economists have traditionally 
used market concentration as a proxy for market power (Waldman & Jensen 2013). The 
rationale behind this is that market concentration is directly related to the ability for an 
individual firm to influence market price and market output. However, there are other 
issues that may influence and generate market power. In the pharmaceutical industry, 
structure is better understood in terms of relationships between members of the 
industry core and a larger group of firms that make up the periphery. In this type of 
structure, economic activity, and more importantly the course of evolution of the 
industry, is largely dictated by the core with the periphery providing supporting 
functions. 
 Since the early 1990s, the pharmaceutical industry has experienced strong 
growth, as seen in Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2. Beginning in 1992 through 2014, the value 
of pharmaceutical manufacturing companies’ inventories has more than tripled, from 
$9.2 billion to $31.2 billion. In terms of the value of manufacturers’ shipments – the 
value of products sold – the industry has also experienced growth, increasing from $6 
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Table 3.2: Pharmaceutical Industry Value of Shipments and Value of Inventories 
(Millions of Dollars, Seasonally Adjusted), 1992-2014  
 
Year Value of Shipments Value of Inventories 
1992  $6,009   $9,153  
1993  $6,367   $9,872  
1994  $6,700   $10,274  
1995  $7,588   $11,320  
1996  $7,987   $11,797  
1997  $8,386   $12,548  
1998  $9,704   $14,127  
1999  $9,278   $15,696  
2000  $11,378   $17,818  
2001  $12,066   $17,093  
2002  $13,050   $17,928  
2003  $12,232   $18,899  
2004  $13,436   $20,786  
2005  $14,027   $21,579  
2006  $14,741   $24,794  
2007  $16,154   $26,403  
2008  $16,894   $26,659  
2009  $16,027   $26,464  
2010  $15,821   $30,193  
2011  $16,795   $29,823  
2012  $15,485   $31,314  
2013  $15,534   $31,327  
2014  $15,012   $31,192  
 
Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve Economic Database (2015)  
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Figure 3.2: Pharmaceutical Industry Value of Shipments and Value of Inventories 
(Millions of Dollars, Seasonally Adjusted), 1992-2014. (St. Louis Federal 
Reserve Economic Database 2015) 
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billion in 1992 to $15 billion in 2014, with a highest value of $16.9 billion in 2008. With 
this high growth, an examination of industry concentration over time should give a 
better understanding of how that growth has been created and distributed.  
There are several ways in which to measure the concentration of an industry14. 
Here, I focus on the number of firms; the concentration ratio at the 4, 8, 20, and 50 firm 
levels; and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, shown in Table 3.3. The first is simply 
counting the number of firms in a given industry. Theoretically, the fewer the number of 
firms in an industry, the more concentrated the industry and vice-versa. Figure 3.3 
shows the number for firms in the Pharmaceutical industry from 1947 to 201215. 
Between 1963 and 1982, the number of companies decreased steadily, before 
increasing rapidly in 1992. The decrease during the 1960s and 1970s reflects the effect 
of the changes in the regulatory structure brought about by the Kefauver-Harris 
amendments. The combination of increased research costs and the conglomerate 
merger wave led to a reduced number of larger, more dominant firms (Greer 1992; 
Chandler 2005). The increase seen in the early 1990s reflects the biotech revolution 
and the wave of entry from small firms that spun off from university departments and 
the privatization of previously public research laboratories (Chandler 2005).  
                                                        
14 Adelman (1951) and Sylos-Labini (1969) discuss different ways to measure 
concentration based on different variables: employees, sales/income, and assets. Based 
on the measurement use, both recognize that there are three general types of 
concentration: technical, which deals with concentration in industrial plants measured 
by the distribution of employees; economic, which deals with the concentration in firms 
measured by the distribution of output; and financial, which deals with concentration 
based on interlocking finances and directories based on the distribution of assets. 
 
15 Data for 1966 and 1970 are unavailable. 
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Table 3.3: Industrial Concentration based on the Number of Companies; 
Concentration Ratio 4, 8, 20, and 50; and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
 
Year 
Number of 
Companies 
CR-4 CR-8 CR-20 CR-50 HHI 
1947 1123 28 44 64 ----- ----- 
1954 1128 25 44 68 ----- ----- 
1958 1064 27 45 73 87 ----- 
1963 944 22 38 72 89 ----- 
1966 ----- 24 41 ----- ----- ----- 
1967 791 24 40 73 90 ----- 
1970 ----- 26 43 ----- ----- ----- 
1972 680 26 44 75 91 ----- 
1977 655 24 43 73 91 ----- 
1982 584 26 42 69 90 318 
1987 640 22 36 65 88 273 
1992 583 26 42 72 90 341 
1997 1428 32.3 47.9 66.6 82.5 446.3 
2002 1444 34 49.1 70.5 83.7 506 
2007 1538 29.5 47.1 68.7 83.8 359.1 
2012 1,680 31.2 44.2 62 80 474 
 
Source: United States Economic Census (Various years, 1947-2012)  
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Figure 3.3: Number of Companies in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1947-2012 (United 
States Economic Census, Various Years 1947-2012) 
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Only looking at the number of firms does not give a completely accurate 
description of industrial concentration. One can picture an industry with many firms, 
but one large, dominant firm that has captured a majority of the market share; in this 
case, the industry may be more concentrated than an industry with fewer firms, but a 
more equally distributed market share. A second, more accurate measure of industrial 
concentration is the concentration ratio16. Figure 3.4 shows the sales concentration 
ratios for the four, eight, 20, and 50 largest firms in the pharmaceutical industry from 
1947 through 201217. Between 1947 and 1987, CR4 and CR8 are fairly stable. However, 
between 1987 and 2012, the industry becomes more concentrated at the top, with the 
CR4 increasing from 22% in 1987 to 31.2% in 2012 and a peak of 34% in 2002. Similar 
results are seen when examining the CR8, which increases from 36% in 1987 to 44.2% 
in 2012, peaking at 49.1% in 2002. CR20 and CR50 both increased from 1987 (65% and 
88%) to 1992 (72% and 90%), but subsequently declined through the 1990s and 2000s 
to below their pre-1987 levels (62% and 80% in 2012). This demonstrates that during 
the time period when the pharmaceutical industry was experiencing the largest number 
of entrants, the overall industry was becoming more concentrated at the top. This 
                                                        
16 Concentration ratios are calculated by taking the market share of the n-largest firms 
in the industry and adding them together: 
 =   


 
 
Where  is the market share of the ith firm. CR-N is calculated by adding together the 
market shares of the n largest firms. 
 
17 Data for the CR20 is unavailable for 1966 and 1970, while data for the CR50 is 
unavailable for 1947, 1954, 1966, and 1970 
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Figure 3.4: Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Concentration Ratios at the 4, 8, 20, and 50 
firm level, 1947-2012 (United States Census, Various Years 1947-2012). 
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reinforces the conclusions found by Orsenigo, Pammolli, and Riccaboni (2003) that new 
entrants reinforce the dominant position of entrenched firms. 
 A similar result is seen when considering the HHI18. Industries with an 
HHI of less than 1,500 are considered competitive, 1,500 to 2,500 are moderately 
concentrated, and over 2,500 are considered highly concentrated. The Justice 
Department and Federal Trade Commission, further, consider any merger that 
increases the HHI by 200 points to significantly affect market power (Federal Trade 
Commission 2010). Figure 3.5 shows the HHI for the pharmaceutical industry. Like the 
CR4 and CR8, this chart shows that between 1987 and 2002, when the industry 
experienced the largest number of entrants, the industry became more concentrated – 
increasing from 273 to 506. There was a slight decline from 2002 to 2007, but 
concentration increased from 2007 through 2012. Still, at no point does the HHI 
surpass 506, so theoretically the industry should be competitive.  
                                                        
18 The HHI corrects a major weakness in the concentration ratio, in that it accounts for 
unequal distribution of market shares. For example, two industries may both have a CR4 
of 80%, but market share in one may be allocated equally – 20% per firm – while the 
other may have one firm with 79% of market share. To correct for this problem, the HHI 
weights each firm’s share, so companies with larger shares will be weighted more 
heavily than those with smaller shares this is done using the formula: 
 
 =  


 
 
Where  is the market share of the ith firm squared. Based on this formula, the largest 
HHI possible is 10,000 in the case of a pure monopoly and zero in the case of perfect 
competition. 
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Figure 3.5: Pharmaceutical Industry Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for the 50 largest 
firms, 1982-2012 (United States Economic Census, Various Years 1982-
2012). 
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One issue with focusing on the HHI and the concentration ratios as absolute 
measures of concentration is the fact that many goods included in these calculations are 
not substitutable. As Waldman and Jensen point out 
Included in this industry are a wide range of therapeutic 
groups such as anasthetics, anticancer agents, antibiotics, 
and cardiovascular hypotensives. Clearly these products 
are not substitutes from the consumer’s point of view… [the 
concentration ratios and HHI] therefore understate actual 
market concentration; the manufacturers of products in 
different therapeutic groups are not truly competitors. 
(2013, p. 94) 
 
Because of the wide range of non-substitutable products, simply looking at baseline 
measures of concentration does not give a good indication of the competitiveness of the 
industry or the industry structure. A better strategy would be to examine structure in 
terms of the nature of relationships between the enterprises to determine which 
companies, if any, have the power to direct the course of action and which companies 
follow these directions and provide support. 
Market Power and Industry Structure 
 When discussing industry structure, understanding the relationship between 
firms is more important than measures of concentration, as it is through these 
relationships that issues of economic power arise. Economic power is defined as “the 
ability of some persons or firms to produce intended effects on others.” (Greer 1992, p. 
94; see also Wong 1979) In other words, it is “a constrained set of conduct option.” 
Greer 1992, p. 94; see also Smith 1981), or the ability of a firm to impose rationing 
transactions on other firms in the industry. 
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 The relationship between market power and industry structure may be seen in 
the relationship between different sectors of the industry. In one conceptualization, 
described here as the Common-conception and seen in Figure 3.6, the focus is on the 
relationship between the government, planning, and entrepreneurial sectors 
(Commons 1950). The planning sector is in charge of large-scale production and 
composes most of the economic activity of a modern economy; this is essentially what 
Galbraith calls the “technostructure”. (1967, p. 60) Much of this sector is, and must be, 
centrally planned due to the degree of technological specialization, interconnectedness 
within the industrial systems, and the need for returns to cover investment outflows 
(Veblen 1904; Galbraith 1967; Munkirs 1985). This does not mean, however, that the 
planning sector is devoid of change; new ideas are delivered to this sector from the 
entrepreneurial sector. In this sector, new products are created and brought to market, 
but whether these products become successful long-term depends upon decisions by 
managers and directors in the planning sector (Galbraith 1967).  
New ideas are developed in one sector, but their development and distribution 
depend upon the decisions of another sector. The planning sector, further, has no 
incentive to introduce new products that may destroy the profitability of the ones the 
currently produce via the process of creative destruction19 (Schumpeter 1942; Munkirs 
& Sturgeon 1985). Therefore, it will attempt to manage the entrepreneurial sector in a  
                                                        
19 This does not include product line extensions, which serve to extend the life of a 
commodity. There is a difference, then, between true invention, which leads to creative 
destruction, and routinized innovation, which reinforces the position of dominant 
capital. The entrepreneurial sector is in charge of the former; the planning sector is in 
charge of the latter (Baumol 2002). 
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Figure 3. 6: Three-Sector Diagram of Industrial Relations  
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way that ensures the entry of new products does not erode their market power. This is 
done through excess capacity, high capital requirements for production, and patent 
licensing agreements to control access to production and distribution networks (Hall & 
Hitch 1939; Acs & Audretsch 1987; Choi 2003; Chein 2008). It is the job of the third 
sector, the government sector, to ensure that the entrepreneurial sector is not 
dominated by the planning sector. This is done in two ways: first, with rules and 
regulations regarding the size and scope of industry, such as anti-trust laws; second by 
providing the entrepreneurial sector with funds and financing to ensure that it can go 
about its business unmolested. The industrial sector, in turn, does not simply accept the 
rules and regulations delivered to them from regulators; they work to change those 
rules to suit their own needs via lobbying, campaign finance, and other similar methods. 
The government sector, then, is just as likely as the entrepreneurial sector to be 
captured by the planning sector. 
 When the planning sector is large, centrally planned production takes over the 
entrepreneurial sector and innovation also becomes centrally planned. This is seen in 
the R&D budgets of firms, which are designed to extend the life of products (Baumol 
2002). As Pearce (2006) explains, with the existence of patent monopolies, firms’ R&D 
budgets are structured in a way to ensure the firm will maintain their dominance after 
patent expiration. This is done by focusing energies into pre-emptively launching 
generic productsto gain a first-mover advantage in the generic market; layering 
innovations by tweaking the product and re-patenting; and creating product line 
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extensions so that consumers are switched to the new – patented – version of the 
product prior to the creation of generics for the old. 
 This type of shift has been shown in research on centralized private sector 
planning (Munkirs 1983, 1985; Sturgeon 1983; Munkirs & Sturgeon 1985; Munkirs & 
Knoedler 1987). With the existence of private sector planning, the economic activity of 
a given country takes the form of a core-periphery relationship. Decisions regarding 
investment, pricing, product development, and other long-term activities that influence 
the course, direction, and evolution of economic activity are made by a core group of 
firms while these actions are carried out by a group of enterprises that compose the 
supporting nexus (Lee 2009). Put another way, this represents the creation of the 
transnational corporation with its special purpose entities, as discussed in the previous 
chapter. 
 The core-nexus resulting from centralized private sector planning may be 
thought of as the diagram shown in Figure 3.7. Government rules and regulations form 
an action space within which industrial activity may occur. However, these rules and 
regulations are in part determined by the industry as a whole via feedbacks. At the 
center is a central planning core group of firms that direct the activities of the entire 
industry. This is done directly through interlocking boards of directors, stock 
ownership, and debt ownership as shown by Munkirs (1985) in the most direct form of 
centralized private sector planning, or indirectly through control of networks or 
production and distribution. The ability for periphery firms to gain access to markets, 
then, is regulated by the demands and requirements of the core (Fligstein 1996, 2001; 
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Figure 3.7: A Core-Nexus Diagram of Industrial Relations  
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Chandler 2005; Gagnon 2009). Orsenigo, Pammolli, and Riccaboni’s (2001) study of 
technological change in the pharmaceutical industry found that the development of new 
drugs, rather than lead to changing power dynamics in the core, reinforced the 
dominant position of core firms, as the smaller, entrepreneurial firms depended upon 
the financing, production, and distribution capabilities of these central firms. This fits 
with the results found by Acs and Audretsch (1987), which showed that innovation in 
industries with high barriers to entry due to capital intensity did not lead to the erosion 
of dominant market shares qua creative destruction, but rather reinforce the position of 
dominant firm. 
 So, to understand the pharmaceutical industry in terms of structure, the first 
step is to identify the core of the industry. These are the firms whose actions and 
decisions are responsible for maintaining the industry as a going concern. The ability 
for the industry to reproduce itself as a going concern, then, depends upon the ability 
for the core to reproduce itself (Jo & Henry 2015). 
The Pharmaceutical Core 
 To determine which firms compose the core of the pharmaceutical industry, I 
begin with the largest firms. As Greer points out, “firm size is, in general, a major power 
source.” (1992, p. 94) So, firms with market power are likely going to be large 
themselves. 
 Table 3.4 lists the pharmaceutical companies listed in the FT Global 500 and the 
Fortune 500. However, there are several issues with simply using size as determination 
of the core. Recall that to have market power, a firm must be able to influence the  
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Table 3.4: Largest Pharmaceutical Companies, Globally 
Company Country FT Global 
Rank 
Market Cap. 
(Million $) 
Fortune 
Ranking 
Revenues 
(Million $) 
Johnson & 
Johnson 
US 6 277,828.20 39 71,312 
Roche Switzerland 9 258,542.10 ----- ----- 
Novartis Switzerland 14 229,770.40 ----- ----- 
Pfizer US 19 205,359.90 48 53,785 
Merck US 33 166,938.90 65 44,033 
Sanofi France 40 138,132.80 ----- ----- 
GlaxoSmithKline UK 45 128,915.80 ----- ----- 
Gilead Sciences US 60 108,972.20 250 11,202 
Novo Nordisk Denmark 68 100,804.40 ----- ----- 
Amgen US 80 93,122.50 154 18,676 
Bristol Myers 
Squibb 
US 93 86,079.70 176 16,385 
AbbVie US 97 82,036.90 152 18,790 
AstraZeneca UK 98 81,492.60 ----- ----- 
Biogen Idec US 115 72,305.70 375 6,932 
Eli Lilly US 132 65,908.80 129 23,113 
Abbott 
Laboratories 
US 157 59,423.60 ----- ----- 
Celgene US 166 56,680.40 401 6,494 
Teva 
Pharmaceuticals 
Israel 202 48,971.50 ----- ----- 
Valeant 
Pharmaceuticals 
Canada 226 44,125.80 ----- ----- 
Takeda 
Pharmaceuticals 
Japan 271 37,511.40 ----- ----- 
Allergan US 277 37,119.40 408 6,415 
Actavis US 285 35,919.70 ----- ----- 
CSL Australia 341 31,178.80 ----- ----- 
Alexion 
Pharmaceuticals 
US 354 30,095.90 ----- ----- 
Regeneron 
Pharmaceuticals 
US 364 29,399.80 ----- ----- 
Shire UK 375 28,866.90 ----- ----- 
Astellas 
Pharmaceuticals 
Japan 408 27,155.60 ----- ----- 
Forest 
Laboratories 
US 443 25,001.60 ----- ----- 
Mylan Inc. US ----- ----- 377 6,909 
Source: Fortune; Financial Times (2014)  
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conduct of other firms. Therefore, this list must be altered to identify which firms are 
large and have market power, and which firms are simply large. This is done using 
Chandler’s concept of "learned organizational capabilities”:  
In market economies, the competitive strengths of 
industrial firms rest on learned organizational 
capabilities… The capabilities are product related in terms 
of technologies used and markets served. These product-
related capabilities, moreover, are learned and embodied in 
an organizational setting: individuals come and go, but the 
organization remains. Thus, in modern industrial 
economies, the large enterprise performs its critical role in 
the evolution of industries not merely as a unit carrying out 
transactions on the basis of flows of information, but more 
important as a creator and repository of product-related 
embedded organizational knowledge. (Chandler 2005, p. 6) 
 
There are three main types of learned organizational capabilities: technological, or can 
the firm conduct its own research and product discover; functional, or can the firm 
develop, commercialize, manufacture, and market the product to a global consumer 
base; and managerial, or can the firm manage a multiproduct company. Companies that 
do not have all three of these are not included in the core20. Gagnon (2009, 2014) uses 
this concept to identify a core of 15 pharmaceutical firms. In Table 3.5, I update 
Gagnon’s core to include updated information. The main change is the removal of 
Abbott Laboratories and the inclusion of Novo Nordisk.  
                                                        
20 For example, Takeda and Shire require aid from larger firms to sell their drugs 
overseas, and biotechnology companies like CSL, Biogen, and Celgene require aid to get 
their products through FDA approval and marketing; these companies lack the 
functional capabilities to be a part of the core. Other companies, like Teva and Mylan, 
focus primarily on generics, while still others – like Alexion – focus on niche products. 
These companies lack the technological capabilities to be a part of the core. 
 
 
 
 
122
The Pharmaceutical Industry’s Performance 
Within the third degree of separation, an efficient enterprise is not one that can produce 
the most output, but the one that can generate the largest earning capacity. Enterprises 
seek to gain differential advantages that allow them to swell their earning capacity 
relative to other firms in the same industry and relative to other industries in general 
(Veblen 1904). Companies may obtain differential advantages through increasing 
differential breadth or differential depth (Nitzan & Bichler 2009). Differential breadth 
refers to increasing the scale of business faster than industry average through 
greenfield investment that adds productive capacity – called external breadth – or 
through mergers and acquisitions21 - called internal breadth. Differential depth, 
alternatively, refers to increasing earnings faster than average without increasing 
capacity. This, too, may be done externally, through stagflation in which enterprises 
increase prices without a change in productive capacity, or internally – through 
increases in the profit markup without an underlying change in costs. Goodwill and 
patents allow a firm to achieve differential depth by allowing the enterprise to sell 
output at higher prices than normal, allowing inputs to be obtained cheaper than 
average and protecting the technology used to produce output. This grants a differential 
advantages by allowing the enterprise to produce cheaper than competitors or reduce 
competition (Commons 1924; Levitas & McFayden 2009).  
                                                        
21 Nitzan and Bichler argue that mergers and acquisitions are more common for three 
reasons: “it directly increases differential breadth; it indirectly helps to protect and 
possibly boost differential depth…; and it reduces differential risk.” (2009, p. 330) 
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Table 3.5: Core of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 2014 
 
Company Country Global Rank in 
Terms of 
Capitalized Value 
Capitalized Value 
(Million $) 
Johnson & 
Johnson 
United States 6 277,828.20 
Roche Switzerland 9 258,542.10 
Novartis Switzerland 14 229,770.40 
Pfizer United States 19 205,359.90 
Merck United States 33 166,938.90 
Sanofi France 40 138,132.80 
GlaxoSmithKline United Kingdom 45 128,915.80 
Bayer Germany 57 112,126.20 
Gilead Sciences United States 60 108,972.20 
Novo Nordisk Denmark 68 100,804.40 
Amgen United States 80 93,122.50 
Bristol Myers 
Squibb 
United States 93 86,079.70 
AbbVie United States 97 82,036.90 
AstraZeneca United Kingdom 98 81,492.60 
Eli Lilly United States 132 65,908.80 
 
Source: Modified from Fortune (2014); Financial Times (2014); Gagnon (2014) 
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Measuring Differential Depth 
 In order to gauge the performance of the pharmaceutical industry in terms of 
pecuniary return, I calculated the rate of profit for the core discussed above between 
1993 and 201422. The core has been somewhat fluid, but for the most part remains 
stable. Table 3.6 shows the firms that were included in this calculation, along with the 
years they were members of the core. For certain firms, notes as to why they entered or 
exited were included. In almost all cases, it should be recognized that firms exited the 
core by merging with or being acquired by other core firms. 
 Of the 23 companies examined, eight were core companies throughout the entire 
time period. These are Johnson & Johnson, Pfizer, Roche, Novartis, Sanofi, Merck, Bayer, 
Novo Nordisk, Bristol Myers Squibb, and Eli Lilly. Two, GlaxoSmithKline and 
AstraZeneca, formed as a result of mergers between other core companies23. The most 
recent exit, Abbott Laboratories, does not constitute a major change in the core as it 
spun off its research pharmaceutical business into its own entity, which explains the 
entrance of AbbVie in 2013. In a similar fashion, Aventis SA was formed when Rhône 
Poulenc and Hoechst AG merged in 1999, but left the core after merging with Sanofi in 
2004. Of the core, only two companies entered during the time period that were not the 
result of mergers; these were first movers in the biotech industry. Amgen entered in 
2000 after 20 years of building its own learning base and following what Chandler 
                                                        
22 Data on profit rates come from Compustat accessed via Wharton Research Data 
Services and the SEC Annual Filings. Data is gathered from 1993-2014. 
 
23 GlaxoSmithKline formed as a result of the merger between Glaxo Wellcome and 
SmithKline Beecham. AstraZeneca formed as a result of the merger between Astra AB 
and Zeneca Group PLC. 
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refers to as the virtuous path of reinvesting profits into the production of new 
pharmaceuticals (Chandler 2005). Gilead 24  followed a similar strategy, taking 
advantage of the royalty payments it received from licensing Tamiflu to Roche to 
engage in profitable acquisitions that allowed it to build its learning base and become 
part of the core in 200825 (Agrawal, Rewwatkar, Kokil, Verma, & Kalra 2010). 
 To measure performance, my focus is on the earning efficiency of the core. This 
is in line with the stated goal of enterprise activity under Money Manager Capitalism 
being the generation of earning capacity (Veblen 1904; Gagnon 2009; Dean 2013; Jo & 
Henry 2015). There are five different measures that can be used to analyze the earning 
capacity of the firm, each consistent with the three degrees of separation. 
 The first is the return on revenue, also known as return on sales. This is the ratio 
of net income to revenue, and effectively shows the firm’s ability to increase its revenue 
relative to its expenses, shown by an increased ROR. In the first degree of separation, 
the firm uses its intangible assets to prevent the community from accessing its own 
stock of knowledge; they are able to engage in bargaining transactions with the 
community, and their profits result from the sale of output. In this degree, the firm’s 
activities are focused on increasing the volume of sales while reducing their expenses, 
                                                        
24 Gilead is currently a first mover in the Hepatitis C market with its drugs Solvadi and 
Harvoni being largely responsible for its $25 Billion in revenue during 2014 (Palmer 
2015). 
 
25 One company of future interest is Valeant Pharmaceuticals. While it is not currently 
part of the core, it was acquired by Biovail in 2010, which gave it the ability to follow a 
different strategy. Rather than conduct its own R&D, it has taken on characteristics of 
an investment bank, engaging in frequent acquisitions and cost cutting to the point 
where it has been dubbed the pharmaceutical version of Berkshire Hathaway (Helfand 
2015; Kishand & Bit 2015).   
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Table 3.6: Pharmaceutical Industry Core, 1993 through 2014 
Firm Years as Core 
Member 
Notes 
Johnson & Johnson 1993-2014  
Pfizer 1993-2014  
Roche 1993-2014  
Novartis 1996-2014 Formed as a result of a merger 
between two chemical companies, 
Ciba Geigy and Sandoz in 1996 
Sanofi 2000-2014 Entered core as a result of merger 
with Synthélabo; Merged with 
Aventis in 2004 
Aventis SA 1999-2003 Formed as result of merger between 
Rhône Poulenc and Hoechst; Merged 
with Sanofi in 2004 
Merck 1993-2014  
GlaxoSmithKline 2000-2014 Result of Merger between Glaxo 
Wellcome and SmithKline Beecham 
Glaxo/Glaxo Wellcome 1993-1999 Glaxo and Wellcome merged in 1995; 
it merged with SmithKline Beecham 
to form GSK in 2000 
SmithKline Beecham 1993-1999 Merged with Glaxo Wellcome to form 
GSK 
Bayer 1993-2014  
Amgen 2000-2014  
Novo Nordisk 1993-2014  
Bristol Myers Squibb 1993-2014  
AbbVie 2013-2014 Spun off by Abbott Laboratories 
Eli Lilly 1993-2014  
AstraZeneca 1999-2014 Formed via merger of Astra AB and 
Zeneca Group PLC 
Astra AB26 1993-1998 Merged with Zeneca Group PLC to 
form AstraZeneca 
Zeneca Group PLC 1993-1998 Merged with Astra AB to form 
AstraZeneca 
Abbott Laboratories 1993-2013 Spun off its pharmaceutical business 
into AbbVie 
Wyeth 1993-2008 Acquired by Pfizer in 2009 
Schering-Plough 1993-2008 Merged with Merck in 2009 
Gilead Sciences 2008-2014  
Source: Modified from Chandler (2005); Gagnon (2009, 2014)  
                                                        
26 Earnings per share were unavailable for Astra AB. 
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so return on revenue offers a good measurement of the firm’s profits resulting from the 
first degree of separation. 
 The second measure is return on assets, also typically referred to as return on 
investment, and measures the ability of the firm to derive profits from its asset base. 
There are three reasons why this is a good measurement for firm’s performance. First, 
in the pharmaceutical industry, R&D expenses may become realized as assets in the 
form of patents and trademarks (Gagnon 2009). Return on assets is a way to measure 
the ability for a firm to use those intangible assets to generate profits. Second, ROA over 
time gives an understanding of the firm’s business strategy with regards to mergers and 
acquisitions, especially if such strategies include the sale and closure of manufacturing 
plants and facilities. These are tangible assets sold to other companies that improve 
ROA by reducing operating expenses and the tangible asset base (Denning 2011; 
Christensen 2011). Finally, and most important, in the second degree of separation, 
business activities emphasize increasing the pecuniary earning capacity by erecting 
barriers to entry. Such barriers can take two forms: productive capacity through 
greenfield investment (Hall & Hitch 1939; Waldman & Jensen 2013) and legal barriers 
to entry through the acquisition of market equities (Hamilton 1943; Dean 2013). Both 
are recognized by the firm as assets – tangible or intangible – so ROA can be thought of 
as the return due to these barriers to entry. 
 The final measurements used here are the stock price, return on equity, and 
earnings per share. First, the stock price represents the value of the incorporeal 
property held by the absentee owner. The New Economy Business Model emphasizes 
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the maximization of shareholder value, and one way to gauge the company’s success in 
this goal is to measure the value of the company’s stock. Second, we can examine the 
return on shareholder’s equity, or the ratio of net income to the company’s shareholder 
equity. This measures the profits generated out of shareholders’ investments. A high 
ROE implies that a firm is able to take the financial investments from shareholders and 
use it to swell their profits. ROE, then, is an essential measure to the owners of the firm 
who wish to see a high return on their equity investments (Lazonick & O’Sullivan 2000; 
Church & Ware 2000; Sheela & Karthikeyan 2012; Waldman & Jensen 2013). Finally, I 
examine earnings per share, which represent the net income of the company 
“generated” by one share of the company. A high EPS represents that each share owned 
by the absentee owner generates more profit for the company; therefore, shareholders 
will, ceteris paribus, prefer a higher EPS. Each of these measurements reflects the 
separation of ownership and control present in the third degree of separation. Owners 
are not concerned with the everyday activity captured by ROR and ROA, but rather their 
return on financial investments (Herman 1981; Moss 1981). The rate of profit that is 
most important to the enterprise in the New Economy Business Model is the return to 
shareholders, measured by stock price, ROE, and EPS. 
 By examining these five measurements it is possible to get an accurate depiction 
of the profits to the industry resulting from each degree of separation. As most of these 
measurements – in particular, EPS – are used to examine industry performance over 
time, I focus on the pattern of performance from 1993 through 2014. The next section 
examines this data, beginning with the first degree of separation and the return on 
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revenue. Summary statistics for all measures may be found in Table 3.7, while Table 3.8 
shows the average profit rates for each company over the time period, weighted by firm 
size, and Table 3.9 shows the yearly average for each measurement. 
Returns in the First Degree: Return on Revenue 
 Figure 3.8 shows the pattern of the return on revenue for the pharmaceutical 
core from 1993 through 2014. Over the time period, the total industry average ROR was 
15.61% with a standard deviation of 6.47%. Recall that ROR represents how well the 
firm is able to generate profit from its sales. A rising ROR represents one of two things: 
either an increase in net income holding expenses constant or a constant net income 
with falling expenses. ROR over the time period has fluctuated, but increased. In 1993, 
ROR was 12.92%, but increased to 18.27% in 2014. The lowest ROR was in 2004 at 
10.85%. The increases seen after were the result of cost-cutting measures by selling of 
portions of business that were not seen as a key area of focus and extensive M&A 
activity that aided in cutting costs. In 2009, there was a consolidation of the core as 
Schering-Plough was acquired by Merck and Wyeth was acquired by Pfizer. This activity 
has continued, with $59.3 billion worth of deals being conducted in 2014 (Fisher & 
Liebman 2015) and M&As becoming the core part of business (Helfand 2015). 
Returns in the Second Degree: Return on Assets 
Figure 3.9 shows the pattern for return on assets for the pharmaceutical core from 
1993 through 2014. Overall, the industry average ROA was 9.84%. Recall that ROA 
represents the ability for a firm to generate profits from its asset base, obtained through 
investment. This investment may be greenfield – increasing productive capacity by 
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Table 3.7: Summary Statistics for Pharmaceutical Core, 1993-2014 
 
Measurement Mean Standard Deviation 
Return on Revenue 15.61% 6.47% 
Return on Assets 9.84% 6.99% 
Stock Price $53.01 $25.81 
Return on Equity 24.29% 24.83% 
Earnings per Share $2.27 $1.69 
 
Source: Wharton Research Data Services (2015)  
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Table 3.8: Average Core Company Profit Rates, 1993-2014 
 
Company ROR ROA 
Stock 
Price ROE EPS 
Abbott 
Laboratories 15.33% 12.34% $47.74 27.12% $2.19 
AbbVie 15.43% 10.29% $59.13 96.87% $1.84 
Amgen 23.14% 13.63% $72.08 21.98% $2.93 
Astra AB 23.51% 18.54% $31.59 26.94% 
AstraZeneca 17.49% 12.89% $47.63 28.19% $3.14 
Zeneca Group 
PLC 10.76% 10.93% $62.27 27.60% $1.24 
Aventis 3.29% 2.37% $66.52 6.66% $0.91 
Bayer AG 5.27% 4.08% $59.85 10.97% $2.74 
Bristol-Myers-
Squibb 18.30% 14.35% $51.67 32.80% $2.40 
Gilead Sciences 35.43% 22.55% $59.20 44.86% $3.46 
Glaxo 21.96% 18.07% $37.55 97.32% $1.64 
GlaxoSmithKline 18.33% 14.41% $46.33 58.44% $2.68 
Johnson & 
Johnson 17.00% 13.73% $69.16 25.18% $3.37 
Eli Lilly 17.58% 11.23% $60.25 26.46% $2.56 
Merck 19.93% 12.21% $56.72 28.65% $2.73 
Novartis 19.16% 9.79% $60.23 16.61% $3.15 
Novo Nordisk 17.93% 16.32% $72.63 25.87% $3.51 
Pfizer 19.74% 10.61% $42.58 22.54% $1.74 
Roche 16.08% 9.24% $77.94 31.00% $3.42 
Sanofi 13.83% 7.74% $40.82 12.71% $1.65 
Schering-Plough 12.82% 12.70% $41.43 28.34% $1.46 
SmithKline 
Beecham 10.73% 10.25% $52.88 52.65% $1.22 
Wyeth 13.33% 8.01% $55.08 20.68% $1.92 
 
Source: Wharton Research Data Services (2015)  
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Table 3.9: Yearly Profit Averages for the Pharmaceutical Core, 1993-2014 
 
Source: Wharton Research Data Services (2015)  
Year ROR ROA 
Stock 
Price ROE EPS 
1993 12.92% 10.16%  $28.73  22.50%  $1.23  
1994 13.81% 9.32%  $31.57  23.04%  $1.53  
1995 14.60% 10.41%  $54.63  39.27%  $1.50  
1996 13.96% 10.71%  $57.70  30.00%  $1.27  
1997 9.99% 9.53%  $67.53  22.85%  $1.41  
1998 15.82% 11.93%  $81.98  28.31%  $2.63  
1999 12.91% 10.30%  $65.34  22.99%  $1.83  
2000 15.38% 12.07%  $70.42  22.94%  $2.23  
2001 16.30% 11.95%  $52.49  28.95%  $1.86  
2002 12.79% 10.41%  $42.63  24.66%  $1.42  
2003 14.04% 8.62%  $48.43  19.20%  $1.57  
2004 10.85% 7.83%  $46.17  17.45%  $1.55  
2005 15.88% 9.46%  $45.10  20.52%  $2.06  
2006 19.76% 11.09%  $51.24  22.22%  $2.71  
2007 17.65% 10.05%  $52.52  21.92%  $3.36  
2008 17.25% 9.86%  $42.96  22.35%  $2.90  
2009 22.13% 9.87%  $43.14  27.76%  $3.33  
2010 14.96% 7.76%  $42.40  20.35%  $2.70  
2011 16.51% 8.66%  $45.60  23.40%  $3.07  
2012 17.55% 8.47%  $54.15  23.52%  $3.18  
2013 20.11% 9.28%  $68.05  25.00%  $3.39  
2014 18.27% 8.75%  $73.48  25.16%  $3.27  
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Figure 3.8: Pharmaceutical Core Return on Revenue, 1993-2014 (Wharton Research 
Data Services 2015) 
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Figure 3.9: Pharmaceutical Core Return on Assets, 1993-2014 (Wharton Research Data 
Service 2015) 
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building new plants and machines – or investments in intangible property – increasing 
control over the joint stock of knowledge. The core’s average ROA has actually slightly 
decreased during the time period, from 10.16% in 1993 to 8.75% in 2014. Similar to 
ROR, ROA was low in 2004 (7.83%), but hit its lowest point in 2010 (7.76%). There are 
several reasons for this decrease. First, the expiration of patents during the 2000s has 
led to increased generic entry, reducing the profitability of existing drugs (Montalban & 
Sakinç 2013). Second, R&D expenses are not considered part of the asset base until the 
patent is generated, and they do not generate income until the patented drug is 
approved by the FDA; if such expenses are not realized in patents that generate net 
income, they reduce ROA (Gagnon 2009). During the mid-2000s, the rate at which new 
drugs were being produced declined (FDA 2016). For example, from 2000 to 2008, 
Pfizer spent $60 billion on R&D but only released nine new drugs, and only four truly 
new drugs, as opposed to product extensions (Elkind & Reingold 2011). Finally, the 
increases from 2004 through 2014 – and the spike in 2009 – reflects the cost-cutting 
and consolidation procedures through M&A. This involves the outsourcing of tangible 
assets to third party producers, a strategy used by high-tech firms as shown by 
Sturgeon (2002). By reducing the quantity of assets, ROA increases and the enterprise 
appears to be more profitable, even if this profitability is not based on the true ability 
for the firm to generate revenue through investments (Christensen 2011; Denning 
2011; Fisher & Liebman 2015). 
 While ROA may have decreased over the time period for several reasons – e.g., 
high R&D costs that do not recognize themselves as valuable assets if the drug does not 
 
 
 
 
136
gain approval and the heavy focus on intangible assets (Gagnon 2009) – the main 
threshold for ROA is approximately 5% (Herciu, Ogrean, & Belascu 2011). So, despite 
performing worse over time in terms of ROA, the core still performs reasonably well 
based on second-degree measures, though the pattern suggests that performance is 
slipping. 
Returns in the Third Degree: Stock Price, Return on Equity, and Earnings Per Share 
 In the third degree of separation, the enterprise is governed in such a way that 
prioritizes generating returns to shareholders. There are three ways in which this can 
be measured. First, the stock price represents the market value of one share of the 
company – a higher stock price, the more value the owner of the share may claim to 
have. Second is return on equity, or the ability to generate profits from shareholders’ 
equity – this shows how well managers use the financial investments of the absentee 
owners to create returns27. The third measurement is earnings per share, which 
measures the profit allocated to each of the company’s shareholders. When discussing 
performance from the perspective of absentee ownership, these measurements 
essential.  
 Figure 3.10 shows the pattern of stock price for the pharmaceutical core from 
1993 through 2014. The industry average stock price over the time period was $53.01 
with a standard deviation of $25.81, however the fluctuations were not as drastic as the 
                                                        
27 This is the performance measurement commonly used by agency theories of 
industrial organization, as “practically, ROE reflects the profitabilyt of the firm by 
measuring the investors’ return.” (Herciu, Ogrean, & Belascu 2011, p. 45; see also 
Lazonick & O’Sullivan 2000; Church & Ware 2000; Sheela & Karthikeyan 2012; 
Waldman & Jensen 2013) 
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Figure 3.10: Pharmaceutical Core Stock Price, 1993-2014 (Wharton Research Data 
Service 2015)  
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summary statistics appear. The chart can be split into four regions: an initial spike from 
1993 through 1998, a sharp decline from 1999 through 2002, a prolonged trough from 
2002 through 2010, and from 2010 onward. From 1994 to 1998, the average core 
company stock price increased from $28.73 to $81.98. This increase was driven by two 
factors. First, expansions in the paths of learning from the biotechnology sector 
increased the perceived value of companies in the high-tech pharmaceutical industry28 
(Chandler 2005). Second, the availability of finance during the fifth merger wave 
allowed core companies to absorb those biotech companies and their intangible assets 
for the purpose of providing access to their networks of production and distribution 
(Black 2000; Sturgeon 2002; Lazonick 2010). Both factors can be seen as related to the 
tech bubble that occurred during this time (Cassidy 2002). After the drop to $42.63 in 
2002 due to the bursting of the tech bubble, stock prices did not begin to recover until 
2010; prior to then, the highest was $52.52 in 2007. However, starting in 2010, the 
average core stock price rose from $42.40 to $73.48 in 2014. Again, there are several 
reasons behind this boom. Cost-cutting measures in the mid-2000s manifested 
themselves in larger net incomes, increasing the market value of the firms (Gagnon 
2014). Further, in response to the “patent cliff” in 2011 and 2012 – when many drugs 
lost patent exclusivity (Nature 2011) – the industry transformed in two ways. First, 
firms altered their strategies from following a blockbuster model to a nichebuster 
model, combining the Orphan Drug Act protections with advancements in the field of 
pharmacogenics. Such drugs, though they treat a smaller portion of the population, have 
                                                        
28 The importance of the tech bubble in driving increases in stock prices in most high-
tech sectors should not go unnoticed (Cassidy 2002). 
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higher expected earnings due to stronger protection and lower R&D costs (Cotê & 
Keating 2012; Gagnon 2015). Second, firms engaged in upstream and horizontal M&A 
activity. During this time, Pfizer acquired Wyeth and King Pharmaceuticals, Merck 
acquired Schering-Plough, and there were several deals between the core and 
supporting nexus – Bristol Myers Squibb purchased Inhibitex, a hepatitis C specialist, 
while Merck, Eli Lilly, and AstraZeneca all acquired or licensed compounds from 
biotechnology companies (Mullin 2012). 
Figure 3.11 shows the return on equity for the core of the industry over the time 
period. The industry average is 24.29% with a standard deviation of 24.83%. Over the 
time period, ROE stays fairly stable, with a spike in 1995 and 1996, driven by Glaxo. 
There is also a dip in 2004 (17.45%), but this recovers to a spike in 2009 (27.76%), as 
seen in other measures. For the most part, however, ROE stays close to its average over 
the time period. Given that the basic guideline for a “good” ROE is 15% (Herciu, Ogrean, 
& Belascu 2011), the core at all points in the time period analyzed was generally 
“efficient” at transforming shareholder’s investment into profits. 
 The final measurement used is earnings per share, which measures the earnings 
a single share of the company returns to its owner; therefore an investor will want as 
high an EPS as possible. To keep shareholders happy in the New Economy Business 
Model, company management will guide the firm with an eye towards increasing EPS 
(Herman 1981; Moss 1981). Figure 3.12 shows the industry EPS, the mean of which was 
$2.27 with a standard deviation of $1.69. Earnings per share increased throughout the 
time period, with spikes in 1998 ($2.63) and 2007 ($3.36). The spike in the early period 
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Figure 3.11: Pharmaceutical Core Return on Equity, 1993-2014 (Wharton Research 
Data Services 2015)  
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Figure 3.12: Pharmaceutical Core Earnings Per Share, 1993-2014 (Wharton Research 
Data Service 2015)  
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coincides with the increasing stock prices seen above, while the increase over this latter 
period coincides with first the moves to cut costs by reducing the amount of tangible 
assets held by the enterprise and, second, the increase in M&A activity in the industry. 
This, combined with the similar patterns of results found when looking only at stock 
price, corroborates the results found by Ravenscraft & Long (2000); Danzon, Epstein, 
and Nicholson (2004); and Montalban and Sakinç (2013), which found that merger 
activity was a quick, if temporary, way to increase returns to shareholders. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 This chapter has given several key insights into the pharmaceutical industry as a 
whole. First, by examining the evolving legal structure, it has shown how the industry 
came to take the core-periphery structure. Government regulations requiring increased 
labeling and FDA approval over drugs led to marketing being focused on doctors rather 
than consumers. The Kefauver-Harris amendments greatly increased the costs of drug 
research and development, while substitution laws and the Hatch-Waxman Act led to an 
increase in the share of generics. Counteracting these restrictions were the Bayh-Dole 
Act, the Orphan Drug Act, and the international TRIPS agreement, which increased 
monopoly protection on drugs and the market power of firms. The industry core, then, 
is composed of that group of firms that has been able to maneuver itself into a position 
where they have the organizational capabilities in the discovery, development, 
production, and distribution of new drugs, allowing them to direct the path of evolution 
for the industry. 
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This is seen in the performance of the industry. As shown by Scherer and Ross (1990), 
Gagnon (2009), and Spitz and Wickham (2012), the pharmaceutical industry has 
enjoyed differential advantages over other industries in terms of profit rates. For 
example, Scherer and Ross found that pharmaceutical enterprises earned 2-3% more 
profits per year than other enterprises between 1976 and 1987, while Spitz and 
Wickham found that pharmaceutical firms earned 3.2 times higher net profit margins 
than non-pharmaceutical firms. Further, when accounting for the high-R&D nature of 
the industry, Spitz and Wickham showed that pharmaceutical enterprises had profits 
that ranged from 2.5 to 3.7 times higher than the average high-R&D enterprise. Another 
striking result in terms of performance is the pattern of profits. Regardless of 
measurement, a clear pattern was found in that return was high in the 1990s before 
falling in the early and mid-2000s, with a valley around 2004. Then, profits began to 
rise again through the late 2000s and early 2010s, with a peak in 2009. 
 As mentioned in this and the previous chapter, mergers and acquisitions are 
important tools for increasing the pecuniary earning capacity in Money Manager 
Capitalism. The next chapter provides a case study of the Pfizer Corporation in terms of 
its M&A conduct. The emphasis will be on the effect that Pfizer’s M&A history has had 
on the structure of its balance sheet and its reliance on intangible assets to remain a 
going concern.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
INTANGIBLE ASSETS AND THE PFIZER CORPORATION: THE IMPORTANCE OF 
MERGERS, ACUQISITIONS, AND STRATEGIC DEALINGS 
 
Introduction 
 In the previous chapter, I discussed the structure of the pharmaceutical industry 
in terms of the core-periphery. The core of the industry is composed of a group of firms 
who, due to their learned organizational capabilities, are able to direct both present and 
future activities within the industry. I then examined the performance of these core 
firms by calculating the rate of return. Each rate showed a pattern, with fairly high 
returns in the 1990s before dropping in the early 2000s, but rising again after 2004. 
 The questions that must now be answered reflect the reasons for the emergence 
of this pattern of profits and this industry structure. This requires an understanding of 
conduct, or how enterprises within the industry behave. “Conduct” is a broad term, and 
can be used to represent activities including, but not limited to, pricing behavior, R&D 
decisions, and merger activity. In this dissertation, the focus is on intangible assets and 
how they have influenced the evolution of the pharmaceutical industry. Intangible 
assets are primarily created in two ways: internally through R&D expenditures, or 
externally by acquisition – e.g., Pfizer’s acquisition of Wyeth gave it both goodwill and 
ownership rights over Wyeth’s patents, brands, and trademarks. 
 The core-periphery structure of the industry has led to a system of drug 
development based on strategic agreements between the core and periphery. Firms in 
the periphery handle much of the discovery and pre-trial research, while the core 
enters when a drug has been approved for testing, usually in stage II or stage III trials. 
 
 
 
 
145
These agreements take the form of cross-licenses, by which the core firm will handle 
the financing for the development and marketing of the drug due to their strong 
functional capabilities. This implies a network effect, in which the industry has become 
broader due to the new entrant, but more centralized, as these new firms reinforce the 
dominance of the core firms (Acs & Audretsch 1987; Orsenigo, Pammolli, & Riccaboni 
2001; Danzon, Nicholson, & Pereira 2003; Danzon, Epstein, & Nicholson 2004). Here, I 
focus on the Pfizer Corporation with regards to its merger and acquisition history and 
the effect that this has had on the structure of their assets. As the data show here, Pfizer 
becomes increasingly reliant on intangible assets over time; not only do intangible 
assets as a percentage of total assets come to make up a larger portion of their total 
assets, but their net tangible assets in the more recent years have gone negative. 
Further, Pfizer’s revenue structure becomes dominated by drugs obtained through 
acquisition, rather than development. This implies that Pfizer’s ability to remain a going 
concern relies upon its ability to acquire intangible assets through merger, acquisition, 
and strategic alliance, rather than internal development.   
 The first part of this chapter reviews the general theoretical issues surrounding 
mergers and acquisitions. A brief summary of the justification for M&As is given to set 
the context for the analysis of the Pfizer Corporation. As will be shown later in the 
chapter, the most common reasoning for Pfizer’s M&As were core-periphery 
speculative agreements – which may be thought of as “new entry deals” – and additions 
to their product pipeline. 
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 I then specifically examine Pfizer’s M&A history. This is done in two subsections: 
the first investigates Pfizer’s history in terms of strategic dealings from its early days as 
a supplier of iodine preparations and citric acid for pharmacists to its rise as a 
dominant firm during World War II and the conglomerate merger wave. The second 
subsection explores Pfizer’s recent M&As as it attempts to re-focus on pharmaceuticals. 
This will give an understanding as to Pfizer’s corporate strategy over time. 
 In general, this history of Pfizer’s conduct is one in which its knowledge in the 
production of chemicals spilled over into pharmaceuticals, allowing it to enter this 
industry through the production of penicillin. However, it diversified beyond its 
knowledge base; rather than using its profits to create new drugs within its 
organizational capabilities, it expanded through acquisition. In doing so, Pfizer was 
unable to take advantage of the technological advancements generated by the 
biotechnology revolution in the 1970s and 1980s. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, it 
divested itself of many unrelated business lines and re-focused on prescription-based 
pharmaceuticals. 
Theoretical Issues of Mergers and Acquisitions 
 The United States has experienced six major merger waves since the passing of 
the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890. The first took place from 1897 through 1903 and 
was composed primarily of horizontal mergers. This wave resulted from a loophole in 
the Sherman Act, which banned collective stock ownership in the form of trusts, but not 
holding companies. The second merger wave took place from 1925 through 1930 and 
was characterized primarily by vertical mergers. Because of increased government 
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regulation with the passage of the Clayton Act in 1914, increasing profits by reducing 
competition through monopoly-creating mergers was no longer a viable option1. Firms 
responded by internalizing costs, leading to the creation of oligopolies during the 
second merger wave. The third merger wave occurred from 1965 through 1969, with 
the Federal Trade Commission recording 2,407 mergers in 1968. These types of 
mergers were primarily conglomerate, as the economic prosperity during this time 
gave firms the resources needed to expand into non-core business areas (Greer 1992). 
The Pfizer Corporation, during this time, branched out of pharmaceuticals into 
chemicals, into specialty minerals and materials and eventually medical equipment. 
 The fourth merger wave occurred during the 1980s as a result of lenient merger 
policy by the Reagan administration. There were two stark differences between this 
merger wave and the ones preceding it. First, while most mergers were friendly, there 
were more hostile takeovers than previously, with the term “corporate raider” 
becoming part of the popular vernacular. Second, debt was more widely used to finance 
these mergers; firms began to take more speculative and Ponzi positions (Minsky 1986; 
Lazonick 2010b). The fifth merger wave began in 1992 and lasted through 2000, with 
the primary focus being cross-border expansion. The sixth, and final thus far, merger 
wave in the United States occurred after the early 2000s recession, spanning from 2003 
to 2008. The wave was driven by the abundance of liquidity during the housing bubble, 
                                                        
1 The purpose of the Clayton Act – among other things – was to close the Sherman 
loophole by banning the acquisition of stock if it would result in monopoly. 
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with a focus on increasing shareholder value (Greer 1992; Minsky & Whalen 1997; 
Black 2000; Sherman et al. 2008; Alexandridis, Mavrovitis, & Travlos 2011). 
 Corporate conduct regarding mergers, acquisitions, and other types of strategic 
alliances, such as cross-licensing agreements, has an important effect on industry 
structure. In the pharmaceutical industry, mergers and acquisitions have been 
fundamental in the creation of the core. For example, GlaxoSmithKline formed as a 
result of a merger between SmithKline Beecham and Glaxo Wellcome – which itself was 
the result of a merger between Glaxo Laboratories and Burroughs Wellcome and 
Company. Aventis SA became part of the core in 1999 when it formed as a result of a 
merger between the pharmaceutical divisions of Rhône Poulenc and Hoechst, and 
eventually merged with Sanofi in 2004 to become Sanofi Aventis2. Sanofi itself, 
meanwhile, became part of the core after merging with Synthélabo in 2000. 
AstraZeneca, meanwhile, formed as a result of the merger between Astra AB and Zeneca 
Group PLC. Wyeth and Schering-Plough were core members that were acquired by 
other core members – Pfizer and Merck respectively. This goes to show that the 
structure of the pharmaceutical industry was created and is maintained through 
mergers, acquisitions, and strategic dealings. Understanding conduct in the 
pharmaceutical industry requires an understanding of mergers and acquisitions. 
 There are six main reasons for mergers and acquisitions discussed here, both 
generally and within the context of the pharmaceutical industry (Greer 1992). The first, 
and most common reason, is economic efficiency. Larger firms are seen as being better 
                                                        
2 The Aventis suffix was dropped in 2011. 
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able to recognize economies of scale and scope, reducing long run average costs. This 
may occur because it becomes cheaper to purchase inputs as a single bulk buyer, 
because larger firms are better able to utilize technologies on a larger scale, or because 
they are able to oust bad managers while giving more power to good managers. While 
this is a nice theoretical reason that fits the neoclassical theory (Stigler 1950), the 
evidence is lacking. Caves (1989) found no evidence that mergers either created value 
or were economically efficient, results that have also been found in similar studies 
(Pearce 1987; Shiller 1987). Further, there was no evidence that companies post-
merger were more efficient due to changes in management (Manne 1965; Fisher 1983), 
nor evidence to support the idea that mergers created efficiency by eliminating poorly 
performing companies (Ravenscraft & Scherer 1987). Research specifically within the 
pharmaceutical industry is of two minds. Within the context of bringing drugs to 
market, Nicholson, Danzon, and McCullough (2002) have found, however, that 
agreements between biotech companies and pharmaceutical companies are more 
successful at bringing drugs to market than individually. This supports earlier findings 
from Lerner and Tsai (2000). However, from a shareholder value perspective, 
Ravenscraft and Long (2000) and Danzon, Epstein, and Nicholson (2004) found that 
such agreements either only created short-term value or did not create value in the first 
place3.  
                                                        
3 The combination of these two results is interesting. Under money manager capitalism, 
where returns to shareholder is of primary interest, it would seem mergers and 
acquisitions do not do what they are supposed to do. However, if we think of such 
acquisitions from a pipeline-filling perspective, rather than a cost-reduction 
perspective, they begin to make sense. Rather than develop the drug, the 
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 The second main justification for mergers and acquisitions is their use as a 
defensive strategy; firms acquire other firms to prevent their own takeover. This 
strategy was common during the fourth merger wave as a means to protect from 
corporate raiders, with Time, Inc. acquiring Warner Communications and Maytag 
acquiring Chicago Pacific Corp. (Roll 1986; Greer 1992). While this is a possible reason 
for mergers – for example, Pfizer’s failed takeover bid of AstraZeneca and its inversion 
with Allergan may have fit this strategy – it is not a common or usual reason (CEPTON 
2014). 
 Other reasons for mergers reflect the need to spread risk and the desire for 
personal aggrandizement of the manager. While these may have been dominant causes 
at one point, they no longer hold true. For example, during the third merger wave, 
Merck and Pfizer both expanded into industries in which they had little to no developed 
organizational capabilities (Chandler 2005). However, recent activity suggests that this 
is no longer the case, as few large pharmaceutical mergers occur outside of the 
pharmaceutical, biotech, and related industries (CEPTON 2014). Personal 
aggrandizement and empire building, further, would be a short-term explanation that 
depends upon the manager at the time (Greer 1992). 
 Based on the discussions in the previous chapter, I find it more likely that 
mergers and acquisitions are undertaken with an eye towards obtaining monopoly 
power in both the immediate term and the long-term. In the immediate term, mergers 
                                                                                                                                                                            
pharmaceutical company has taken the role of an investment bank, financing the R&D 
of the biotech company and acquiring the property rights over the drug once it reaches 
market.  
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and acquisitions grant a differential advantage through control over production and 
distribution networks by creating barriers to entry4 (Greer 1992). Many deals in the 
pharmaceutical industry rest upon the acquisition of future monopoly rights – in this 
way, they are speculative in nature. Deals between the core and the firms that make up 
the supporting nexus are driven by the desire to bring a potential product to market. 
Core firms speculate that the compounds discovered in the nexus will be profitable, so 
they acquire the company or exclusive selling license in exchange for financing the drug 
through development5. 
 Mergers, acquisitions, and strategic alliances can be seen as granting monopoly 
rights in the pharmaceutical industry in two ways. First, the speculative dealings 
between the core and the periphery transfer monopoly rights from the nexus to the 
core firm in exchange for royalty payments and licensing fees (Orsenigo, Pammolli, & 
Riccaboni 2001). Second, previous studies have found that the most common reason for 
horizontal mergers in the pharmaceutical industry is to eliminate gaps in the firm’s 
product pipeline (Ravenscraft & Long 2000; Danzon, Nicholson & Pereira 2003; 
Danzon, Epstein, & Nicholson 2004). Firms that are unable to generate their own 
intangible assets internally acquire them from other firms. Pfizer’s acquisition of Wyeth 
in 2009 and King Pharmaceuticals in 2011 represent this motive, as between 2000 and 
                                                        
4 The tentative merger between Pfizer and Allergan falls under this differential 
advantage reasoning. The merger would allow Pfizer to shift its location to Ireland, 
reducing its corporate income taxes and increasing its profits. 
 
5 This is the strategy taken by Valeant Pharmaceuticals, which has averaged nearly $10 
billion in mergers and acquisitions per year since 2008 (Helfand 2015; Kishand & Bit 
2015). 
 
 
 
 
152
2008, Pfizer only succeeded in getting four truly new drugs approved. With Lipitor, 
their top selling drug, scheduled to go off-patent in 2011, it turned to acquisition, rather 
than internal development. Indeed, Pfizer’s press releases from both acquisitions 
emphasized the importance of pipeline additions in these mergers (Pfizer 2009, 2010). 
 In the next section, I examine Pfizer’s merger and acquisition history, with an 
emphasis on the last 30 years of M&As. In doing so, we can identify which of the M&A 
motives has driven Pfizer.   
Strategic Dealings of the Pfizer Corporation 
 Both the European and American pharmaceutical industries arose 
simultaneously in the 1880s (Chandler 2005). Several factors contributed to this. 
Politically, in Europe, “the unification of imperial Germany and the growth of its 
economy on heavy industry in the Rhine Valley gave chemical and pharmaceutical 
manufacturers scale of operations from which they could dominate European markets.” 
(p. 4) In the United States, it was the development of communications and 
transportation technologies that made mass production in many industries possible. In 
both, new developments in the chemical and biological sciences generated the learning 
bases necessary to produce pharmaceutical drugs. Commercializing the products 
required a way to protect market share, leading to the erection of strong barriers to 
entry. With copying being easier due to scientific advancements, companies moved 
away from trade secrecy and towards patent protection (Kitch 1977; Moser 2013). This 
protection led to the creation of the pharmaceutical core, discussed in the previous 
chapter. 
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A Brief History of the Pfizer Corporation Pre-1985 
 Pfizer’s origins are as a part of the supporting nexus. Established in 1849 by 
Charles Pfizer and Charles Earhart, it focused on producing input chemicals, such as 
iodine preparations, boric tartaric acid, and citric acid used by pharmacists. In 1920, 
Pfizer developed a new way of producing citric acid based on black-bread mold. 
Because this production process was similar to the way in which penicillin mold was 
cultured, Pfizer was able to enter into pharmaceutical production, becoming the leader 
in the United State’s World War II penicillin program. After World War II, Pfizer’s share 
of penicillin production dropped as competitors entered the market. In response, the 
company created the first broad-spectrum antibiotic, Teramycin, which was heavily 
marketed by then-president John McKeen to doctors, hospitals, and in medical journals. 
In 1950, the drug accounted for 25% of Pfizer’s sales. Using the revenue from 
Teramycin, Pfizer engaged in what Chandler refers to as the “virtuous strategy”: it 
reinvested these profits to produce new antibiotics, such as Vibramycin, and entered 
into related fields, like the production of Polio vaccines and treatments for diabetes and 
mental health. Based on McKeen’s agenda, Pfizer also pursued a strategy of growth 
abroad by acquiring subsidiaries in Canada, Mexico, Cuba, Britain, and Belgium; as well 
as building plants in Britain, France, and Japan (Pratt 1985; Stopford 1989; Derdak 
1994; Chandler 2005). 
 As a result of the increased regulation stemming from the Kefauver-Harris 
Amendments, Pfizer began to expand into other areas. Between 1961 and 1964, it 
acquired companies that produced over the counter medications, including Visine eye 
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drops and Coty’s cosmetic and fragrances line. After McKeen’s retirement in 1965, his 
successor, John Powers Jr., began acquiring companies engaged in the production of 
speciality minerals and material, turning Pfizer into a conglomerate. Edmund Pratt Jr. 
continued this trend when he became CEO in 1971, but with an eye towards the 
healthcare industry. Pfizer acquired two medical equipment production companies in 
the 1970s – Howmedica in 1972 and Shirley in 1979 (Pratt 1985; Chandler 2005). 
 There were several downsides to the conglomerate strategy. Because Pfizer was 
allocating much of its financial and managerial resources on companies and 
subsidiaries that were unrelated to pharmaceutical preparations, it was unable to take 
advantage of the new technological advancements in biotech and genetic research that 
birthed the biotechnology sector. While companies like Eli Lilly and Merck focused on 
internally developing drugs using the new rDNA technologies, Pfizer had to license its 
products from elsewhere. Two of its best selling products, Cefoid and Procardia, were 
licensed from Bayer, while it struggled to produce its own treatments. “Only two new 
drugs, Minipress, an antihypertensive, and Feldene, and antinflamatory, were 
developed internally, and Feldene did not enter the market until 1982.” (Chandler 2005, 
p. 190) The lack of new drugs being released and missing out on the biotech revolution 
meant that Pfizer had to refocus to maintain itself as a going concern. 
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Strategic Dealings, Refocus, and Expansion Post-1985 
 Between 1985 and 2014, Pfizer was involved in 110 acquisitions and 81 
divestitures6. The data were subdivided into four sections: 1985 through 1997; 1998 
through 2003; 2004 through 2008; and 2009 through 2014. Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 
show the overall dealings within each section. Table 4.2 and Figures 4.2 and 4.3 track 
the dealings based on what was acquired and divested. There are three categories of 
acquisition and divestiture: company, intangible asset, and tangible asset. “Company” 
refers to the cases in which Pfizer acquired another company or divested an entire 
company/subsidiary. Pfizer’s acquisition of Warner Lambert in 2000 and their 
divestment of Zoetis in 2013 would be included in this category. “Intangible asset” 
includes the acquisition or divestment of a particular product line or joint 
venture/collaboration with another company. Included in this category are transactions 
like Pfizer’s acquisition of SmithKline Beecham’s Fefol and Nucosef in 1998 and their 
collaboration with Neurogen Corp. in 1992. “Tangible asset” refers to transactions 
involving plants, equipment, and buildings; for Pfizer, this was primarily manufacturing 
plants7. 
It is important to note that while I have separated the “company” and “intangible asset” 
categories, most of the company acquisitions were conducted with an eye towards the 
                                                        
6 Data for this section comes from the Mergerstat database. This research includes 
strategic alliances. Data for divestitures is only available from 1988 onwards. 
 
7 I am not keeping track of the dollar value of the mergers and acquisitions, as terms for 
many of these deals – particularly the purchase and sale of assets – are not disclosed. 
Where the term is important, I will make note of it, but otherwise a binary approach is 
taken, i.e. did a merger/acquisition occur.   
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Table 4.1: Pfizer’s Acquisitions and Divestitures, 1985-2014 
 
Year Cluster Acquisitions Divestitures 
1985-1997 38 14 
1998-2003 20 21 
2004-2008 34 27 
2009-2014 18 19 
Totals 110 81 
 
Source: Mergerstat (various years)  
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Figure 4.1: Pfizer’s Acquisitions and Divestitures, 1985-2014 (Mergerstat, various 
years)  
 
 
 
 
158
Table 4.2: Pfizer’s Acquisitions and Divestments by Type, 1985-2014 
Year Cluster Intangible Asset Company Tangible Asset 
 Acquired Divested Acquired Divested Acquired Divested 
1985-1997 18 3 19 10 1 1 
1998-2003 16 14 4 8 0 0 
2004-2008 16 5 17 11 1 11 
2009-2014 6 5 12 3 0 10 
Totals 56 27 52 32 2 22 
 
Source: Mergerstat (various years)  
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Figure 4.2: Pfizer’s Acquisitions by Type, 1985-2014 (Mergerstat, various years) 
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Figure 4.3: Pfizer’s Divestments by Type, 1985-2014 (Mergerstat, various years) 
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intangible property rights held by the acquired company. For example, Pfizer’s 
acquisition of Pharmacia in 2003 was primarily motivated by the acquisition of rights to 
several patented drugs. While tangible assets are included in these deals, the primary 
catalyst for them is the intangible assets that grant the new owner a differential 
advantage. For this reason, though I separate them into unique categories, company 
acquisitions and intangible asset acquisitions may be considered similar in terms of 
motivations. Company divestitures may be seen in a similar way, but the motivation 
here is primarily refocusing. Pfizer’s sale of subsidiaries typically results in the 
relinquishing of control over rights to parts of their business that are not related to 
pharmaceuticals. 
 The four time periods are distinguished by business strategy, which emerges out 
of the data discussed below. Pfizer’s merger and acquisition history will show that 
during the first time period Pfizer ended the conglomeration strategy and began 
refocusing on pharmaceutical research, building their technological capabilities. During 
the second time period, Pfizer’s strategy involved filling its pipeline through acquisition, 
with most divestments mandated by the Federal Trade Commission. The third time 
period may be seen as an extension of the second time period, though includes early 
stages of cost cutting via tangible asset divestment. Data from the final period will show 
a continuation of this trend of divesting tangible assets, with an acquisition strategy 
directed at acquiring companies with already established products. 
 In 1985, Pfizer was still in the conglomerate phase, acquiring American Medical 
Systems. This trend of acquisition continued during the last half of the 1980s; of the 11 
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acquisitions made between 1986 and 1990, none were related to pharmaceutical 
preparations, and only one could be considered part of a related industry: Oral 
Research Laboratories, a producer of consumer healthcare products, which was 
acquired in two purchases in 1987 and 1988. The divestments made, however, show 
Pfizer’s desire to begin winding down its conglomerate activities and refocus on 
research-based pharmaceuticals. Between 1985 and 1992, three of the 10 divestments 
were remotely related to pharmaceuticals and chemicals, but not to the development of 
new pharmaceutical products. Two were product lines falling under the consumer 
healthcare business: Plax Mouthwash8 was sold to Colgate and the Coty Fragrance and 
Cosmetics product line was sold to Benckiser Consumer Products. In 1990, Pfizer sold 
its citric acid business to Archer-Daniels-Midland9. 
 In 1992, Pfizer began to refocus on pharmaceuticals. Between 1992 and 1995, it 
made 20 acquisitions. Nine were agreements with companies to gain access to 
technology to be used for genetic screenings or deals giving Pfizer rights to drugs 
already in development10. In 1995, Pfizer agreed to collaborate with five companies –  
                                                        
8 Pfizer continued to market the product. 
 
9 In 1998, Archer-Daniels-Midland was found guilty of fixing prices in the citric acid 
market (Clarke & Evenett 2003). 
 
10 The remaining agreements included two associated with medical equipment, the 
acquisition of consumer healthcare products from four different companies, and two 
agreements regarding animal health.  
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Immusol, Myco Pharmaceuticals, AEA Technology, Oxford Asymmetry, and Neurogen11 
– to help Pfizer build its learning bases in genetics through the creation of the PfizerGen 
program, a research program specifically designed to target genetic treatments (Glaser 
1995). In exchange for equity purchases, financing, and royalty payments, these 
companies agreed to give Pfizer access to screening technologies or co-develop drugs. 
In 1996, Pfizer made three similar deals with Thompson Medical, Microcide 
Pharmaceuticals, and Catalytica Pharmaceuticals. Each of these agreements were 
directed at the discovery phase of pharmaceutical research. During this time period, 
Pfizer made six divestments – none of which involved the core business. Two were 
medical equipment businesses, while Pfizer also spun off its specialty minerals business 
into Minerals Technology, Inc. 
 The period from 1985 through 1997 can be seen as a time of re-focusing, as 
Pfizer wound down its conglomerate activities and began building its learning base in 
biotechnology with the PfizerGen program. The time period from 1998 through 2003 
continued this trend, though Pfizer made two mega-deals for the purpose of obtaining 
established pharmaceutical products12. Each of the 20 acquisitions made during this 
time period was related to new or established pharmaceuticals, consumer healthcare, 
and animal health. Thirteen of the deals were collaborations or joint-ventures that 
granted Pfizer access to the tools developed by the supporting nexus for the purposes of 
                                                        
11 The Neurogen agreement was an expansion of two previous agreements in 1992 and 
1994 to give Pfizer access to screening technology for potential central nervous system 
drugs. The deal would be renewed again in 1999.  
 
12 An established pharmaceutical product refers to any FDA-approved drug under 
patent and any generic drug. 
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drug discovery. In 1998, Pfizer entered into an agreement with Aventis SA to co-
develop the drug Exubera, an inhalable form of insulin. In 2001 and 2003, Pfizer made 
two other deals related to this agreement, partnering with Metabolex Inc. for insulin 
discovery and licensing Meridica Ltd.’s dry powder inhaler. Pfizer acquired the full 
rights to the drug in 2006, but dropped the product in 2007 after poor sales (Mack 
2007). 
 In 2000, Pfizer acquired Warner Lambert for $90 billion (Langreth 2000). The 
two companies had an existing agreement regarding the blockbuster cholesterol 
medication Lipitor. Parke Davis – a Warner Lambert subsidiary – had developed the 
drug while Pfizer owned the exclusive marketing rights. Pfizer took full control over 
Lipitor, which from the time of acquisition through 2011 when it lost patent protection 
was the world’s top selling drug (Bailey 2015). In 2003, Pfizer acquired the Swedish 
company Pharmacia for $60 billion in stock. The deal gave Pfizer rights to five 
established drugs – Celebrex, Bextra, Xalatan, Camptosar, and Epleronone – and 
provided Pfizer with the organizational capabilities to enter the cancer market13. The 
deal also increased Pfizer’s R&D budget to $7 billion and its share of the pharmaceutical 
market to 11% (Frank & Hensley 2002). 
 During this time, Pfizer made, or was involved in, 22 divestitures. In 1998, it 
continued its refocusing plan by selling two medical equipment businesses – American 
Medical Systems and Howmedica, acquired in 1985 and 1972 – along with its aquarium 
and pond supply business. In 2003, Pfizer also sold its generics business to the South 
                                                        
13 Celebrex was the key to the deal, at that time grossing $3.1 billion in sales. 
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African Tiger Brands Pharmaceuticals. Of the 22 divestments, 13 were mandated by the 
Federal Trade Commission as a result of the acquisitions of Warner Lambert and 
Pharmacia14 (FTC 2000, 2003). Pfizer was required to sell its RID brand of lice 
treatment and return its rights to the lung cancer treatment Tarceva to OSI 
Pharmaceuticals15, while Warner Lambert sold its drugs Celexa and Cognex. For the 
Pharmacia acquisition, Pfizer was required to sell three of its established hormone 
drugs – Estrostep, Leostren, and Femhrt – along with the rights to the overactive 
bladder medication Enablex. Pharmacia was required to sell the rights to several drugs 
it had in development, as well as its Cortaid business. 
 The period from 1998 through 2003 was an extension of the earlier period. 
Pfizer had, for the most part, ended its conglomeration activities and used mergers and 
acquisitions to obtain already established intangible assets and gain access to the 
supporting nexus. This begins to change during the next period. From 2004 through 
2008 is another period of re-focusing, though in a different way. On the acquisition side, 
Pfizer is much more active, making 34 such transactions. Seventeen of the acquisitions 
were company acquisitions, compared to four during the previous period. Rather than 
focus on discovery, many of these acquisitions involved acquiring companies that had 
compounds in the clinical testing phase – Pfizer’s approach during this time was to 
replenish its product pipeline through acquisition, rather than internal development. 
                                                        
14 I include divestments made by all parties involved here – Pfizer, Pharmacia and 
Warner Lambert – as such deals are unlikely to have occurred without the merger. 
 
15 OSI Pharmaceuticals and Pfizer were co-developing the drug. 
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 In 2004, Pfizer acquired Esperion Pharmaceuticals. Esperion was developing a 
cholesterol medication – torcetrapib – that Pfizer had hoped would replace Lipitor once 
it went off patent. However, the drug failed to pass Stage III clinical trials, and Pfizer 
sold Esperion in 2008 as a result (Harper 2008). Pfizer also acquired two companies in 
2005 – Idun Pharmaceuticals and Vicurion Pharmaceuticals – for the sole purpose of 
filling its pipeline: Vicurion’s drugs Eraxis and Zevan replaced the antifungal Diflucan, 
which lost patent exclusivity in 2004, while Idun had patents covering 150 different 
targets, new chemical entities, screening assays, diagnostics, and antibodies ready for 
development. This trend continued in 2006 when Pfizer acquired Schwarz Pharma AG 
and PowderMed to obtain the rights to the overactive bladder treatment fesoterodine 
and to gain access to the vaccine market. In 2008, Pfizer acquired three companies that 
had compounds in clinical testing: CovX Biotherapeutics had three early stage 
compounds, one for diabetes and two for oncology; Encysive Pharmaceuticals Inc., 
which was acquired to obtain the rights to Thelin, a pulmonary arterial hypertension 
treatment; and Serenex Inc., which had developed the compound SNX-5422, a Stage I 
clinical trial candidate in oncology. 
 Pfizer’s divestment strategy, while reinforcing its focus on research based 
prescription pharmaceuticals, also represents the beginning of their emphasis on 
intangible assets over tangible. That is to say, Pfizer’s re-focusing represents an effort to 
accumulate intangible assets and outsource its production activities. Of the 11 company 
divestments made in 2004 and 2005, three were related to their core prescription 
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pharmaceutical business, and each was focused on generic products16. During these two 
years, Pfizer also sold several manufacturing plants to Warner Chilcott and Fareva SA, 
as well as a research and development center. The deal with Fareva is notable because 
later sales of plants would be of a similar characteristic: while Fareva assumed 
ownership of the plants, they agreed to continue to produce medications for Pfizer in a 
sub-contracting type of deal17. Similar agreements were made with Nichol’s Primal and 
Kemwell Internationall in 2006 – Pfizer sold the plant, but the buyers agreed to 
continue to produce drugs for Pfizer. During 2006, Pfizer also divested itself of its 
consumer healthcare business, selling to Johnson & Johnson18. In 2007, Pfizer continued 
production outsourcing, selling plants to Abraxis BioSciences, Nihon Generic Co. Ltd., 
and Kaeta Pharmaceuticals, as well as a 3rd party manufacturing business to Fareva SA. 
In 2008, Pfizer not only sold manufacturing facilities to Actavis and Hovione, it also sold 
a research laboratory to the University of Michigan, reducing its ability to internally 
develop pharmaceuticals. Pfizer also spun off two companies focused on developing 
new pharmaceuticals: Esperion, as mentioned above, after torcetrapib failed to pass 
Stage III approval; and RaQualia Pharmaceuticals, a Japanese research and development 
laboratory that formed its own independent enterprise. 
                                                        
16 The other divestments were in the areas of consumer healthcare, animal health, and 
medical equipment. 
 
17 This outsourcing of manufacturing activities to third parties has come to be a 
common occurrence in high-tech industries. Sturgeon (2002) refers to these as modular 
production networks. 
 
18 As part of the deal, Pfizer was required by the Federal Trade Commission to sell its 
Cortizone, Unisom, and Balmex product lines to Chattem; and Johnson & Johnson was 
required to sell its Zantax H-2 product line to Boehringer (FTC 2006). 
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 From 2009 through 2014, the strategy of cutting costs by divesting tangible 
assets became dominant. Further, Pfizer shifted its acquisition strategy from acquiring 
companies with drugs in development to acquiring companies with already established 
products. Of the 18 acquisitions made during this time, 15 were company or intangible 
asset acquisitions, with nine including established pharmaceuticals. The biggest 
acquisition during this time was the 2009 purchase of Wyeth for $68 billion, motivated 
by the threat of the patent cliff ( 2009). From 2009 through 2014, fourteen of Pfizer’s 
drugs were scheduled to lose patent protection without internally developed 
replacements19. The acquisition of Wyeth helped alleviate this threat by adding 
Prevnar, a treatment for childhood infections, and Enebrel, a rheumatoid arthritis 
treatment, as well as giving Pfizer a stronger learning base in vaccines. Similarly, Pfizer 
acquired Axxordia Ltd. for its treatments for heart disease, liver failure, Parkinson’s, 
and multiple sclerosis. In 2010, Pfizer continued to gain intangible assets through 
acquisition, but also expanded into the rare disease/niche market. The acquisition of 
FoldRX gave Pfizer an entry into the rare disease/niche industry through the 
transthyretin amyloid polyneuropathy drug Tafamandis, while it also acquired 16 niche 
abbreviated new drug applications from Akron Inc. 
 In 2011, four of Pfizer’s five acquisitions were to replenish its pipeline: it 
acquired Ferrosan SA’s consumer healthcare business, Icagen Pharmaceuticals for their 
pain medications, and Excalliard Pharmaceuticals after successful Stage II clinical tests 
for their anti-fibrotic antisense drug EXC 001. Pfizer also made a major acquisition in 
                                                        
19 Between 2000 and 2008, Pfizer released four new molecular entities: Argatroban in 
2000, Geodon in 2001, Relpax in 2002, and Toviaz in 2008 (FDA 2015).  
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purchasing King Pharmaceuticals for $3.6 billion, enhancing Pfizer’s presence in the 
pain killer market (Pettypiece & Larkin, 2010). The targets of this acquisition were five 
different drugs: the morphine pill Embeda; the non-narcotic Flector pain patch; 
Thrombin JMI; Levoxyl; and the in-development Remoxy, being co-developed with Pain 
Therapeutics. Remoxy had previously failed to obtain approval while owned by King. 
Pfizer resubmitted the drug to the FDA twice, once in 2011 after acquiring it and once 
again in 2013, but was rejected both times. After the second rejection, Pfizer returned 
its rights to the drug to Pain Therapeutics in October of 2014 (Carroll 2014). 
 In 2012, Pfizer acquired NextWave Pharmaceuticals for the rights to the ADHD 
treatment Quillivant XR, and in 2014 acquired InnoPharma and Baxter International. 
From InnoPharma, Pfizer acquired 10 approved generic products, 19 pipeline products, 
and 30 injectable ophthalmic products in development. The key to the Baxter 
acquisition was the vaccine unit, which included the meningitis vaccine NeisVac-C and 
the encephalitis vaccine FSME-IMMUN. This capped off a period of company 
acquisitions, primarily for the purpose of filling Pfizer’s pipeline and expanding its 
intangible asset base. 
 On the divestment side, Pfizer’s outsourcing strategy continued. Of the 18 
divestments made, ten were sales of plants, research sites, and other tangible assets 
while seven were sales of non-core businesses. In 2009, Pfizer sold plants in Latina, 
Italy and Frankfurt, Germany to Haupt Pharmaceuticals and MannKing Corp.20 
                                                        
20 The plant sold to MannKing was centered on insulin production, and its sale was 
related to the failure of Exubera. In 2014, MannKind Corp. received approval for their 
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respectively, the former agreeing to continue to manufacture antibiotics for Pfizer. As 
part of the acquisition of Wyeth, the FTC mandated that Pfizer sell half of Wyeth’s Fort 
Dodge animal health business to Boehringer Ingelheim GmbH. These mandates 
continued in 2010, when Pfizer was required to sell parts of its animal health business 
to VrBac S.A. by the FTC, Elanco Animal21 by European regulators, and Harbin 
Pharmaceutical group by the Anti-Trust Bureau of China’s Ministry of Competition (FTC 
2009; Kwok 2010). In 2011, Pfizer continued the outsourcing strategy by selling 
manufacturing plants to Amgen, KKR&Co., BioMarin, and Fareva SA. Amgen and Fareva 
agreed to continue to produce output for Pfizer while proceeds from the KKR&Co. deal 
were used to repurchase outstanding shares. From 2012 through 2014, Pfizer engaged 
in five divestments – three were sales of plants and production sites, which included 
subcontracting deals, while Pfizer also sold its nutrition business to Nestle and spun off 
its animal health business into a separate company, Zoetis. 
 Finally, it is also worth mentioning Pfizer’s stock buybacks. Stock buybacks are a 
tool used by enterprises to reduce the number of shares outstanding of the company 
and increase the price of the stock. This is important within the New Economy Business 
Model, as it increases the earnings per share for owners. Further, when a company 
chooses to buy back its stock, it is choosing not to use those financial resources in the 
production of output. A stock buyback is a pure third degree tool used to increase 
shareholder value without affecting any of the day-to-day operations of the going plant 
                                                                                                                                                                            
own inhalable insulin product, Afrezza, which was released in 2015. Like Exubera, it has 
performed poorly, prompting the CEO to step down (Mittelman 2015). 
 
21 Elanco Animal is a subsidiary of Eli Lilly. 
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or the productive ability of the enterprise as a whole. From 1991 through 2014, Pfizer 
authorized or completed 16 stock buybacks for a total of over $103 billion, with $41 
billion being authorized between 2011 and 2014. Several important buybacks include 
$169.3 million in 1994, as these shares were used as currency to acquire the medical 
equipment company Namic USA Corp.; $17 billion in 2005 which occurred with Johnson 
& Johnson’s acquisition of Pfizer’s consumer healthcare business; $10 billion in 2012, 
with some of the funds being raised from the sale of manufacturing plants; and an $11 
billion authorization after Pfizer’s failed bid to acquire AstraZeneca in the spring of 
2014 – rather than repurpose those funds for R&D, Pfizer’s strategy was to increase 
shareholder value through stock buybacks. 
Final Thoughts on Pfizer’s M&A History 
 Pfizer’s corporate history, as seen here, fits within the framework described in 
the second chapter. As noted by Serfatti (2008), Lazonick (2008, 2010), and Dean 
(2013), the business enterprise within the New Economy Business Model takes the 
form of a transnational corporation. Rationing transactions imposed on the enterprise 
by absentee owners set the parameters within which the enterprise may act, and these 
actions are typically carried on by subsidiaries, or the locus of intangible assets. As seen 
in this history, Pfizer begins as a member of the supporting nexus – in a going-plant 
type role – but through the development of learning bases in antibiotics and aid from 
the government crash programs during World War II, becomes an entrenched member 
of the industry’s core. It then uses its earnings from its core pharmaceutical business to 
branch to fields in which it did not have established organizational capabilities, such as 
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mining and medical equipment. This stunted Pfizer’s development of learning bases in 
the new fields of biotechnology and enzymology, causing it to fall behind its 
competitors like Merck and Eli Lilly (Chandler 2005). 
 The next section examines the effect that the above history has had on Pfizer’s 
revenue and balance sheet structure. This is done in three ways: First, I examine Pfizer’s 
revenue structure by investigating the sales of its highest earners. In doing so, I 
differentiate between the drugs that Pfizer internally developed and the drugs that it 
acquired, focusing on the sales generated from each over the different time periods. If 
Pfizer is emphasizing the acquisition of intangible assets, rather than the internal 
development of drugs, we should expect to see revenue emanating from drugs acquired 
in the most recent time period to outweigh revenue from drugs that were internally 
developed. Next, I examine the composition of total assets. Over time, we should expect 
intangible assets to take on a more prominent position. Finally, I examine Pfizer’s net 
tangible assets, which should be falling. When taken together, the implication is that 
Pfizer as a going enterprise is dependent upon its monopoly rights qua intangible assets 
to remain solvent rather than its productive capabilities. 
The Accumulation of Intangible Assets 
 The purpose of this section is to examine the impact of Pfizer’s strategic dealings 
on the structure of its sales and its balance sheet. First, I examine Pfizer’s sales in 2014, 
and the drugs that generated over $100 million in sales. The focus will be to see 
whether Pfizer’s sales are due to drugs that it has internally developed, or drugs that it 
has acquired. Next, I examine Pfizer’s intangible assets as a percentage of their total 
 
 
 
 
173
assets. An enterprise with a high intangible asset to total asset ratio is one that is not 
relying on its productive capacity to earn profits, but rather its control over the social 
relations those intangible assets embody. Finally, I examine Pfizer’s net tangible assets. 
Net tangible assets refer to the enterprise’s book value; low or potentially negative net 
tangible assets reflect the reliance upon control over social relations to reproduce the 
enterprise as a going concern. By examining both, then, we can make reasonable claims 
as to the importance of accumulating intangible assets insofar as it pertains to Pfizer’s 
reproducibility. 
Pfizer’s Sale and Revenue Structure 
Table 4. 3 and Figure 4.4 shows Pfizer’s revenues, research and development expenses, 
overhead expenses22, and net income from 1995 through 2014. Revenues increased 
fairly continuously from 1995 through the 2003 acquisition of Pharmacia, with only a 
slight decrease in 2002. From 2004 through 2009, revenues fell from $43.01 billion to 
$36.78 billion. The acquisition of Wyeth in late 2009 temporarily alleviated this 
problem, as revenues rose to $49.39 billion in 2010, but since then, revenues have 
decreased to $33.62 billion, below the pre-merger levels. R&D expenses increase slowly 
from 1995 ($1.44 billion) through 2003 ($5.95 billion) while Pfizer was in its discovery 
stage. However, from then on, are fairly stable until the acquisition of Wyeth increases 
R&D expenses to $6.86 billion in 2010. Following this acquisition, however, R&D has 
fallen to $5.69 below its pre-merger level of $5.77 billion. This implies that in inflation 
adjusted terms, though Pfizer currently spends more on R&D than it did prior to 2003, 
                                                        
22 This includes advertising expenses. 
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Table 4.3: Pfizer’s Revenues, R&D Expenses, Overhead, and Net Income, 1995-
2014 (Millions of 1995 Dollars) 
 
Year Revenues R&D Expenses Overhead Net Income 
1995 10021.00 1442.00 3855.00 1572.00 
1996 11010.10 1639.93 4251.73 1878.51 
1997 11892.99 1833.79 4713.83 2104.86 
1998 12594.26 2119.19 5177.56 3116.02 
1999 14761.91 2528.95 5785.79 2896.08 
2000 26300.49 3944.10 10175.50 3313.57 
2001 27943.36 4198.56 9787.41 6746.11 
2002 27406.44 4381.91 9182.04 7725.92 
2003 37704.41 5950.03 12717.77 3262.46 
2004 43057.39 6300.04 13858.62 9314.78 
2005 41166.89 5973.29 13642.57 6489.39 
2006 37872.61 5949.72 12205.58 15140.12 
2007 37044.45 6188.87 11955.40 6230.95 
2008 36121.46 5942.21 10872.49 6061.13 
2009 36776.19 5769.15 10938.95 6350.10 
2010 49393.26 6856.59 14287.18 6014.54 
2011 48312.47 6529.08 13949.53 7171.81 
2012 41392.00 5522.58 11659.88 10224.14 
2013 35570.49 4604.91 9898.70 15172.49 
2014 33617.91 5688.04 9553.71 6190.90 
 
Source: Pfizer (various years)  
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Figure 4.4: Pfizer’s Revenues, R&D Expenses, Overhead, and Net Income, 1995-2014 
(Pfizer, various years)  
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it has not experienced rising costs as its CEO Ian Read has claimed in justification for 
high pharmaceutical prices (Herper, 2015). 
Table 4.4 and Chart 4.5 show Pfizer’s revenues emanating from drugs grossing over 
$100 million in sales in 201423. Of the $37.67 billion in sales in 2014, $8.01 billion was 
from drugs Pfizer internally developed, $26.977 was from drugs Pfizer acquired, and 
$2.683 billion was from drugs developed as part of a joint venture24. Of the 45 drugs 
grossing over $100 million in sales, only two that were internally developed sold over 
$1 billion in 2014 –Viagara and Norvasc, both of which were approved prior to 1998. 
The emphasis on acquisition of drugs rather than internal development is clear in this 
data; of Pfizer’s 2014 drug sales, $16.554 billion came from drugs that were acquired 
between 2009 and 2014, compared to $410 million from drugs that were internally 
developed over the same time period. The inability for Pfizer to internally develop and 
release new drugs is also clearly seen. Internally developed drugs released after 2004 
account for only $1.081 billion of the 2014 total $37.67 billion in sales. Over this same 
time period, drugs acquired since 2004 accounted for over $21 billion of the total sales. 
These data support the claims from the preceding section that Pfizer is reliant on the 
external acquisition of drugs to maintain itself as a going concern, rather than internal 
development.  
                                                        
23 For a full list of these drugs, their sales, and how they were acquired, please see 
Appendix B. 
 
24 Of this $2.683 billion, $2.061 billion come from sales of Lipitor. 
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Table 4.4: Pfizer’s 2014 Sales From Internally Developed, Acquired, and Joint-
Venture Created Drugs Grossing Over $100 Million Sales in 2014, Based on Year 
of Drug Approval/Acquisition (Millions of 2014 Dollars) 
 
Year of 
Approval/Acquisition 
Internally 
Developed 
Acquisition Joint 
Venture 
Total 
1950-1997 3,153 0 622 3,775 
1998-2003 3,056 5,255 2,061 10,372 
2004-2008 1,391 5,168 0 6,559 
2009-2014 410 16,554 0 16,964 
Total 8,010 26,977 2,683 37,670 
 
Source: Pfizer (2015)  
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Figure 4.5: Pfizer’s 2014 Sales From Internally Developed, Acquired, and Joint Venture 
Created Drugs Grossing over $100 Million in Sales, Based on the Year of 
Approval/Acquisition (Pfizer 2015)  
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Intangible and Tangible Assets 
 Intangible assets can be divided into two categories: definite lived and indefinite 
lived. Indefinite lived intangible assets are those that have no foreseeable limit to the 
cash flow they grant the company; this includes items such as goodwill and trademarks 
(FASB 2001). Definite lived intangible assets, such as patents, do have a foreseeable 
limit due to hard expiration dates25. On a firm’s balance sheet, goodwill is removed from 
the indefinite lived intangible asset category and included as its own section; this is 
calculated as the sum of the differences between the acquisition value and book value of 
acquired companies, less impairment. Goodwill can only increase on the balance sheet, 
then, as a result of acquiring other companies. In the data presented here, I categorize 
intangible assets in three ways: first, total intangible assets, which includes goodwill, 
non-goodwill indefinite lived intangible assets, and definite lived intangible assets26. 
Second, goodwill is considered to be its own category. Finally, total intangible assets are 
included27. Each of these is represented as a percentage of total assets. 
                                                        
25 While trademarks can expire, they can also be continuously renewed. Patents, on the 
other hand, may not be renewed and may only be extended under certain 
circumstances for a predetermined amount of time. This does not prevent the company 
from altering the product and applying for a new patent, but this would be considered a 
different intangible asset. 
 
26 This is for consistency, as prior to 2001 companies were not required to separate 
definite and indefinitely lived intangible assets 
 
27 I use gross intangible assets here, rather than net intangible assets. For accounting 
purposes, intangible assets are amortized over their useful life, which for all intents and 
purposes is the intangible equivalent of depreciation. I use unamortized assets instead 
of amortized, as, from an economic standpoint, the intangible asset does not lose its 
earning capacity over time in the same way a tangible asset does. A monopoly right in 
year one generates the same earning capacity as a monopoly right in year two, whereas 
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 Table 4.5 and Figure 4.6 show Pfizer’s intangible assets as a percentage of total 
assets. The pattern shown here fits with what one would expect given Pfizer’s merger 
and acquisition history. From 1995 through 2002, Pfizer’s intangible assets decrease, 
though there is a slight uptick in 2000 when Warner Lambert is acquired. This period, 
as mentioned, was when Pfizer re-focused on research based pharmaceuticals, building 
their learning bases in biotechnology. The decrease, then, can be seen as part of an 
attempt to internally develop their own pharmaceuticals. More important is the 
diminishing goodwill – goodwill decreased by 47.77% between 1997 and 1998, and 
51.21% between 2001 and 2002. Over the course of the whole period, goodwill fell 
from 20.38% of total assets to 2.59% of total assets, the only important increase being 
in 2000 when Pfizer acquired Warner Lambert. This changes in 2003 when Pfizer 
acquires Pharmacia. All three measures show a spike: total intangible assets become 
51.34% of total assets, up from 5.15%; non-goodwill intangible assets become 32.67% 
of total assets, up from 2.56%; and goodwill becomes 18.67% of total assets, up from 
2.59%. Between 2003 and 2009, intangible assets as a percent of total assets decline 
slightly, but for the most part stay stable. The decline is driven primarily by a decline in 
non-goodwill intangible assets as a percentage of total assets. Goodwill as a percent of 
intangible assets, though it decreases from 2005 to 2006, stays fairly consistent. The 
acquisition of Wyeth in 2009 leads to another spike in intangible assets. Total intangible 
assets increases to 56.37% of total assets, up from 44.54%; non-goodwill intangible 
                                                                                                                                                                            
a machine in year one has less wear and tear than the same machine in year two. Using 
unamortized intangible assets, then, gives a better understanding of the enterprise’s 
accumulation of intangible assets. 
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Table 4.5: Pfizer’s Intangible Assets as a Percentage of Total Assets 
Year Total Intangible 
Assets 
Goodwill Non-Goodwill 
Intangible Assets 
1995 20.80% 10.38% 10.42% 
1996 22.51% 10.49% 12.01% 
1997 19.23% 9.65% 9.59% 
1998 12.62% 5.04% 7.58% 
1999 11.90% 4.34% 7.56% 
2000 13.93% 6.24% 7.69% 
2001 12.56% 5.31% 7.25% 
2002 5.15% 2.59% 2.56% 
2003 51.34% 18.67% 32.67% 
2004 48.69% 18.28% 30.41% 
2005 48.14% 18.85% 29.28% 
2006 45.25% 16.25% 29.00% 
2007 44.38% 16.20% 28.18% 
2008 44.54% 16.54% 28.00% 
2009 56.37% 18.01% 38.36% 
2010 57.95% 19.75% 38.20% 
2011 58.80% 19.90% 38.90% 
2012 57.40% 19.83% 37.57% 
2013 58.09% 19.76% 38.33% 
2014 57.32% 19.51% 37.81% 
 
Source: Pfizer (Various Years)  
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Figure 4.6: Pfizer’s Intangible Assets as a Percentage of Total Assets (Pfizer, various 
years)  
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assets increase to 38.36% of total assets, up from 28.00%; and goodwill increases to 
18.01% of total assets, a slight increase from 16.54%. Increases are seen in 2010 and 
2011 as well, before starting to slowly decrease. The movements in this later period are 
driven almost exclusively by changes in non-goodwill intangible assets. Goodwill as a 
percentage of total assets stays more or less constant from 2010 through 2014. 
 From 1995 through 2014, it should be clear that Pfizer has been accumulating 
intangible assets at the expense of tangible assets. This comes as Pfizer itself has grown 
larger – its total assets in 2014 were $169.3 billion, compared to $12.8 billion in 1995. 
The importance of mega-deals is also seen in this data, as the acquisitions of Pharmacia 
and Wyeth greatly increased the amount of assets held by Pfizer that were intangible. 
Pfizer’s strategy can be seen as one in which acquisitions are primarily driven by the 
addition of intangible assets, which has resulted in an increasing importance of 
intangible assets on the balance sheet. In 2014, intangible assets composed 57.32% of 
total assets, meaning any return on investment is being driven primarily by Pfizer’s 
control over social relations. 
Net Tangible Assets 
 Another measurement that displays the importance of intangible assets is net 
tangible assets. Net tangible assets are calculated by subtracting total liabilities and 
total intangible assets from total assets. Because solvency requires that total assets are 
greater than total liabilities, net tangible assets helps measure the enterprise’s reliance 
on control over social relations qua intangible assets to remain a going concern. Based 
on Pfizer’s merger and acquisition history, one would expect net tangible assets to rise 
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or remain steady in the early period, but begin to fall from 2008 onwards due to the 
increased emphasis on reducing tangible assets through outsourcing of production 
activities combined with the accumulation of intangible assets through merger and 
acquisition. 
Table 4.6 and Figure 4.7 show exactly this. From 1995 through 2002, as Pfizer 
was still in its focus on expanding its research based pharmaceutical business, net 
tangible assets increase from $2.8 billion to $14.8 billion. It drops in 2003 – to $5.6 
billion – as a result of the Pharmacia merger, but then continues to increase until 2006. 
From 2006 through 2008, net tangible assets decreases from $20.5 billion to $13.7 
billion as Pfizer begins to sell off its tangible assets while maintaining its intangible 
property rights. In 2009, net tangible assets becomes negative – dropping to -$14.7 
billion – as a result of the Wyeth acquisition. Unlike the Pharmacia acquisition, where 
net tangible assets were back to their pre-merger levels by 2005, net tangible assets 
never fully recovered. Since 2009, Pfizer’s net tangible assets have been negative; in 
2014, they were -$4 billion. 
These results, too, lend support to the conclusions that emerged out of Pfizer’s 
merger and acquisition history. Over time, Pfizer has emphasized the accumulation of 
intangible assets rather than the maintenance of productive capacity. This has led to a 
reliance on acquiring medications to sell rather than internally developing their own 
intangible assets; intangible assets taking on a greater importance in the structure of 
the balance sheet, rising from 20.8% of total assets in 1995 to 57.32% in 2014; while 
also reducing Pfizer’s book value to the point where it relies on control over the social 
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Table 4.6: Pfizer’s Total Assets, Total Liabilities, and Net Tangible Assets, 1995-
2014 (Millions of 1995 Dollars) 
 
Year Total Assets Total Liabilities Net Tangible 
Assets 
1995 12729.30 7222.70 2858.80 
1996 14283.13 7511.13 3557.39 
1997 14258.47 6713.11 4803.23 
1998 17018.62 8826.40 6045.14 
1999 18743.00 10646.91 5865.96 
2000 29800.82 15504.25 10144.37 
2001 33915.07 18069.33 11586.54 
2002 39244.21 22354.88 14819.44 
2003 97435.89 42885.98 5607.93 
2004 101407.39 45426.88 9240.99 
2005 93885.45 41100.27 11400.78 
2006 90468.02 34597.48 20460.34 
2007 88191.17 38452.23 17696.69 
2008 83129.62 40082.44 13740.01 
2009 156600.86 90087.65 -14651.20 
2010 142051.60 77757.83 -9628.22 
2011 134710.29 75509.33 -9409.56 
2012 130379.24 73063.69 -5712.05 
2013 118674.73 65840.31 -3643.66 
2014 114719.04 66397.49 -4021.54 
 
Source: Pfizer (Various Years)  
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Figure 4.7: Pfizer’s Total Assets, Total Liabilities, and Net Tangible Assets, 1995-2014 
(Pfizer, various years)  
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relations, as discussed in the second chapter, to remain solvent. As a result, Pfizer has 
taken on the characteristic of the transnational corporation described by Serfatti 
(2008). The primary focus is the acquisition of intangible property rights, with the 
actual production activities being secondary; they are outsourced and conducted by 
members of the supporting nexus through cross-licensing and subcontracting 
agreements. The ability for Pfizer to remain a going concern, then, depends upon its 
continual accumulation of differential advantages qua intangible assets. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined Pfizer’s history, beginning with its origins as a nexus 
member producing chemicals for pharmacists and finishing with it as a core company 
reliant upon the acquisition of intangible assets. Over time, Pfizer’s conduct with 
regards to acquisitions and divestitures has changed as well. Upon becoming a member 
of the core post-World War II, it initially branched out very quickly, becoming a 
conglomerate in the 1970s and 1980s. The new lines of business required different 
learning bases and organizational capabilities than chemicals and prescription 
pharmaceuticals, causing Pfizer to miss out on the beginning of the biotech revolution. 
It refocused in the early 1990s by partnering with periphery companies to access the 
new paths of pharmaceutical learning. These periphery companies had property rights 
over screening technologies and strong technological capabilities – they were proficient 
in the research and discovery of new compounds. 
 In the 2000s, Pfizer switched strategies; rather than acquire companies with the 
technological capabilities to aid in the discovery of new molecular entities, Pfizer began 
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acquiring companies with compounds already in development. Using its strong 
functional capabilities to facilitate the development and distribution of 
pharmaceuticals, Pfizer began to accumulate intangible assets and goodwill. Driven by 
the acquisition of Pharmacia in 2003, intangible assets as a percentage of total assets 
increased from 13.93% in 2000 to 48.14% in 2005. These acquisitions were primarily 
speculative in nature, as the compounds acquired still needed to pass through the latest, 
most costly stages of FDA approval. This proved to be difficult, as between 2000 and 
2008, Pfizer only released five new molecular entities. This provoked a change in 
strategy to the acquisition of companies with already established products. Beginning 
with the acquisition of Wyeth in 2009 and continuing through 2014, Pfizer acquired 
companies that had already established products and cut costs by divesting itself of 
tangible assets. The effect was to further increase intangible asset’s share of total assets 
– from 44.54% in 2008 to 57.32% in 2014 – while also reducing its book value and 
making Pfizer more reliant on acquired drugs for sales rather than internally developed 
drugs. Pfizer’s net tangible assets being negative throughout this most recent time 
period reflects its reliance on social control to remain a going concern. 
 Based on this history and these results, the impetus for M&A for Pfizer can be 
seen as the generation and acquisition of intangible assets in the form of monopoly 
rights. Dealings between the core and periphery are – and have been – speculative in 
nature, where Pfizer acquires the distribution rights to the drug in exchange for 
financing clinical trials and royalty payments. Thus, the motivation behind 
pharmaceutical mergers and acquisitions fits within the Veblenian framework. The 
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view is not towards increasing the productive capacity of the enterprise, but the 
pecuniary earning capacity qua accumulation of intangible assets – indeed, this is seen 
as Pfizer has been eschewing its tangible assets while accumulating intangibles, leading 
to a negative book value. In this way, intangible assets function as a type of rent-asset, 
where Pfizer is earning a return to ownership of the rights of the drugs, rather than 
their ability to develop and manufacture new drugs. With the separation of business 
and industry combined with the separation of ownership and control, return to 
shareholders and the ability to generate pecuniary returns becomes the dominant goal 
of the business enterprise. Mergers and acquisitions, then, are the tool by which the 
enterprise acquires patent rights and goodwill that generate the desired returns 
(Veblen 1904; Nitzan 1998, 2001; Nitzan & Bichler 2009). 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
Summary of Results 
 The aim of the preceding chapters has been to examine the nature and function 
of intangible assets as they pertain to the structure, conduct, and financial performance 
of pharmaceutical enterprises. A principal focus of this dissertation was the emergent 
properties of an industrial system, grounded in social relationships, in which issues of 
production, distribution, and control are embedded. Intangible assets are seen as also 
containing emergent properties that regulate the relations between the community and 
its joint stock of knowledge by defining property rights within the production process 
and dictate access to the provisioning system. In developing this framework, I showed 
how the work of important figures in institutional economics – in particular Veblen, 
Ayres, and Commons – has translated to the modern economy and the more recent 
research of Chandler, Lazonick, Serfati, Gagnon, and Dean. 
 The fundamental focus of the second chapter was to understand intangible 
assets within the context of the business enterprise qua going concern. While tangible 
assets were seen as emerging out of the technological relations between a community 
and its joint stock of knowledge, intangible assets emerged out of the relationships 
between community members. In the first degree of separation – the separation of the 
community from its joint stock of knowledge – intangible assets establish bargaining 
transactions between consumers and producers. Access to the provisioning system 
shifted to being dictated by private owners. In the second degree of separation – the 
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internal separation of the business enterprise into the going plant and the going 
business – it was shown that intangible assets instituted rationing transactions that 
limited the number of sellers of a particular product. For an enterprise to survive, it 
needed to ensure that the bargaining transactions in which it engages were undertaken 
at a profitable price. The best way to do this was to limit the number of competing 
sellers. In this way, intangible assets took on two characteristics to increase the earning 
capacity of the business enterprise: they lock the community out of its joint stock of 
knowledge and they dictate competitors’ access to markets through monopoly rights. 
 In the first two degrees of separation, the earning capacity of an enterprise 
depended upon its ability to sell output. Differential advantages were gained through 
acquiring monopoly power and cutting costs faster than competitors. With the creation 
of the joint stock corporation, the enterprise’s earning capacity depended upon its 
ability to expand its asset base and issue incorporeal property. Intangible assets in this 
third degree of separation become the basis for the capitalization of the enterprise as 
they represent pure earning capacity through control over market processes, rather 
than productive capacity. The emphasis on accumulating intangible property rights led 
to the development of Serfati’s Transnational Corporation, which is the dominant form 
of enterprise within money manager capitalism. With the TNC and its subsidiaries, a 
distinction is made between the core of the industry and the periphery, with the core 
dictating the course of action and evolution of the industry and the periphery carrying 
out much of the day-to-day activities for the business enterprise. 
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 This separation between the core and the supporting nexus was further 
investigated in the third and fourth chapter of this dissertation. The primary purpose of 
the third chapter was to investigate the pharmaceutical industry structure, and how the 
core of the industry has performed over time. The impact of federal regulations on 
industry structure became clear. The elixir sulfanilamide tragedy – due to lack of safety 
regulations – led to the creation of the Food and Drug Administration. This, in turn, 
caused pharmaceutical companies to market their products primarily to doctors to 
avoid the new labeling requirements, creating a separation between the consumer of 
the product and the one making the choice of which product would be consumed. 
Further, in the wake of the thalidomide tragedy in the 1950s, Congress passed the 
Kefauver-Harris Amendments, increasing the intensity of regulatory approval. In 
response, pharmaceutical companies focused their energies on creating blockbuster 
drugs, or drugs that could treat a large number of patients. This created a class of 
orphan diseases, or afflictions harming too few patients to be profitable for 
pharmaceutical companies for whom to develop treatments. In response, Congress 
passed the Orphan Drug Act in 1983, providing incentives for this development. 
 Simultaneously, developments in the fields of biotechnology and enzymology 
opened up new paths of research. Much of this research was organized around 
university laboratories that, with changes in legislation due to the Bayh-Dole Act in 
1980 and the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984, were able to form their own biotechnology 
companies as a part of the supporting nexus. From this point forward, rather than 
pharmaceutical companies conduct a majority of research in-house, the preliminary 
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discovery and early stage clinical testing was outsourced to smaller companies. This 
created the modern day structure of the pharmaceutical industry, whereby decisions by 
a central group of companies dictate which products will advance to later stage testing 
and approval and provide financing, while smaller companies provide the new 
compounds, screening technologies, and, in some cases, production capabilities. 
 The existence of intangible assets, either in the form of goodwill or patent rights, 
has helped reinforce this structure. On the one hand, patent rights owned by the 
enterprises in the supporting nexus generate income flows to these companies, which 
can be reinvested for future research. However, intangible assets in the form of, e.g., 
tightly controlled sales networks and high costs of late-stage research makes it difficult 
for such enterprises to become part of the core. Rather than innovation leading to a 
process of creative destruction, it leads to the position of dominant companies being 
strengthened with new entrants. Further, in order to maintain control over the 
industry, the focus of the core becomes the accumulation of intangible assets. This 
allows dominant companies to block research in areas that would compete with their 
already existing products in a tragedy of the anti-commons process, while also allowing 
them to increase their earning capacity, as shown when discussing the performance of 
the core. 
 The primary tools of the dominant pharmaceutical enterprise for increasing 
earning capacity are mergers, acquisitions, and strategic alliances. As the fourth chapter 
has shown in its investigation of the Pfizer Corporation, the fundamental focus in 
Pfizer’s deals was to acquire intangible assets necessary to swell the valuation of the 
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company. In the 1990s, these deals were designed to gain access to screening 
technologies for the discovery phase of pharmaceutical research. As the split between 
the core and the supporting nexus became more pronounced, Pfizer refocused on its 
sales network, acquiring the rights to drugs in later stages of development. Over time, 
as Pfizer’s transactions in the late 1990s and early 2000s failed to produce marketable 
products, the company began to outsource its productive activities, selling 
manufacturing plants and research facilities to third party producers while maintaining 
its intangible assets. From 2009 through 2014, this strategy becomes clearer, as 
acquisitions of Wyeth and King Pharmaceuticals reflected the need to acquire 
established products. As shown, a substantial majority of revenue from Pfizer’s top 
selling drugs in 2014 came from drugs that were acquired, rather than internally 
developed.  
 The effect of this strategy has been the increased importance of intangible assets 
in maintaining Pfizer as a going concern. Intangible assets now compose over half of 
Pfizer’s total assets, while its net tangible assets – the value of the company not dictated 
by its market capitalization – are negative. To prevent insolvency in this later stage of 
enterprise development, then, Pfizer must continue to accumulate intangible assets, 
increasing its earning capacity without increasing its productive capacity. 
Paths for Future Research 
 By emphasizing the importance of intangible assets in the pharmaceutical 
industry, and more specifically, the way in which intangible assets are used to obtain 
and maintain differential advantages for core companies, this dissertation may serve as 
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the base for future research in structure and conduct for the pharmaceutical industry. 
Two clear lines of research emphasize the nature of the relationships between the core 
and periphery and current technological advances that, when viewed within the context 
of existing legal structures, may prevent the greater portion of society from gaining 
access to pharmaceuticals. 
 As stated above, the nature of the core of the pharmaceutical industry is to 
acquire intangible assets from the supporting nexus. This has the effect of turning 
dominant enterprises into quasi-investment banks – providing the financing for 
research and development, as well as marketing approved products. Some companies, 
such as Valeant Pharmaceuticals, have taken this strategy to the extreme, doing very 
little of their own research and engaging in mergers and acquisitions numbering in the 
double digits. Future research into the pharmaceutical industry structure, then, should 
focus on these relationships between the core and the supporting nexus within the 
context of deliveries of research funding and property rights between the two. Policy 
should decide if this is an instrumentally efficient way to structure the pharmaceutical 
industry in terms of the development and production of truly new pharmaceutical 
products that would maintain the community as a whole as a going concern. 
 Technological changes and their effects on the legal structure must be 
investigated. Of key interest here are orphan drug policies and how the advancement of 
research in pharmacogenics will affect the industry. As Gagnon (2015) has already 
noted, the blockbuster model of drug development is dying; rather than firms focusing 
on producing one drug that has a wide reach, they focus on producing niche drugs that 
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fall under orphan policies and then continually reapply for orphan protection once the 
drug loses marketing exclusivity. In this way, the effective life of a drug is no longer 
bound by the life of the patent. Rather, it depends upon the ability for the enterprise to 
obtain different orphan applications on the drug, expanding the value of the intangible 
assets involved in producing the drug and the enterprise’s control over social 
knowledge. 
 Research advances in the area of pharmacogenics has also allowed companies to 
divide diseases into subcategories, each potentially being classified as an orphan 
disease. Pharmacogenics, therefore, has the potential to increase the number of orphan 
diseases, increasing the value of the monopoly rights over those drugs. Orphan drug 
policies are already problematic1, but not revising them in the face of these 
technological developments would be puzzling. The protection provided by orphan 
policies is already stronger than the patent privilege for non-orphan drugs, and prices 
for orphan drugs are much higher as well, effectively pricing out of the market many 
who are suffering from these diseases. Indeed, as Côte and Keating reveal “Orphan drug 
policies have the paradoxical effect of creating new orphan patients!” (2012, p. 1190) 
Future research in public policy should examine how orphan drug laws can be 
rewritten so as to ensure that those who suffer from orphan diseases can access the 
necessary medications.  
                                                        
1 For example, when the first treatments for HIV/AIDS were released, they fell under 
orphan drug protection. However, when the AIDS epidemic hit and the number of 
patients exceeded the orphan disease limits, the protection for these treatments was 
not removed. 
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 From a theoretical perspective, this dissertation has also opened two paths of 
inquiry. First, as Mazzucato (2013) has shown, much of the truly innovative work – the 
creation of brand new knowledge – has been done with public funds. Baumol (2002) 
has also shown that much of the research and development done by private enterprises 
is focused on “routinized innovation” or the adjustments of existing knowledge so that 
it may be further commercialized. From this perspective, then, it seems that much of 
what we typically call “innovation” is the result of government finance and public work. 
However, the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 has allowed this work done with public funds to be 
appropriated by individual enterprises. The risk of innovation has been socialized, but 
the gains have been privatized. Future research should investigate whether changes to 
legal structures are necessary to ensure that the returns to innovation are distributed in 
an instrumentally efficient manner. 
 Second, the nature of the business enterprise within money manager capitalism 
must be revisited. Specifically, if the focus is on maximizing shareholder value, can the 
enterprise be thought of as a going concern? As Jo and henry (2015) have claimed, 
rather than consider the enterprise itself as a going concern, we must consider the 
enterprise the tool through which the capitalist class reproduces its dominant relations: 
“While the existing going concerns die, the capitalist class as a whole survives and 
grows, insofar as new financial instruments, new concerns, new markets, and new 
demands are created.” (p. 43) Dean responds to this claim, adding that with the third 
degree of separation, what has changed is the nature of the hierarchical structure of the 
business enterprise: 
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Once it is understood that the modern business enterprise 
has always consisted of a hierarchy of going concern 
structures, the base of which is the community itself, it 
becomes evident that the paradox of stability for the 
business enterprise exacted at the expense of the stability 
of its lower going concern structures is inherent to this 
form of organization. The foundation of capitalism is 
constructed so, and financialization is only a new accretion 
to the structure. (p. 17) 
 
Both Dean and Jo and Henry, however, lack the accounting nature of intangible assets. 
When a company is acquired, it has not vanished; rather its assets have been 
transferred. The goodwill and appropriated knowledge of the acquired company lives 
on as a balance sheet entry for the acquiring company. In this way, an enterprise that 
has sold itself to another is still a going concern in that the social relationships upon 
which it has capitalized continue to be capitalized upon. It is only when these intangible 
assets have been impaired and revalued to zero – the equivalent of being returned to 
the community – does the entity cease to be going. Future research into the “goingness” 
of the going concern should emphasize the accounting nature of intangible assets. 
Intangible Assets, Industrial Organization, and Industrial Policy 
 In the New Economy Business Model, with the emphasis on maximizing 
shareholder value, intangible assets become a principal focus for the activities of the 
business enterprise. Productive capacity is eschewed in favor of maintaining property 
rights over ideas and control over relations involved in production and distribution. 
Intangible assets may be seen, then, as the means to dominating the system of social 
provisioning. With the development of the Transnational Corporation as the dominant 
owner of such property rights, access to the system of social provisioning is mediated 
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by a small number of large enterprises that control and dictate the course of action for 
the economy as a whole. 
 Any study of industrial organization and any industrial policy proposal, then, 
must include the nature and use of intangible assets in that particular industry. If an 
enterprise’s fundamental focus is on maintaining and expanding its control over 
economic and social relations rather than the accumulation of profits through 
production and sale of output, then return to shareholders as a performance measure 
should not be seen as a measure of allocative efficiency, but as reflecting the scale and 
scope of social control. Minsky (1986), in his analysis of the financial system, explains 
how bad theory can lead to bad policy, culminating in financial instability and 
depression. On a larger scale, bad theories of industrial organization lead to bad 
industrial policy, which threatens the viability of an industrial economy as a whole. A 
good theory of industrial organization is required to make good policy, and a good 
theory of industrial organization emphasizes the importance of intangible assets. 
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APPENDIX A 
THE DRUG APPROVAL PROCESS 
 After the thalidomide tragedy and the passing of the Kefauver-Harris 
Amendments, pharmaceutical companies were required to show both safety and 
efficacy of new drugs, increasing the costs of research. The approval process may be 
considered in six steps, shown in Figure 3.A1. Once a compound has been developed 
into a potential pharmaceutical product, it begins the process. In the first stage, known 
as the discovery or pre-human/pre-clinical stage, firms test compounds for basic safety 
and efficacy, with 21.5% of R&D funds devoted to this stage. Stages two through four 
are grouped together as the three clinical trial phases; this is the most expensive 
portion of R&D, composing 56.9% of funds. In Phase I clinical trials, the drug is tested 
for dosage safety using a small number of participants; increasing doses of the drug are 
given to participants to determine the body’s response and what dosage is safe. This is 
the cheapest portion of the clinical trials, composed of 8.7% of funds. In Phase II clinical 
trials, the drug is tested for biological efficacy in a slightly larger number of 
participants; side effects, effective dosage size, and delivery method are determined in 
this stage, and it composes 12.5% of R&D funds. In Phase III clinical trials, the drug is 
tested in thousands of participants across many locations using double-blind 
experiments for the purpose of determining therapeutic efficacy – does the drug 
actually treat the disease it is supposed to? This is the longest and most expensive stage  
                                                        
1 The European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (2013), using 
data from the PhRMA Annual Membership Survey (2013) estimates the percentage of 
funds devoted to R&D that are used in each stage. These numbers are included here as 
well; 3.5% of R&D funds were unclassified. 
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Figure A.1: The Drug Development Process and Percent of Funds Allocated to Each 
Stage (EFPIA 2013; PhRMA 2013b)  
Pre-Human/Pre-Clinical
• 21.5% of R&D
Clinical Trials
• Phase I Human Trials: 8.7% of R&D
• Phase II Human Trials: 12.5% of R&D
• Phase III Human Trials: 35.7% of R&D
FDA Approval
• 8.3% of R&D
Pharmacovigilance
• Phase IV Human Trials: 9.8% of R&D
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of drug development, requiring 35.7% of R&D funds.  
If a drug passes through the three clinical trial stages, it enters the approval 
stage. During this stage, the FDA reviews the results from the clinical trials and decides 
whether it should be approved for widespread marketing. When a company applies for 
approval, they may do so in one of three ways. A biological license application (BLA) is a 
submission that deals specifically with biological products, or biopharmaceutical. A 
second type of approval application is the Abbreviated New Drug Application, which 
deals specifically with generic products. An ANDA allows a generic applicant to bypass 
the pre-clinical and clinical testing if they can show the generic product is bioequivalent 
– it performs in the same manner as the brand name drug2. The third type of approval – 
a New Drug Application (NDA) – is the most common. In an NDA, companies submit the 
results of clinical trials to the FDA. Once the FDA approves the NDA, the drug may be 
marketed to the public. This leads to the last stage of development, Phase IV trials, or 
the post-market surveillance phase. Companies monitor the safety and efficacy of the 
drug, focusing on finding new areas of treatment in which the drug may be useful, 
leading to product line extensions and follow-on drugs. 
                                                        
2 There is some controversy over using bioequivalence to approve generic products. A 
recent example involves Johnson & Johnson’s ADHD medication Concerta, an extended 
release form of Ritalin. Generic versions were approved based on bioequivalence, but 
the key to Concerta’s efficacy was in the release mechanism that provided symptom 
relief for 12 hours. Generic versions, despite being bioequivalent in that they provided 
the same form of treatment, did not have the same release mechanism and provided 
symptom relief for seven hours. In this case, bioequivalence does not equate to effective 
equivalence (Thomas 2015). 
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APPENDIX B 
PFIZER DRUGS GROSSING OVER $100 MILLION IN SALES IN 2014 
Table B.1 shows Pfizer’s drugs that grossed over $100 million in sales in 2014. 
Included are the value of the drugs’ sales in 2014; whether the drugs were internally 
developed; acquired, or the result of a joint venture; the year the drug was acquired; the 
year the drug was approved by the FDA1; and the originator of the drug.  
                                                        
1 For drugs acquired prior to FDA approval, the importance was on the stage in which 
the drug was acquired. For Lyrica and Sutent, though Pfizer had some hand in their 
development, Warner-Lambert and Pharmacia did the majority of the development 
work. Therefore, I consider these to be acquisitions, rather than internal development. 
For internally developed drugs, acquisition year is left blank.  
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Table B.1: Pfizer’s 2014 Drugs Grossing Over $100 Million In Sales 
Drug Name Sales 
(Millions of 
Dollars) 
How The 
Drug Was 
Acquired 
Year of 
Acquisition 
Year of 
FDA 
Approval 
Origin 
Lyrica2 5,168 Internal 
Development 
2000 2004 Warner-
Lambert 
Prevnar 
Family 
4,464 Acquisition 2009 2010 Wyeth 
Enebrel 3,850 Acquisition 2009 1998 Wyeth 
Celebrex 2,699 Acquisition 2009 1998 Pharmacia 
Lipitor3 2,061 Joint Venture 2000 1996 Warner-
Lambert & 
Pfizer 
Viagra 1,685 Internal 
Development 
1998 1998 Pfizer 
Zyvox 1,352 Acquisition 2003 2000 Pharmacia 
Sutent4 1,174 Acquisition 2003 2006 Pharmacia 
Norvasc 1,112 Internal 
Development 
1997 1997 Pfizer 
Premarin 
Family 
1,076 Acquisition 2009 1982 Wyeth 
BeneFIX 858 Acquisition 2009 1994 Wyeth 
Vfend 756 Internal 
Development 
2002 2002 Pfizer 
Pristiq 737 Acquisition 2009 2007 Wyeth 
Genotropin 723 Acquisition 2003 1995 Pharmacia 
Chantix & 
Campix 
647 Internal 
Development 
2006 2006 Pfizer 
Refacto AF & 
Xyntha 
631 Acquisition 2009 2008 Wyeth 
  
                                                        
2 Lyrica was discovered by Richard Bruce Silverman at Northwestern University and 
licensed to Warner-Lambert’s subsidiary Parke-Davis in 1988. Pfizer acquired the 
rights to the drug when it acquired Warner-Lambert in 2000. 
 
3 Warner-Lambert developed the drug while Pfizer marketed the drug. 
 
4 Pfizer acquired the rights to Sutent when it acquired Pharmacia in 2003. Most of the 
development work was done by the biotech company SUGEN, who was acquired by 
Pharmacia in 1999.  
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Table B.1, Continued 
Drug Name Sales 
(Millions of 
Dollars) 
How The 
Drug Was 
Acquired 
Year of 
Acquisition 
Year of 
FDA 
Approval 
Origin 
Xalatan & 
Salacom 
495 Acquisition 2003 1996 Pharmacia 
Medrol 443 Acquisition 2003 1959 Pharmacia 
Xalkori5 438 Acquisition 2009 2011 PF Prism 
CV 
Zoloft 423 Internal 
Development 
1991 1991 Pfizer 
Inlyta 410 Internal 
Development 
2012 2012 Pfizer 
Relpax 382 Internal 
Development 
2002 2002 Pfizer 
Fragmin 364 Internal 
Development 
1994 1994 Pfizer 
Cefobid 354 Internal 
Development 
2997 1997 Pfizer 
Effexor 344 Acquisition 2009 1993 Wyeth 
Rapmune 339 Acquisition 2009 1999 Wyeth 
Tygacil 323 Acquisition 2009 2005 PF Prism 
CV 
Zithromax & 
Zmax6 
314 Joint Venture 1986 1991 Pilva & 
Pfizer 
Xeljanz7 308 Joint Venture 1996 2012 Pfizer & 
NIH 
Zosyn & 
Tazocin 
303 Acquisition 2009 1993 Wyeth 
EpiPen 294 Acquisition 2010 1987 King  
  
                                                        
5 Pfizer acquired PF Prism CV as part of the Wyeth acquisition. 
 
6 Pilva discovered the drug in 1981 and licensed the drug to Pfizer in 1986. Pilva is now 
owned by Teva Pharmaceuticals.  
 
7 The joint venture began in 1996. Pfizer was approached by the National Institute of 
Health, but did not agree to the venture until NIH policies regarding pricing limits was 
removed.  
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Table B.1, Continued 
Drug Name Sales 
(Millions 
of Dollars) 
How The Drug 
Was Acquired 
Year of 
Acquisition 
Year of 
FDA 
Approval 
Origin 
Toviaz 288 Internal 
Development 
2008 2008 Pfizer 
Revatio8 276 Internal 
Development 
2005 2005 Pfizer 
Cardura 263 Internal 
Development 
1990 1990 Pfizer 
Xanax & 
Xanax XR 
253 Acquisition 2003 1981 Pharmacia 
Inspra9 233 Internal 
Development 
2002 2002 GD Searle 
Somavert 229 Acquisition 2003 2003 Pharmacia 
Diflucan 220 Internal 
Development 
1990 1990 Pfizer 
Neurontin 210 Internal 
Development 
1993 1993 Pfizer 
Unasyn 207 Internal 
Development 
1986 1986 Pfizer 
Detrol/Detrol 
LA 
201 Acquisition 2003 1998 Pharmacia 
Depo-Provera 201 Acquisition 2003 1960 Pharmacia 
Protonix & 
Pantoprazole 
198 Acquisition 2009 2000 Wyeth 
Dalacin & 
Cleocin 
184 Acquisition 2003 1980 Pharmacia 
Caduet 180 Internal 
Development 
2004 2004 Pfizer 
 
Source: Pfizer (2015) 
                                                        
8 This is another form of Viagara. 
 
9 GD Searle is a subsidiary of Pfizer. 
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